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The European Union (EU) is a great 
success story. For more than six decades, 
the European project has generated 
unprecedented levels of freedom, peace, 
prosperity, openness, and stability across 
the continent. European integration has 
shown that we wield far greater influence  
if we cooperate economically and 
politically. But at a time when working 
together is increasingly necessary, trust in 
the wisdom of cooperation is challenged.
There is nothing inevitable about the 
European project. Today, the hard-won 
achievements of European integration are 
taken for granted or are openly questioned, 
while the wider international conditions 
that benefitted the Union’s development 
are fraying. Internal and external 
centrifugal forces are putting European 
integration under pressure. This is why 
the EU cannot afford to stall – muddling 
through clearly entails the risk of losing 
relevance in the global context and in the 
eyes of citizens.
This issue of Challenge Europe – the  
24th edition already – delivers an alternative 
to those who cynically claim that European 
cooperation no longer works and should be 
abandoned. It argues instead that integration 
can still work, and that it is still the best 
answer to the many problems we are now 
facing. We want to remind people of the value 
of European cooperation and offer some 
suggestions on how we can continue to shape 
and improve the project now, so that we are 
better equipped to respond to the underlying 
political, socio-economic, and cultural 
insecurities plaguing Europe, and later down 
the line, to radically re-think the way we 
organise our societies.
Each of the 24 contributions in this 
volume, authored by renowned experts 
and practitioners in their respective 
fields, presents a set of concrete 
recommendations for the next EU 
leadership, both in terms of key priority 
areas – sustainable prosperity, values, 
migration and Schengen, and Europe’s 
place in the world – and on how the EU 
can use the instruments it already has 
at its disposal to act in a more effective, 
transparent, and decisive way.
The volume ends with a call for action 
from the younger generation. Looking 
into the future, participants of the EPC’s 
Younger European Strategy Lab (YES Lab) 
contemplate what Europe should look like 
in 2057. 
Challenge Europe is a multi-authored, 
periodical publication appearing at key 
moments and dealing with key issues in the 
EU integration debate. The papers of this 
volume were concluded in March 2019.
We would like to thank all the authors 
who contributed to this issue, and Mariusz 
Dabek, Myriane Bartholomé, and Maxime 
Bineau, without whom this publication 
would not have been possible. 
A B O U T C H A L L E N G E  E U R O P E
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The European Union (EU) is not alone 
in its struggle to grapple with the major 
headaches of our times. The Western 
world as a whole is affected. Inside the 
Union, the crises in and of its national 
societies and democracies have radiated 
to the EU level. Half of the member states 
have minority governments. If they are 
politically weak in their own countries, 
how can the Union be strong? The EU is, 
after all, also the sum of its member states. 
I am not trying to make excuses for the 
Union. However, no good decision can 
be made based on a wrong reading of 
the current situation. After all, the EU 
institutions, with their new composition 
following the European elections in May 
2019, must work in a context that is 
politically and socio-economically difficult.
There is a great paradox. On the one 
hand, more than ever, many people are 
convinced that major problems such 
as climate change, unemployment, 
migration, economic automatisation and 
growth, terrorism, trade, military security, 
and inequality require a European 
approach. Many of our fellow citizens 
instinctively know that being isolated in 
today’s world is close to being suicidal. 
This certainly applies to small countries 
but also to those in the EU who still think 
they are ‘big’. Never before have people 
so clearly recognised the usefulness of EU 
membership. Support for EU membership 
has never been greater in 35 years, 
especially among youngsters. The years 
of chaos in the United Kingdom (UK) 
after the Brexit referendum have opened 
the eyes of many. It was not even that 
necessary for young people: their eyes 
were already open! 
But on the other hand, paradoxically, 
citizens seem to insist more than some 
time ago on national or even regional 
solutions, because unfettered globalisation 
offers little protection against threats like 
deindustrialisation, financial speculation, 
illegal migration etc., prompting many 
people to fall back on themselves. 
In times of confusion, leadership is needed. 
Striving for ‘more Europe’ is, therefore, a 
matter of leadership, of political courage 
– a scarce commodity in today’s world, 
unfortunately. But leaders have to keep in 
mind that societal support for the European 
project is greater than assumed. 
One must, of course, be realistic and take 
into account the general sense of malaise 
that is plaguing so many societies today, 
including European ones. This is not the 
time for a major European offensive, a 
‘tectonic shift’, a qualitative integration 
jump. Now is the time to re-energise the 
European project and to avoid stagnation. 
The level of ambition must be chosen well. 
High expectations can lead to equally great 
disappointments. There has been enough 
disillusionment since the poly-crises 
erupted in 2010. As is often the case, we 
have to find the balance between ambition 
and realism.
F O R E W O R D
Herman Van Rompuy 
President Emeritus of the European Council, 
President of the European Policy Centre
The newly formed EU leadership (after May 2019) should be 
aware of the possibilities as well as the constraints they have 
to live with. The high expectations created after President 
Macron’s Sorbonne speech have not materialised. One of the 
main reasons is that any new initiative involving financial 
solidarity cannot count on widespread support in Germany. 
The domestic political and social problems in France have 
also put a brake on the country’s European ambitions. The 
new leadership of the EU institutions must take over from 
the Franco-German tandem, however necessary an entente 
among them remains in the euro area.
The challenges for the next EU leaders are determined by 
an agenda that responds to the concerns of a large part of 
the population and that is not only short term in nature. 
The three dominant themes are migration, climate change 
and purchasing power. The latter also includes employment, 
especially now that the economy is slowing down again, in 
Europe and globally as well.
In terms of institutions, this means a further strengthening  
of the eurozone and the Schengen area, as well as a 
deepening and broadening of the Single Market, the three 
pillars of the Union. We know what to do; that is not 
the problem. It is a question of finding a consensus and 
assuming leadership. Of course, the reforms will be gradual, 
but the steps must not be too small!
We also know the global context in which we have to operate: 
a sky-high global private and public debt, even 40% higher in 
relation to global GDP than in 2008, and a migration potential 
of 4 billion people in Africa by the end of the century.
Social issues must be high on the agenda, too. High 
(youth) unemployment in a number of European countries, 
significant and growing inequalities in those same and a 
good number of other countries, the lack of integration of 
migrants into the labour market and society in general; all 
of this is undermining the social cohesion and harmony 
in many member states. It is primarily a competence of 
national governments to master these challenges, but there 
is also a specific European dimension, including the fight 
against international tax fraud and evasion. The absence of a 
social component to many EU policies is one of the reasons 
for the strong rise of populism. Social protection is part of 
the broader protection that governments should be able to 
provide to their citizens.
To achieve greater unity, a consensus must be found on 
migration. The debate is splitting the Union, just as it is 
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will be gradual, but 
the steps must not be 
too small!
splitting the UK and the US. It should, 
therefore, be a priority for the next  
EU leadership.
The renewed institutions must also reach 
an agreement as soon as possible on a 
European budget for the period 2021-2027. 
A budget is the concrete translation of 
your strategy. In the case of a multiannual 
budget, it even constitutes the core of a 
long-term strategy. The proposals put 
forward by the Juncker Commission 
contain a philosophy and a strategy. 
But the proposals have been met with 
resistance because of the clear choices 
they make, e.g. on reducing expenditure 
on agriculture and cohesion to the benefit 
of innovation, investment, migration,  
and other policy domains. Brexit is, of 
course, an additional complicating factor. 
The link between the rule of law and the 
allocation of funds is another bone of 
contention. The institutions must prove 
that they can follow through. It will be 
the first major test in the new politico-
institutional cycle. A failure would be a 
very bad start.
The EU may have to work in a climate of 
economic stagnation in the coming years, 
unless the political problems – the trade 
war(s), Brexit, the internal tensions in 
Italy and France, the economic course in 
China – are resolved at different levels 
of power. This is all the more necessary 
because monetary and budgetary policy 
can hardly play a stimulating role any 
more. Interest rates are already very low. 
Budget deficits will increase as a result of 
the economic downturn, and there will be 
pressure to correct them in the euro area, 
although the threat of even more populism 
will dampen the austerity zeal.
The EU must be less fragmented and  
more united in one more crucial area. 
It must be a ‘Union of values’. The 
instruments for safeguarding fundamental 
public values within the Union must be 
made permanent. Violating them must  
be sanctioned institutionally and 
financially. There can be no Union  
without common values.
The EU institutions will more clearly than 
before bear the markings of the divisions 
between and within member states. Some 
governments will try to send populist 
Commissioners to Brussels, which will 
make decision-making in the Commission 
more difficult. The European Parliament 
will have to deal with a bigger group of 
euro-negative forces, however divided they 
may be among themselves. There will still 
be a constructive pro-European majority 
in the assembly, although it will require 
more than two parties to form a majority. 
The make-up of the European Council 
depends on national elections. During the 
Brexit negotiations, it proved that it was 
still able to take unanimous decisions. But 
migration remains a difficult obstacle for 
them, too.
This time, the distribution of the 
main ‘posts’ in the new EU leadership 
configuration is likely to take place as 
part of a bigger package in which the 
various groups and parties will try to find a 
balance. This will be no easy task.
The EU must take its place in the new 
world order that is emerging, with a 
weaker role for multilateralism, an 
emphasis on nationalism in the US and 
China and with less Western solidarity. In 
this new global landscape, the EU must 
remain the defender of openness, but also 
demand that other global partners respect 
international rules, especially the rule-
based trading system. The EU economy 
should not become too dependent on 
non-European multinational companies, 
especially in strategic sectors and in new 
technologies. Protection is not the same 
as protectionism. The EU should have its 
own industrial and economic strategy and 
make use of the scale offered by the Single 
Market together with the pooling of R&D, 
investment and innovation resources. 
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Finally, the Union must strengthen its own military security 
through greater cooperation and integration, with the 
long-term goal being a European army. Our role in the world 
depends on the degree of political unity we can display. 
Much progress has been made in recent years. The EU has 
shown a united front on trade, Iran, sanctions on Russia, 
climate, Brexit, etc. – but this is not enough. More needs 
to be done. There is no contradiction between the Union’s 
role as a ‘soft power’, with an emphasis on our values and 
on solidarity with the poorer parts of the world, especially 
in Africa, and the EU’s role as a ‘world power’. But the latter 
requires a much stronger military arm of the Union. We can 
only move from the status of a global actor to that of a world 
power if we have all the means of international politics at 
our disposal.
In short, the plans we will have to make and the measures 
we will have to take to re-energise the EU must be realistic 
without falling into muddling through, and ambitious 
without striving for a political Europe in the short term.  
This balance requires statesmanship, the ars gubernandi.
Protection is 
not the same as 
protectionism. The 
EU should have its 
own industrial and 
economic strategy and 
make use of the scale 
offered by the Single 
Market together 
with the pooling of 
R&D, investment and 
innovation resources.
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WHY SHOULD WE?
The European Union (EU) is a great 
success story. For more than six decades, 
the European project has generated 
unprecedented levels of freedom, peace, 
prosperity, openness, and stability across 
the continent. European integration has 
shown that we wield far greater influence if 
we cooperate economically and politically. 
But at a time when working together is 
increasingly necessary, trust in the wisdom 
of cooperation is challenged.
There is nothing inevitable about the 
European project. Today, the hard-won 
achievements of European integration are 
taken for granted or are openly questioned, 
while the wider international conditions 
that benefitted the Union’s development are 
fraying. Internal and external centrifugal 
forces are putting European integration 
under pressure. This is why the EU cannot 
afford to stall – muddling through clearly 
entails the risk of losing relevance in the 
global context and in the eyes of citizens.
HOW SHOULD WE DO IT?
In the Union’s next politico-institutional 
cycle, Europeans should choose cooperation 
over political myopia, partnership over 
isolation, and action over apathy. We 
should build on our past accomplishments 
and defend the pluralist, open, and liberal 
principles and values on which the EU and its 
member states are founded. Yes, we should 
roll up our sleeves and tackle the immediate 
issues at hand, while not losing sight of the 
more fundamental economic, political, and 
societal challenges we are facing. Action 
in the short and medium term is necessary 
to create the indispensable conditions for 
1. Yes, we should!
From the European Policy Centre 
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devising more fundamental responses to 
structural problems in the long run.
The outgoing EU leadership has fought 
hard to limit the damage inflicted by the 
poly-crisis over the last decade, seeking to 
offer shared solutions to common problems 
under very difficult circumstances. However, 
our European project remains a work-in-
progress, and we should continue to work on 
it together. Compared to five years ago, the 
awareness of Europe’s challenges is much 
more acute and widespread. But while many 
‘Sunday speeches’ call for ‘more Europe’, the 
political will and courage to move beyond 
the current state of affairs is still insufficient. 
So far, what has been done is barely enough, 
barely on time. 
The European elections will likely confirm 
the mismatch between the need for 
Europeans to re-unite and re-energise 
the European project, on the one hand, 
and the increasing polarisation within our 
societies, as well as the lack of trust and 
increased fragmentation among member 
states, on the other. Therefore, ‘business as 
usual’ will not be enough in the upcoming 
politico-institutional cycle. The simplistic 
recipes advocated by ‘anti-forces’, who 
oppose European integration and follow a 
‘my-country-comes-first’ attitude, are not 
helpful either. History has taught us that 
nationalism leads to catastrophe.
The next EU leadership should assert 
the principle of European responsibility 
and confront national leaders with their 
obligations. In the words of Herman Van 
Rompuy, the EU is “the sum of its member 
states”. From this perspective, the Union 
cannot succeed if pro-European leaders are 
not ready to take ownership of European 
integration. They should aim to bring added 
value where the EU can make a difference 
without creating false expectations, which 
the Union will not be able to match given 
its current limitations in terms of power, 
competences, and financial means. The idea 
of an EU that is big on big things, and small 
on small things remains valid. The problem 
is that the Union needs to be much bigger on 
a few very big things.
WHAT SHOULD WE DO?
As an essential precondition for its survival, 
the Union must be equipped to weather 
future storms that are bound to come – even 
though we do not know when and how hard 
they will hit us. Preparing the EU for future 
turbulences will in the next five years require 
a more fundamental deepening of the 
Economic and Monetary Union to guarantee 
the robustness of the single currency. There 
is also a need to address the lack of solidarity 
in the field of migration and to fully restore 
and safeguard the freedom of movement in 
the Schengen area. These essential tasks 
remain on the EU’s to-do-list, even if they 
are no longer making headlines.
In addition, the member states should jointly 
work to address key priority areas where 
short-term challenges reflect long-term, 
structural trends, as well as key concerns 
for the citizens. These include: safeguarding 
liberal democratic values by strengthening 
the Union’s ability to respond to national 
governments backsliding on the rule of law 
and breaching fundamental democratic 
rights and freedoms; creating a more social 
Europe with concrete and visible initiatives 
that address people’s grievances, such as 
fair taxation and efforts aiming to enhance 
Europe’s social fabric; addressing climate 
change to ensure that the EU becomes a 
climate neutral economy by 2050; investing 
in innovation, to sustain technological 
prowess as a source of wealth and jobs for all 
citizens; and guaranteeing security, not least 
by fostering defence cooperation and coping 
with the challenges that affect Europe’s 
resilience by adopting a firm, ‘rules-first’ 
approach on the international stage.
Of course, in none of these domains, the 
EU can deliver alone. But in all of them, the 
Union can be both a protective force and a 
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strategic enabler. It can help its members 
to succeed together where they would fail 
separately.
All this is necessary – but it will not suffice. 
Today might not be the right moment 
for momentous leaps forward, given the 
volatility and polarisation of domestic 
politics in most EU countries and the level 
of fragmentation and distrust currently 
dividing Europeans. However, sooner rather 
than later, having received a much-needed 
boost from addressing the immediate key 
concerns, we will have to be ready to respond 
more fundamentally to the underlying 
political, socio-economic, and cultural 
insecurities facing Europe. To do more than 
just survive, we will, one day, have to radically 
re-think the way we organise our societies to 
guarantee the resilience of Europe’s political, 
economic, and social models in the changed 
circumstances of our modern world. The EU 
and its member states cannot escape from 
the need to adapt to the massive forces of 
technological, economic, and (geo-)political 
transformation overwhelming us.
WHO SHOULD DO IT?
To create the necessary conditions to do so, 
it is high time that we start thinking about 
the EU not as a remote, top-down entity 
that only dictates and regulates, but as an 
inclusive project – a story we have all written 
and are all a part of. The EU is not just a 
project – it is our project. Every member 
state, region, town, and citizen is responsible 
for our Union’s destiny. The EU institutions, 
national governments, and policymakers at 
all levels have to show political courage and 
should take joint responsibility for our shared 
future. The Union cannot evolve without us 
– its constituent parts – cooperating in the 
name of our common interests in a world in 
which we are only as strong as we are united. 
Whether we like it or not, we are all in the 
same boat. So, yes, we should!
 Recommendations for the  
2019-2024  politico-institutional cycle
This issue of Challenge Europe delivers an 
alternative to those who cynically claim 
that European cooperation no longer 
works and should be abandoned. It argues 
instead that integration can still work, 
and that it is still the best answer to the 
many problems we are now facing. Each 
of the 24 contributions presents a set of 
concrete recommendations for the next 
EU leadership, both in terms of key priority 
areas – sustainable prosperity, values, 
migration and Schengen, and Europe’s 
place in the world – and on how the EU 
can use the instruments it already has 
at its disposal to act in a more effective, 
transparent, and decisive way.
WHAT TO DO:
SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY
In ‘Deepening the EMU as a win-win: How 
to keep the reform debate alive’ (chapter 2), 
George Pagoulatos argues that despite 
some institutional tinkering since 2010, the 
eurozone remains underequipped to face 
the next big crisis. That is why sustaining 
the process towards a deeper Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), through greater 
financial, fiscal, economic, political, and 
social integration, should be a strategic 
priority for the EU as it moves into its next 
politico-institutional cycle. However, the 
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next window of opportunity for reform might not open before 
well into 2020. Nonetheless, or exactly because of that, it is 
important to keep the quest for ambitious EMU reform on the 
agenda, until a next opportunity arises.
The next three papers all call for the EU to reassess its priorities 
in the face of climate change, the loss of biodiversity and the 
degrading of ecosystems, and adopt sustainability as a guiding 
principle for all its policies. In their chapter ‘Prioritising circular 
economy to boost European competitiveness’ (chapter 3), 
Janez Potočnik and Julia Okatz recognise that growth based 
on natural resources has improved living standards around 
the world and enabled many of the most successful European 
industries. They argue, however, that this model has reached its 
limits. To further increase prosperity in Europe and beyond, we 
need to create a new kind of economy according to the principles 
of a new paradigm that decouples growth from resource use and 
impacts. The authors set out why and how circular economy 
should be made a priority in the EU’s next politico-institutional 
cycle of 2019-2024. The rationale is obvious: the transition 
to a circular economy carries enormous, underdeveloped, 
possibilities. It can significantly boost economic growth, while 
reducing environmental and health impacts. This line of 
reasoning is also picked up by Martin Porter in his contribution 
‘Making climate neutrality the galvanising heart of a new 
economic agenda for Europe’ (chapter 4). He proposes to make 
the vision of a climate neutral Europe by the mid-century the 
centre-piece of the Union’s new policy agenda. Tackling the 
sustainability crisis could be the way to reconnect the EU’s core 
principles and purpose to a genuinely popular idea, one that is 
rooted in economic innovation and modernisation as much as 
it is in shared values and common interests. Gunter Pauli, in 
‘Framework for a new European economy’ (chapter 5) calls for 
a new approach to create a sustainable, competitive European 
economy. In the next politico-institutional cycle, the EU 
institutions should collaborate and take the lead in developing a 
framework that will allow businesses and entrepreneurs to make 
the switch from traditional modes of economic development, 
based on the endless quest for cost reduction and ever-higher 
economies of scale, to a more sustainable, environmentally-
friendly system. 
In ‘Give EU citizens what they want: The case for Social Europe 
and fiscal justice’ (chapter 6), Claire Dhéret argues that policy 
answers to today’s social challenges have, so far, been too weak, 
have lacked credibility or have favoured a retreat into nationalism. 
That is why robust solutions to these trends must be central in the 
EU’s new upcoming politico- institutional cycle and a priority in 
the future design of ‘Social Europe’. Building a more social Europe, 
based on clear, concrete and visible initiatives, can address some of 
Europeans should 
choose cooperation 
over political myopia, 
partnership over 
isolation, and action 
over apathy.
The political will 
and courage to move 
beyond the current 
state of affairs is still 
insufficient. So far, 
what has been done  
is barely enough, 
barely on time.
History has taught 
us that nationalism 
leads to catastrophe.
As an essential 
precondition for its 
survival, the Union 
must be equipped  
to weather future 
storms that are  
bound to come.
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people’s most fundamental grievances while 
breathing new life into the European project, 
she argues. This will not solve all the economic 
and social challenges of the 21st century; that 
will require a profound change of our growth 
model and a reinvention of our social and 
institutional frameworks. But it will make 
Europe stronger in the face of the ongoing 
transition, better prepared for upcoming 
changes, and it will bring more stability and 
enhance trust in the future.
VALUES
Christian Calliess reminds us in ‘Restoring 
credibility and trust by enforcing the rule 
of law’ (chapter 7) that too often, European 
policies have failed to defend the rule of 
law in the member states. Some national 
governments have been successful in putting 
political pressure on institutions, others 
have been incapable, or indeed unwilling, to 
implement agreed rules defining European 
goods and interests. Consequently, the EU 
has lost credibility among its citizens and 
the trust of its member states. Therefore, 
he argues, in the next politico-institutional 
cycle, the EU has to find a convincing and 
efficient answer to the ongoing pressure on 
the rule of law in individual member states. 
To that end, the Union should prevent 
rule of law backsliding in individual EU 
countries by making full use of its available 
legal instruments and by enhancing the 
implementation of European law through 
the introduction of a new concept of 
cooperative enforcement. The new EU 
leadership should push in this direction if 
it wants to regain trust and credibility with 
regard to the defence of European values in 
the eyes of its citizens.
Stefan Heumann’s contribution ‘Protecting 
democracy in the EU: Tackling the 
disinformation problem’ (chapter 8) makes 
the argument that the core of our liberal 
democracy – the competition for political 
power through elections – can only work 
if facts about the candidates and their 
political programmes are not distorted or 
misrepresented. This is why disinformation 
campaigns – the dissemination of false 
information with the intention to mislead 
– are such an essential threat to our 
liberal democracies. To craft effective 
policy responses, we need a much more 
comprehensive approach at the EU level 
than the current focus on identifying 
and countering foreign, and particularly 
Russian, disinformation within the context 
of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS). Instead, he proposes to develop 
and implement a ‘Disinformation Index’ to 
measure member states’ resilience against 
disinformation, to hold political parties and 
campaigns accountable and to create clear 
rules for social media platforms. 
MIGRATION AND SCHENGEN
In the context of the EU’s current migration 
policy and the state of Schengen, Marie 
De Somer dedicates her contribution to 
‘Safeguarding Schengen: The next European 
leadership should return to fact-based 
policies’ (chapter 9). She argues that as the 
past three years have shown, buying time, 
hoping for the dust to settle or the political 
pressure from the (far-)right to ease is not 
a viable strategy for securing continued free 
movement with respect to Schengen. If the 
next EU leadership fails to bring Schengen 
back to its normal, that is, pre-2015 state of 
affairs, the long-term consequences will be 
grave. To do so, EU leaders must counter the 
distorted discourses that currently surround 
the Union’s valued free movement acquis. 
They need to lift border checks at once and 
end the spill-over of negative, discursive 
dynamics in EU affairs.
The EU’s migration policy is also at the 
centre of Evangelia (Lilian) Tsourdi’s 
contribution ‘Solidarity in EU asylum policy: 
From an emergency-driven approach to the 
fair sharing of responsibility’ (chapter 10). 
Here she states that the absence of solidarity 
and fair sharing in the legislative design and 
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implementation of the EU’s asylum policy 
is glaringly salient. This piece argues that 
rather than a refugee crisis (i.e. a perceived 
fundamental lack of capacity to deal with a 
certain numbers of protection seekers) we 
are actually dealing with a governance crisis, 
one that has laid bare the inadequacies of 
the EU asylum policy. Tsourdi explores the 
scope and impact of the legal principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility 
in EU asylum law; she critically analyses the 
Union’s efforts to implement solidarity; and 
reflects on meaningful ways forward towards 
realising the fair sharing of responsibility. 
The next politico-institutional cycle needs 
to result in a redesign of the EU asylum 
policy, which embeds solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibility structurally, rather 
than linking it with the notion of emergency, 
she demands.
EUROPE AND THE WORLD
With regards to Europe’s role in the world, 
Giovanni Grevi, in his contribution ‘Rules 
first: The way forward for ‘shaping power’ 
Europe’ (chapter 11) argues that over the 
next five years, the EU should adopt a ‘rules 
first’ strategic approach to frame and guide 
Europe’s projection on the international 
stage. This approach should harness the 
EU’s considerable rule-making power to 
both promote its interests and values and 
support multilateralism and partnerships 
on the global stage. The EU has long aimed 
to advance international cooperation. 
This time, however, it is different. Recent 
developments point to a much more 
challenging strategic context for ‘shaping 
power’ Europe and call for a new level of 
commitment, he states.
In ‘European security and defence: A year 
of opportunity and risk’ (chapter 12), Jamie 
Shea predicts that at the beginning of a 
new politico-institutional cycle, the EU and 
its member states will have to show their 
determination to assume more responsibility 
as an international security provider. 
Europeans will have to prove their readiness 
to produce new initiatives within the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
avoid a renationalisation and regionalisation 
of Europe’s security, while keeping strong 
links with the United Kingdom after Brexit.
Corina Stratulat, Marko Kmezić, and 
Srdjan Majstorović argue in ‘The European 
Union and the Balkans: In the same boat’ 
(chapter  13) that while for three decades 
the EU has been preoccupied with how to 
transform its vicinity, the main concern today 
is how the West itself is being transformed by 
modern-day challenges: globalisation, aging 
societies, migration, and so on. These seem 
to throw the Union’s political, economic, and 
social model ever more into question. The 
way forward, however, is not to quarantine 
the ‘patient’ behind hard borders. Instead of 
retreating into navel-gazing, the authors call 
for the EU to strengthen and diversify the 
ways in which it reaches out to its allies in 
the Balkans, who, in any case, share the same 
problems and interests.
With regard to the EU’s policy towards Eastern 
Europe, Dimitar Bechev’s contribution ‘EU 
and Eastern Europe: The case for continued 
engagement’ (chapter 14) states that a decade 
ago, the EU went on a mission to change 
Eastern Europe in its own image. However, it 
is on the defensive now. The Russian challenge 
and the ongoing war in Ukraine shifted the 
EU’s focus from economic integration to 
crisis management. Dealing with an assertive 
Russia overshadows all other objectives, he 
argues. While the Union has not given up 
on its role as a champion of reforms in the 
eastern neighbourhood, its overriding concern 
is the mounting instability at its doorstep. 
The challenge the EU faces vis-à-vis both 
Russia and the Eastern neighbours is striking 
the right balance between engagement, the 
assertion of European interests and values 
and, in the case of Russia, containment.
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HOW TO DO IT:
INSTITUTIONS
Poul Skytte Christoffersen makes the case 
that now, ten years after the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty, is an appropriate time 
to take stock of the institutional experience 
of the past decade and make some relevant 
adjustments. In ‘The role of the (European) 
Council: Practical improvements in volatile 
times’ (chapter 15) he assesses the role of 
these institutions and reflects on possible 
adjustments to the way the two institutions 
work and interact with each other and with 
other EU institutions. Since treaty change is 
unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future, 
he presents practical improvements for the 
upcoming period to make the work of the 
European Council and the Council more 
effective.
In ‘The European Commission: The need 
for a clearer set-up’, Paul Ivan and Fabian 
Zuleeg (chapter 16) argue that the next 
European Commission should improve on 
the innovations introduced by the Juncker 
Commission by turning the Commission 
College into a more hierarchical structure, 
with powerful vice-presidents coordinating 
small teams of commissioners aiming to 
streamline work and ensure policy coherence. 
In the longer-term, parts of the Commission’s 
policy enforcement role, for example in 
competition policy, should be transferred to 
independent agencies.
INSTRUMENTS
Annika Hedberg states in her contribution 
‘The EU budget – including the CAP – should 
be used to finance the Union’s priorities’ 
(chapter 17) that in its current form, the MFF 
proposal suggests that the EU’s priorities lie in 
the past rather than in the future. While keeping 
old structures, such as the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), on life support, it underperforms 
when it comes to addressing today’s pressing 
challenges. It also fails to devote enough 
resources to people’s top concerns today. 
As the European Commission’s proposal for the 
new MFF is currently under discussion with the 
European Parliament and the member states, 
it is still possible for the next EU leadership 
to ensure that this time around the Union 
will put its money where its mouth is. She 
identifies a number of concrete issues where 
changes in the EU’s budget can enhance 
the Union’s performance in regard to those 
pressing challenges.
In ‘A nimble and responsive EU? Predicting 
unpredictability: A new approach to EU 
policymaking’ (chapter 18), Fabian Zuleeg 
and Marta Pilati argue that today, as the 
global environment becomes more complex 
and rapidly changing, the EU needs more 
flexible policymaking so that it can effectively 
respond and adapt to unexpected events. A 
change of mind-set is required to move away 
from the existing framework, which is too 
rigid and often ineffective.
DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION
Julian Rappold recognises in ‘Handle 
with care: The potentials and limits of 
differentiated integration’ (chapter 19) 
that differentiation has been and will continue 
to be an integral feature of European 
integration – although it is still unclear 
in which areas, how and to what extent it 
will be applied in practice in the years to 
come. Given the many internal and external 
challenges the EU is facing and the increased 
heterogeneity among member states, the 
number of flexible forms of cooperation will 
likely further increase in the next politico-
institutional cycle (2019-2024) as it offers a 
pragmatic and functional way to maintain 
the Union’s capacity to act. However, 
differentiated integration is not a panacea 
to cure the EU’s internal divisions. It should 
not lead to a closed ‘core Europe’ and rather 
remain a second-best option in order not to 
jeopardise the Union’s political, legal and 
institutional cohesion, he argues.
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In ‘The never-ending Brexit?’ (chapter 20) 
Larissa Brunner and Fabian Zuleeg dare to 
look into the future and predict what it might 
hold for the UK-EU relationship. They argue 
that, even after the United Kingdom’s (UK) exit 
from the EU, Brexit will not disappear from the 
Union’s agenda – if anything, it will become 
even more important. The EU institutions 
and member states will not only have to deal 
with immediate day-to-day issues such as the 
EU-UK trade negotiations but also with more 
strategic questions on the future relationship 
between the EU and the UK and the broader 
implications of the divorce for the Union’s role 
in the world and its own future architecture. 
FUTURE OF EUROPE
Corina Stratulat and Paul Butcher explain 
in ‘The European Citizens’ Consultations: 
Will the member states make them count? 
(chapter 21) that the ECCs might have 
emerged in response to the EU’s long-
standing need to fix its growing problem 
of democratic legitimacy, but it was the 
push that the French President Emmanuel 
Macron gave to the idea of organising 
citizen consultations across the EU that 
turned the odds in favour of this new, large-
scale experiment in European democratic 
reform. Whatever helped to make the ECCs 
a reality in 2018, the burning question as 
the process draws to an end in May 2019 is 
whether the member states will now make 
it count. To do so, they should explicitly link 
their discussions about the EU’s next policy 
agenda and priorities with the results of the 
consultations in the run-up to the European 
Parliament elections, they argue.
In a call for a federal Europe, Andrew Duff’s 
contribution ‘The politics of ever closer Union’ 
(chapter 22) argues that in its current state, 
the EU is too weak to do what is expected 
of it. The Union faces systemic challenges 
demanding sustained structural responses 
from stable, strong government. He thus 
argues that the EU should be granted sufficient 
centralised powers to be able to act effectively 
in the many critical situations in which it finds 
itself while endowing the governance of the 
European Union with credible and democratic 
leadership.
Janis A. Emmanouilidis, in ‘Re-unite 
EUrope: A shared Leitmotiv for the next 
EU leadership’ (chapter 23), analyses that 
the EU’s record over the past decade is 
somewhat mixed and that it is highly 
difficult to predict its future path given 
the many uncertainties inside and outside 
Europe. One thing that is certain is that 
the Union and its members will face 
two fundamental, structural challenges 
in the coming years: a high degree of 
fragmentation between countries and a 
high level of polarisation within national 
societies. To counter these challenges, 
which will strongly affect the ability of EU 
institutions and member states to deal 
with future internal as well as external 
turbulences, he argues that the Union’s new 
leadership should follow a shared Leitmotiv 
aiming to help Re-unite EUrope at both the 
European and national level.
YES LAB
The volume ends with a call for action 
from the younger generation. Looking 
into the future, participants of the EPC’s 
Younger European Strategy Lab (YES 
Lab) contemplate what Europe should look 
like in 2057. In ‘Our vision: Europe, a beacon 
of sustainability’ (chapter 24), they make 
a passionate plea for the EU to become a 
beacon of sustainability, a place that respects 
the rights, livelihoods and environment of 
all its citizens, both now and in the future. 
For the next five years, they want the EU to 
take action in three key areas connected to 
building a strong, stable and sustainable 
European community: climate change, 
economic inequality and human rights.
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Sustainable 
prosperity
q Family photo marking the 20th anniversary of the euro during a Eurogroup meeting  
at the EU headquarters in Brussels on 3 December 2018. © JOHN THYS / AFP
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Deepening EMU as a 
win-win: How to keep 
the reform debate alive
George Pagoulatos – Professor of European Politics & Economy, Athens University of Economics  
& Business and Vice-President of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
The euro has celebrated its 20th birthday with a mixed 
record. The eurozone’s most impressive achievement is that 
it has survived, defying the many doomsayers. The worst-
case scenario has been averted. However, the legacies of 
the eurozone crisis weigh heavily, particularly upon certain 
economies whose ‘adjustment’ came at high cost. Moreover, 
despite some institutional tinkering since 2010, the eurozone 
remains underequipped to face the next big crisis. That is 
why sustaining the process towards a deeper Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), through greater financial, fiscal, 
economic, political and social integration, should be a strategic 
priority for the European Union (EU) as it moves into its next 
politico-institutional cycle. 
Euro governments remain divided over additional eurozone 
reforms. One side supports the bolder package promoted 
by French President Emmanuel Macron or the European 
Commission. The opposite side, the “new Hanseatic League” 
led by the Netherlands, opposes such reforms, claiming that 
The eurozone’s 
most impressive 
achievement is that it 
has survived, defying 
the many doomsayers.
It is important  
to keep the quest for 
ambitious EMU reform 
on the agenda.
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q Sustain the reform process towards a deeper EMU, 
through	greater	financial,	fiscal,	economic,	political	and	social	integration.
WHAT TO DO: 
q Create a eurozone safe asset.
q Introduce a European Deposit Insurance Scheme.
q Create	a	real	fiscal	capacity	for	the	euro.
q Establish closer tax policy integration.
q Strengthen the social dimension of EMU. 2
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risk reduction should come before risk 
sharing. In December 2018, the eurozone 
governments met and discussed a diluted 
and highly unambitious ‘Meseberg minus’ 
version of reforms agreed on the basis of the 
Franco-German blueprint proposal of June 
2018 (“Meseberg Declaration”). Meseberg 
itself was already a watered-down version of 
the Macron proposals – many in Berlin were 
relieved they were rejected. 
The main problem of the eurozone 
decisions of December 2018 is not just a 
lack of audacity. It rather relates to the 
circumstance that they closed the window 
of opportunity that had opened up following 
Macron’s initiatives. The next window might 
not open before well into 2020. Nonetheless, 
or exactly because of that, it is important to 
keep the quest for ambitious EMU reform on 
the agenda, until a next opportunity arises. 
 State of play – A list of inadequate  
 reforms 
Let’s briefly recap the state of play following 
the Eurogroup/euro summit decisions of 
December 2018: 
q Some progress was made on enhancing 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and 
amending the ESM treaty by June 2019. The 
principle of “no risk sharing before risks are 
substantially reduced” prevailed. New rules to 
facilitate debt restructuring in case of sovereign 
insolvency will be introduced by 2022. 
q An ESM backstop to the Single Resolution 
Fund (SRF) will be introduced earlier than 
2024, provided there is progress by 2020 on 
risk reduction concerning legacy issues. 
q The European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
(EDIS) will be deferred. A high-level group will 
report back in June 2019 before a roadmap on 
political negotiations can be agreed.
q A eurozone budgetary instrument was 
agreed to be included in the next EU budget. 
But contrary to Meseberg, which envisaged 
“instruments to ensure convergence and 
stabilisation in the EMU”, only convergence 
and competitiveness was mentioned, while 
stabilisation was dropped. The overall size 
of the new budgetary instrument will be 
determined by the European Council in the 
context of the next Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF) as part of a broader 
package deal subject to the potential veto 
power of non-euro member states. Finally, 
as in the Meseberg Declaration, no reference 
was made to a European unemployment 
stabilisation fund. 
 Why more ambition is needed 
Bolder financial and fiscal integration is 
needed to bring about convergence and 
stability in the eurozone, for two main 
reasons: 
LEGACIES OF FRAGILITY IN POST-CRISIS 
ECONOMIES 
Post-crisis economies are still burdened by 
large public debt, high funding costs, a heavy 
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share of non-performing loans (NPLs), 
and a higher government need to rely on 
domestic banks for debt refinancing. In 
addition, the flow of capital to the periphery 
remains constrained and gross fixed capital 
formation registers a wide investment gap. 
Post-crisis economies remain subject to 
contagion, bank-sovereign doom loops, and 
lower confidence in their banking system.
Unemployment shocks in the periphery 
have been resolved through extensive labour 
emigration, which undercuts productive 
capacity, growth potential, and the future 
sustainability of pay-as-you-go pension 
systems. In the worst cases, severe hysteresis 
effects have started to unfold Backtracking 
on domestic reforms (as in Italy) exacerbates 
the situation.
Peripheral economies will need to grow 
faster, but the combination of crisis legacies, 
procyclical adjustment, and the rigidity of 
policy instruments tends to make it harder 
for them to catch up. 
TRANSITION COSTS OF THE REFORM 
AGENDA
Certain elements of proposed eurozone 
reforms, while positive, could further 
aggravate the woes of post-crisis economies, 
including Italy. Three examples stand out:
q First, debt restructuring clauses that 
are inserted as a precondition for an ESM 
bailout could further raise the risk premium 
for highly indebted sovereigns, incurring 
self-fulfilling prophecy dynamics.
q Second, transition problems could 
arise because of the regulatory limit on 
bank holdings of sovereign debt, which is 
a vital part of the banking union agenda. 
Presently, highly indebted sovereigns rely 
on their banks’ home bias to suppress 
funding costs.
q Third, aggressive NPL reduction could 
undermine the capital adequacy of ailing 
banks, further impairing their ability to 
finance the economy. 
So positive reforms could entail serious 
transition costs for the vulnerable economies 
of the eurozone, causing instability. 
A more integrated EMU would have 
mitigated the debilitating legacies of the 
crisis. A eurozone fit for purpose would 
activate countercyclical policies to prevent 
crises from evolving into downward spirals 
and facilitate speedier recovery. 
 EMU deepening is a win-win 
It is also in the interest of the ‘surplus’ 
economies of the eurozone core to accept 
further EMU deepening, for the following 
reasons: 
q First, a broad consensus exists among 
EMU experts that the eurozone crisis resulted 
not only from national policy failures in the 
periphery, but mainly from the deficient 
structure and inherent asymmetries of an 
incomplete monetary union. The EMU needs 
to become more closely integrated and equip 
itself for the next big crisis.
q Second, greater eurozone stability 
and cohesion is a collective good for all 
its members. And the eurozone needs all 
its members on board to be a balanced 
monetary union. A euro without the southern 
members would appreciate, undermining 
the competitiveness of the export-oriented 
‘surplus’ economies. 
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q Third, experience has shown that crisis 
prevention through some degree of risk 
sharing is less costly and more efficient 
than the delayed management of crises 
gone out of hand. Risk sharing must be 
predicated upon national economic and 
fiscal responsibility, and an effective way 
of supporting national reforms. National 
adjustment without sufficient risk sharing 
and countercyclical eurozone instruments 
accentuate the recessionary impact of 
internal devaluation, debilitating human 
capital and productive capacity. 
q Fourth, vulnerability is not limited to 
peripheral economies (see Germany’s bank 
problems). Surplus countries have in the 
past, and will in future, run into cyclical 
shocks, and when that time comes they will 
benefit from a more integrated eurozone, 
equipped with effective stabilisation and 
risk-sharing instruments.
q Fifth, in terms of political engineering, 
deeper eurozone integration can be part of 
a broader package deal involving mutual 
concessions and compromises between 
debtors and creditors: more solidarity 
and risk sharing in exchange for more 
national reforms and policy discipline. 
This is a positive sum game, a win-win 
for all. Expanding the package deal to 
additional policy issues (such as migration 
and security) raises the chances for success, 
as the New Pact for Europe publication 
has argued.1  
 What to do: Five strategic priorities 
How to better equip the eurozone to address 
the legacies of the last crisis and prepare for 
the next? Five priority areas: 
PRIORITY 1: CREATION  
OF A EUROZONE SAFE ASSET
Several analysts and institutions, including 
the Commission and the European 
Systemic Risk Board, have supported a ‘safe 
asset’ for the eurozone. This could take the 
form of ‘synthetic’ sovereign bond-backed 
securities, resulting from the pooling and 
tranching of cross-border portfolios of 
national bonds. 
A safe bond is not a means for fiscal transfer 
but a stabilising asset class for eurozone 
financial markets in the face of potential 
bank panics. It does not presuppose joint 
liability or mutualisation between member 
states. In the proposed safe asset, senior 
and junior tranches of the security would 
reflect the varying risk profile between 
sovereigns. Senior tranches corresponding 
to the debt of AAA-rated sovereigns would 
be absorbed by risk-averse investors, while 
junior securities incorporating default risk 
would meet investor demand for higher 
yield/higher risk assets. 
The introduction of a eurozone safe asset 
would strengthen financial stability and 
the banking union, offering banks a safe 
asset in which to invest. It would facilitate 
market access for sovereigns undergoing 
cycles of acute vulnerability. It would 
also improve debt sustainability and 
prevent contagion from spreading from 
the sovereign to the banking sector and 
back. ‘Core’ economies of high credit rating 
should view a pan-eurozone safe asset 
as positive-sum, for its ability to stabilise 
eurozone financial markets without 
necessitating a fiscal union, transfers or 
debt mutualisation.
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PRIORITY 2: INTRODUCTION OF A EUROPEAN DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE SCHEME
Next to a eurozone safe asset, a European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (EDIS) is necessary to bolster confidence in national 
banking systems. The crisis has demonstrated the peripheral 
economies’ vulnerability to capital flight towards the core. 
National deposit insurance schemes are incapable of restoring 
depositors’ confidence when sovereign credit-worthiness is in 
doubt. This is a severely destabilising, procyclical feature of the 
notorious bank-sovereign doom loop. Faced with the erosion of 
savings under an overhanging default risk translated into euro-
exit risk, peripheral economies are locked into vicious cycles of 
banking fragility and high financing costs. 
The banking union can reduce this risk, by spreading the risk 
throughout the financial system. The existing two pillars of the 
banking union must be complemented with the third pillar of 
EDIS, the roadmap to which must be accelerated.
PRIORITY 3: A REAL FISCAL CAPACITY FOR THE EURO
The introduction of a new budgetary instrument would be 
the first step. However, a real eurozone fiscal capacity is 
needed to complement national fiscal stabilisers in the face 
of asymmetric shocks. During a downturn, fiscal revenues 
shrink while governments are forced to cut spending. Their 
capacity for a countercyclical fiscal stimulus is constrained by 
the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact and/or debt market 
pressures. An investment protection scheme would prevent a 
more enduring erosion of a productive capacity that suppresses 
the member state economies’ future growth potential. A similar 
outcome could be achieved by exempting certain categories of 
investment from fiscal deficit rules. In general, rules must allow 
for stronger counter-cyclicality: more restrictive fiscal policies 
when economies are growing, more expansionary to counter 
stagnation and recession. A fiscal capacity would support 
stabilisation, convergence and competitiveness. 
An alternative role of macroeconomic stabilisation could 
be exercised by a European Unemployment Reinsurance 
Scheme (EURS), operating as a reinsurance fund for 
national unemployment schemes. Unemployment benefits 
automatically increase during a downturn, while at the same 
time, fiscal resources decline. EURS would help cover the gap 
between increased needs and reduced national capabilities, 
providing the necessary stimulus to facilitate a faster 
economic recovery. 
2
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If the insured identity is not the national unemployment 
insurance fund but the unemployed worker, then the proposed 
reform is a European Unemployment Insurance Scheme. This 
also operates for macroeconomic stabilisation and supplements 
the national unemployment scheme in funding benefits for the 
short-term unemployed. A European scheme would help the 
contracting economy address cyclical unemployment while 
national reforms (in the labour market, education, training, and 
social security) tackle structural unemployment.
These schemes operate as stabilisation funds, to which 
member states are net contributors when their economies 
are growing, and net recipients in a downturn. What counts 
is the incremental loss of output (or gap between output 
and potential output) or the rise of unemployment. The 
system would be neutral over the economic cycle, eschewing 
permanent transfers. 
This is a scheme all member states should endorse under a 
Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” regarding their current position 
in the economic cycle. Greece would have been a net recipient 
of stabilisation funds during 2010-2016, but a net contributor 
during its high-growth period from the second half 1990s to 2007; 
Germany would have been a net recipient during its own period of 
stagnation and rising unemployment in the 1990s. Fiscal capacity 
is thus a political win-win across eurozone countries.
Apart from national contributions, a fiscal capacity should be 
equipped with own resources (such as revenue from VAT, excise 
duties or corporate taxes) including the ability to borrow by 
issuing bonds. To be macro-economically significant, it should 
represent at least 1% of eurozone GDP (preferably well above 
that) – which reminds us how inadequate the recently agreed 
status quo is.  
PRIORITY 4: CLOSER TAX POLICY INTEGRATION
The EU faces an inescapable trend: welfare state costs will rise 
significantly due to ageing societies and slow economic growth. 
At the same time, tax competition erodes the ability to tax 
mobile factors of production such as transnational firms. This 
is shifting the burden of taxation increasingly (including social 
security contributions) upon citizens and employees. Popular 
frustration over unfair taxation has broadened the appeal of 
nationalist-populist and insurrectional movements like the 
gilets jaunes.
Bold and honest initiatives are needed to restore tax fairness 
(see also the contribution by Claire Dhéret in the present 
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inescapable trend: 
welfare state costs 
will rise significantly 
due to ageing 
societies and slow 
economic growth.  
At the same time,  
tax competition 
erodes the ability  
to tax mobile factors 
of production such  
as transnational firms. 
For economies 
with acute social 
vulnerabilities, 
associated with a 
steep unemployment 
increase, it is 
important to target 
EU support for social 
safety nets and 
employment  
and reskilling 
schemes early on.
The adoption  
of a European Pillar 
of Social Rights 
opens an important 
avenue, whereby 
specific EU actions 
can be launched to 
strengthen the E(M)
U’s social dimension. 
25EUROPEAN POLICY CENTRE
volume). The EU must lead in tackling tax 
havens and strengthening pan-European tax 
coordination, and target extremely wealthy 
citizens and global companies (such as big 
tech) able to exploit tax loopholes and bank 
secrecy. The process towards a Common 
(Consolidated) Corporate Tax base must 
accelerate following the UK’s departure 
from the EU, and the Commission’s proposal 
to introduce qualified majority voting in 
the Council on taxation policies must be 
strengthened. 
PRIORITY 5: STRENGTHEN  
THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF EMU
The crisis has left debilitating legacies of 
long-term unemployment and deprivation 
in countries l ike Greece, Italy and 
Spain. For economies with acute social 
vulnerabilities, associated with a steep 
unemployment increase, it is important to 
target EU support for social safety nets and 
employment and reskilling schemes early 
on. This would mitigate enduring social 
disruptions and human capital erosion. The 
introduction of a European unemployment 
insurance scheme, as discussed above, 
apart from macroeconomic stabilisation, 
also carries a social protection function. 
Closer E(M)U-wide coordination on fiscal, 
taxation and social policies can strengthen 
social cohesion, especially in the face of 
asymmetric shocks. 
The adoption of a European Pillar of Social 
Rights opens an important avenue, whereby 
specific EU actions can be launched to 
strengthen the E(M)U’s social dimension. 
Social benchmarks need to acquire greater 
salience in the coordination of economic 
policies. A single social security number 
for every European would support cross-
border mobility and the convergence of 
social standards. 
The EU needs to support the welfare 
system transitions to ‘flexicurity’ by 
ensuring the development of  both 
dimensions (both employment flexibility 
and social protection). Overall, in both the 
macroeconomic and the social dimension, 
the EMU needs to strengthen its ability to 
operate as a true insurance union. 
Post-scriptum: priorities 4 and 5 are 
immediate, for the next institutional cycle, 
2019-24. Priorities 1, 2 and 3 are deeper, 
longer-term reforms, requiring gradual 
progress. Unless the next crisis becomes the 
ultimate accelerator.
2
1. New Pact for Europe (2017), “Re-energising Europe: 
A Package Deal for the EU27.Third Report New Pact 
for Europe”, Brussels: European Policy Centre.
q	Trash	is	being	recycled	in	a	sorting	centre	in	Sevran,	near	Paris,	where	the	United	Nations’	COP21	international	
climate conference ran from 30 November to 11 December 2015. © AFP PHOTO / THOMAS SAMSON 
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Prioritising circular 
economy to boost 
European competitiveness
Janez Potočnik – Partner, SYSTEMIQ; former European Commissioner for Environment, and for Research
Julia Okatz – Associate, SYSTEMIQ
Natural resources have fuelled the great economic growth 
stories of the last century, including in the European Union 
(EU), the United States and Japan.1 This growth, in turn, has 
improved living standards around the world and enabled 
many of the most successful European industries. But this 
model has reached its limits. To further increase prosperity 
in Europe and beyond, we need to create a new kind of 
economy according to the principles of a new paradigm 
that decouples growth from resource use and impacts. The 
rationale is there: the transition to circular economy carries 
enormous, underdeveloped, possibilities. It can significantly 
boost economic growth while reducing environmental and 
health impacts. This piece sets out why and how circular 
economy should be made a priority in the next EU’s politico-
institutional cycle of 2019-24. 
Implementing the 
principles of a circular 
economy is crucial for 
innovation, growth, 
the mitigation of 
the risks of climate 
change, and the 
achievement of 
environmental and 
climate commitments.
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q	The	EU	can	foster	the	benefits	of	the	circular	economy	
through	clear	priorities,	continuous	action	and	expanding	current	policies	and	objectives.
WHAT TO DO: 
q  Immediately start developing the next circular economy package to signal leadership.
q EU Council presidencies should make circular economy a top priority.
q Develop an active approach on all levels of governance.
q Establish a multi-stakeholder group to develop a vision of a decoupled European economy.
q Assume leadership to improve global governance of resource use and circular economy. 3
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 Decouple growth from  
 resource use 
There is a strong rationale for this decoupling, including the 
pressing negative environmental and health impacts of our 
current resource use, material scarcities, and the increasing 
risks of resource trade dependencies and price volatilities. 
The world currently consumes 92 billion tonnes of materials 
per year, and is expected to consume up to 190 billion tonnes 
by 2060 if current consumption trends continue. This is 
fundamentally unsustainable and will endanger human 
well-being. 
Already today, resource extraction and processing are responsible 
for about half of global GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions and 
more than 90% of biodiversity loss and water stress. At the 
same time, high-income countries are becoming more and more 
dependent on resource imports: the average person in high-
income countries uses 9.8 tons of primary materials produced 
and processed elsewhere in the world. This reliance has been 
increasing at a rate of 1.6% per year since 2000.
Global decoupling measures can boost innovation and new 
growth, and save costs and reduce negative environmental 
and health impacts at the same time. A recent International 
Resource Panel (IRP) report found that concerted resource 
management and efficiency measures can boost economic 
growth by 8% globally by 2060.2 This estimate does not yet even 
fully consider the opportunities that a transition to a circular 
economy would bring.
 Transition to a circular  
 economy 
A circular economy is a key tool in achieving decoupling while 
boosting growth and rethinking socioeconomic dynamics 
and cooperation. Moving towards a circular economy will 
mean to reduce, maintain, reuse, remanufacture and recycle 
products, components and technical materials, as well as reuse 
biochemical feedstock and maintain or restore regenerative 
biospheres, such as agricultural land.
Europe is uniquely 
positioned to exploit 
the benefits of the 
circular economy and 
establish itself as a 
frontrunner in  
a new circular  
global system. 
The recently 
published EU 2050 
Climate Strategy 
envisions a climate 
neutral Europe by 
2050, which is in line 
with the 2015 Paris 
Agreement. Although 
the strategy considers 
a circular economy 
as one of the main 
tools to decarbonise 
European industry, 
it is still not explicit 
enough about its 
overarching systemic 
importance – and its 
implementation.
The circular economy 
is an opportunity  
for true innovation 
and leadership  
that is collaborative 
by definition – a 
promising  
European project.
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A circular economy must operate on four 
levels: products and services, companies, 
networks and policies (adapted from Geng 
et al.3):
q First, products (components) need to be 
recyclable and reusable, sustainably sourced 
and manufactured using clean methods. 
Where possible, tangible products must be 
replaced by services that provide the needed 
function for the customer using less or no 
materials – such as mobility as a service or 
lighting as a service (for example selling 
hours of light as a service instead of light 
bulbs).
q Second, to make decoupled products and 
services profitable, companies need new 
business models that de-link the revenue 
base from material use, through rethinking 
the design and use of products and value 
chain interactions.
q Third, companies need to build networks 
to enable new, decoupled value creation, for 
example by encouraging reverse logistics 
(moving goods from the user back to the 
producer, or the remanufacturer respectively), 
industrial symbiosis (direct or indirect 
reuse of waste or surplus resources across 
companies) or public-private partnerships.
q Fourth, policies are needed to support 
circular markets, especially through fiscal 
policies, regulations, research and vision 
building. Circular principles are applicable 
in the majority of sectors, including 
manufacturing, retail, agriculture, mobility, 
energy, and digital intelligence. 
Implementing the principles of a circular 
economy is crucial for innovation, growth, 
the mitigation of the risks of climate change, 
and the achievement of environmental and 
climate commitments.
  The EU’s role – Tackling challenges  
 jointly and exploiting synergies 
Europe is uniquely positioned to exploit 
the benefits of the circular economy and 
establish itself as a frontrunner in a new 
circular global system. The EU has a unique 
combination of market power, production 
and logistical know-how, integrated markets 
and political and economic institutions that 
can facilitate the transition.
In addition to this potential, Europe is also 
in great need of new areas of innovation and 
growth. It failed to establish itself as a leader 
in recent tech-innovation waves and still 
needs to develop a strategy for the fourth 
industrial revolution that encompasses the 
physical and digital economy.4,5 Moreover, 
the EU is among those economies most 
advised to reassess its material import 
dependencies. 
WE CAN TACKLE THESE CHALLENGES 
TOGETHER AND EXPLOIT SYNERGIES 
WITHIN A CIRCULAR ECONOMY PARADIGM
An Ellen McArthur and SYSTEMIQ report 
found a €320 billion circular economy 
investment opportunity available to 
Europe until 20256. The main areas of 
interest for profitable circular economy 
investments are mobility (including 
manufacturing), our food system and the 
built environment. Although companies 
are beginning to see the benefits of 
circular practices, its potential is still 
mass ively  underused. Only  s trong 
political leadership, in collaboration with 
strategic industry actions will enable the 
fundamental transition that is needed to 
reap the full benefits.7
3
30 CHALLENGE EUROPE  –  YES, WE SHOULD! EU PRIORITIES FOR 2019-2024
Embracing decoupling through a circular 
economy is also an effective and cost-
efficient strategy to fulfil  Europe’s 
environmental commitments, in particular 
its commitment to halt biodiversity loss 
under the United Nations Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD) and its 
agreement to keep global warming well 
under 2oC under the Paris Agreement. 
A recent report by the Energy Transitions 
Commission has shown that material 
efficiency and circularity in industry, 
specifically in plastics and metals supply 
chains, could reduce the global GHG 
emissions of heavy industry and heavy-
duty transport– which are commonly 
considered “harder-to-abate” sectors – by 
55% by 2050 and would reduce the cost of 
decarbonising these sectors by 45%.8 In 
the case of plastics, for example, circular 
production could result in products that are 
80% cheaper than products made of new 
materials (if the costs of collecting, sorting 
and processing are kept low).9
It is important to note that a circular 
economy not only reduces direct GHG 
emissions through material savings (and 
limits other negative impacts), it is also an 
enabling factor in the sustainable scaling 
of renewable energy sources. Renewable 
technologies are likely to increase material 
demand, but the materials used in the 
production process, such as metal for 
example, lend themselves well to reuse.10,11
The recently published EU 2050 Climate 
Strategy envisions a climate neutral Europe 
by 2050, which is in line with the 2015 
Paris Agreement. Although the strategy 
considers a circular economy as one of 
the main tools to decarbonise European 
industry, it is still not explicit enough about 
its overarching systemic importance – and 
its implementation.12
 No time to waste 
The task is now to link the circular economy 
with and beyond the environmental 
agenda, including industrial and digital 
agendas as well as climate, energy and 
agricultural policy, and develop strategic 
implementation plans.
Apart from the tangible benefits, a 
circular economy could become the EU’s 
new common mission. Surely it is no 
silver bullet to solve the current lack of 
social and political cohesion and must be 
accompanied by the right social policies to 
ensure fair access to the benefits and the 
mitigation of transition costs. However, 
the circular economy is an opportunity 
for true innovation and leadership that is 
collaborative by definition – a promising 
European project. 
Moreover, sustainable resource management 
provides significant opportunities in foreign 
policy, development cooperation as well 
as migration policy. Natural resources are 
closely linked to economic development 
and are important factors in conflict and 
peacebuilding. Studies suggest that over 
the past sixty years at least 40% of all intra-
state conflicts were at least partly linked 
to natural resources.13 The drivers of the 
European and global migration challenge 
can therefore not be seriously addressed 
without a deep understanding and strategic 
management of the global resource 
dynamics. 
Overall, the question is not whether there is 
a need to prioritise the circular economy as 
a European strategy but rather how we can 
start as soon as possible and how we can 
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ensure that all parts of society benefit from 
the gains.
If Europe acts too late, it will be overtaken by 
more innovative economies such as China, 
which is already taking important steps in 
the direction of more circularity. 
Although a circular economy requires 
collaboration across borders, and other 
countries should be encouraged to join 
the transition, shaping the system and 
leading the way for others to follow could 
bring the EU enormous benefits. The risk of 
failing to do so will impede on the Union’s 
ability to anticipate change and surprising 
disruptions. We can end up with large, 
stranded assets: machinery and factories 
that are very costly to adapt to circular value 
chains. 
 Setting clear priorities 
THE EUROPEAN UNION CAN FOSTER 
THE BENEFITS OF THE CIRCULAR 
ECONOMY THROUGH CLEAR 
PRIORITIES AND CONTINUOUS ACTION
Europe is headed in the right direction, but it 
needs to pick up the pace and become more 
strategic to unlock the full potential of the 
transition to a circular economy. The EU has 
introduced important policies in the past few 
years. The current circular economy package, 
presented in 2015 and adopted in 2018, for 
example, puts forward a recycling and reuse 
target of 65% for 2030 (the package proposed 
by the previous Commission in 2014 had 
proposed a 70% target for 2030). The package 
addresses recycling, and proposes to limit 
landfill dumping, reduce food waste and the 
reuse of wastewater and has a strong overall 
focus on plastics and waste management.14,15 
The Commission also introduced an eco-
design directive that deals with appliances’ 
energy efficiency. 
While these and other measures have been 
crucial to initiate the transition, they must 
be seen precisely as that: a starting point 
to continuously improve and enhance our 
efforts. 
Circular economy policies and objectives 
must not only be updated and expanded 
upon, they must become a shared ambition 
across directorates, EU commissioners, 
the EU institutions and member states. 
The benefits of this transition must be 
strategically exploited for the purpose of 
growth, competition, labour, international 
relations, health and the environment. 
Immediate improvements must be combined 
with mid- and long-term strategies to create 
the right conditions in Europe and along 
global value chains for a more circular 
system to emerge – and the EU’s efforts 
must go beyond what the Commission can 
do, to provide the economy and society with 
the long-term ambition and support needed 
for fundamental innovations. 
The list of actions to be decided on and 
implemented in the coming political-
institutional cycle should include the 
following:
In terms of next concrete steps, the current 
Commission should establish where 
increased efforts are needed now, paving 
the way for and sending a clear message 
to the next Commission to immediately 
start developing the next circular economy 
package to signal continuity and leadership. 
It must include more product groups than 
the last package and emphasise extended 
producer responsibility as aligned with 
more stringent eco-design guidelines for 
value retention in the different circular 
3
32 CHALLENGE EUROPE  –  YES, WE SHOULD! EU PRIORITIES FOR 2019-2024
processes (reuse, repair, refurbishment, 
remanufacturing and recycling). It should 
also focus on economic signals and policy 
drivers, such as taxes, subsidies and 
public procurement procedures. Besides 
the greening of the Union’s finances, the 
new package should also highlight the 
importance of the social aspects of the 
transition (employment, inclusiveness, 
local benefits). 
Member states also have an important 
role to play. The upcoming EU Council 
presidencies (Finland, Croatia, Germany, 
Portugal, Slovenia, France, Czech Republic, 
and Sweden) should make circular economy 
one of their top priorities. Those countries 
that are willing to commit need to build a 
coalition of ‘circular economy champions’ 
to promote circular economy among 
their peers, as well as to mainstream the 
development of national circular economy 
roadmaps. These member state champions 
should be encouraged to drive leadership 
and creativity, becoming a designated ‘vision 
group’ (see below).  By setting up a European 
policy fragmentation can be avoided.
An active approach on all levels of 
governance is needed. Cities should take an 
active role in supporting the transition to a 
circular economy. They are in a privileged 
position due to their relative autonomy and 
due to the fact that many circular economy 
opportunities are related to the cities. For 
example, the city of Amsterdam developed 
an explicit strategy that aims to redesign its 
core product- or material chains.
The Commission should establish a multi-
stakeholder group to develop (and promote) 
a vision of a decoupled European economy, 
and the different pathways to get there. 
This group should span across directorates, 
include industr y  and civi l  society 
representatives, and also interact with 
global initiatives. The group should include 
a technical expert committee that can advise 
directorates and assess the potential of 
relevant policies to unleash the untapped 
potential of the circular economy. Policies 
in the areas of research and innovation, 
taxation, trade, agriculture, labour, climate, 
and digitalisation are all crucial to enable a 
circular economy that is in turn beneficial 
for these areas;
The long-term strategies, as well as the 
more immediate steps, must be based 
on a deep understanding of Europe’s 
resource dynamics. The analysis of 
specific implications in terms of risks, 
responsibilities and opportunities must be 
supported by a user-friendly database of 
Europe’s material flows that is embedded 
within a respective global data base (as 
material flows are increasingly global). The 
existing Global Material Flows Database 
hosted by UN Environment provides a good 
starting point, as do the global assessment 
reports such as the Global Resource 
Outlook by the International Resource 
Panel (IRP). However, information on data 
flows must be more specific about societal 
and economic use dynamics, specific risks 
and opportunities, and must become more 
practical for different stakeholder groups. 
An institution like the EU should offer its 
member states methodologies on how to 
assess national resource use implications 
and specific circular economy opportunities. 
Most multilateral research organisations do 
not have programmes specifically devoted 
to the circular economy, yet16– the EU must 
strive to change this.
Last but not least, the EU as an institution 
and its ‘champion’ member states must 
assume the leadership in the pursuit of 
improving the global governance of resource 
use and the circular economy. There is 
currently no multilateral institution to 
monitor and let alone manage global 
resource use, its impacts and the circular 
economy’s huge global potential. A proposal 
for a ‘UN Convention for Natural Resource 
Management’ should be considered. The 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
recognise the importance of resource 
use, particularly goal 12 “Sustainable 
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Consumption and Production”. However, indicators are vague 
and the universal importance of resource use for all the 
other goals is not made explicit enough. Only through global 
cooperation can global resource flows be managed in such a 
way that they support global prosperity. The EU must make a 
concerted effort to promote the discussion of suitable solutions. 
If we want to accomplish the SDGs, we need to make 
sustainable resource management a priority among 
governments, businesses and civil society. If we want to 
advance a competitive Europe and become a global leader, it is 
high time to start the circular economy transition. 
3
If we want to advance 
a competitive Europe 
and become a global 
leader, it is high time 
to start the circular 
economy transition. 
1. UNEP (2016), Global Material Flows and 
Resource Productivity. An Assessment Study of the 
UNEP International Resource Panel. H. Schandl, M. 
Fischer-Kowalski,	J.	West,	S.	Giljum,	M.	Dittrich,	N.	
Eisenmenger, A. Geschke, M. Lieber, H. P. Wieland, 
A. Schaffartzik, F. Krausmann, S. Gierlinger, K. 
Hosking, M. Lenzen, H. Tanikawa, A. Miatto, and 
T. Fishman, Paris: United Nations Environment 
Programme.
2. IRP (2019), Global Resources Outlook 2019: 
Natural Resources for the Future We Want. Bringezu, 
S., Clement, J., Hatfield-Dodds, S., Hellweg, S., Oberle, 
B., Schandl, H. and Cabernard, L., Che, N., Droz-
Georget , H., Ekins, P., Fischer-Kowalski, M., Flörke, M., 
Frank, S., Froemelt , A., Geschke, A., Haupt , M., Havlik, 
P., Hufner, R., Lenzen, M., Lieber, M., Lu, Y., Lutter, 
S., Mehr , J., Miatto, A., Newth, D., Oberschelp, C., 
Obersteiner, M., Pfister, S., Piccoli, E., Schaldach, 
R., Schüngel, J., Sonderegger, T., Sudheshwar, A., 
Tanikawa, H., van der Voet, E., Walker, C., West, J., 
Wang, Z. A. Report of the International Resource 
Panel,	Nairobi:	United	Nations Environment	
Programme.
3. Yong Geng, J Sarkis, R., Bleischwitz (2018), “How 
to globalize the circular economy”, Nature.
4. Dekkers, M, “Why Europe lags on innovation”, 
POLITICO, 21 April 2016. 
5.	World	Economic	Forum	(2016), “The Fourth 
Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to 
respond”.
6. Ellen McArthur Foundation, SYSTEMIQ, Material 
Economics (2017), “Achieving	‘Growth	Within’”.
7. Eurobarometer (2016), EC, SMEs and the Circular 
Economy.
8. ETC Mission Possible (2018), Reaching Net-Zero 
Carbon Emissions From Harder-To-Abate Sectors 
By Mid-Century. A report by the Energy Transitions 
Commission.
9.	OECD	(2018), Improving Markets for Recycled 
Plastics.
10. IRP (2017), Green Technology Choices: The 
Environmental and Resource Implications of Low-
Carbon Technologies. Suh, S., Bergesen, J., Gibon, T. J., 
Hertwich, E., Taptich M. A report of the International 
Resource Panel, Nairobi: United Nations 
Environment Programme.
11. IRP (2019), Global Resources Outlook 2019: 
Natural Resources for the Future We Want. Bringezu, 
S., Clement, J., Hatfield-Dodds, S., Hellweg, S., Oberle, 
B., Schandl, H. and Cabernard, L., Che, N., Droz-
Georget , H., Ekins, P., Fischer-Kowalski, M., Flörke, M., 
Frank, S., Froemelt , A., Geschke, A., Haupt , M., Havlik, 
P., Hufner, R., Lenzen, M., Lieber, M., Lu, Y., Lutter, 
S., Mehr , J., Miatto, A., Newth, D., Oberschelp, C., 
Obersteiner, M., Pfister, S., Piccoli, E., Schaldach, 
R., Schüngel, J., Sonderegger, T., Sudheshwar, A., 
Tanikawa, H., van der Voet, E., Walker, C., West, J., 
Wang, Z. A Report of the International Resource 
Panel,	Nairobi:	United	Nations Environment	
Programme.
12. European Commission (2018), “Our Vision for  
A Clean Planet for All: Industrial Transition”.
13.	UNEP	(2009),	From	Conflict	to	Peacebuilding:	
the role of natural resources and the environment. 
Geneva: UNEP.
14. European Commission (2018), “Environment, 
Implementation of the Circular Economy Action 
Plan”.
15. Ibid.
16. Yong Geng, J Sarkis, R., Bleischwitz (2018),  
“How to globalize the circular economy”, Nature.
q German climate activist Luisa Marie Neubauer (front right) and Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg  
(second right) take part in a “Fridays for Future” demonstration for a better climate policy in Berlin on  
29	March	2019.	Since	December	last	year,	teenagers	across	Europe,	inspired	by	the	16-year-old	Thunberg’s	climate	
fight,	have	been	skipping	classes	and	marching	weekly. © TOBIAS SCHWARZ / AFP 
35EUROPEAN POLICY CENTRE
Making climate 
neutrality the 
galvanising heart  
of a new economic 
agenda for Europe
Martin Porter – Executive Chair of the University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability  
Leadership (CISL) in Brussels 
 Europe’s two-fold  
 existential challenge 
In 2015, the University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability 
Leadership (CISL) published “Rewiring the Economy”, a ten-
year plan to lay the foundations for a sustainable economy, 
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q The urgency and scale of changes necessary to address 
climate change require an immediate and enormous collective effort to make the EU 
climate neutral.
WHAT TO DO: 
q Re-organise for immediate action around the long-term economic goal.
q  Confirm	the	ambition	to	achieve	a	climate	neutral	economy	by	mid-century	at	the	
latest, including a European carbon budget and high scale emissions reduction.
q  Appoint a separate Commission vice-president responsible for climate neutrality 
and sustainability.
q  Create an industrial strategy that incorporates climate neutrality and circular 
economy	objectives	through	more	circular	value	chains	and	a	package	of	cross-
sectoral measures to enable investment and innovation, establish partnerships, 
infrastructure and necessary governance.
q  Connect pan-European strategy and people through energy, mobility and buildings.
4
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built on ten interconnected tasks, delivered by leaders across 
business, government and finance. Re-reading the case for this 
and its agenda for action in 2019, it is striking how the basic 
case for action remains true: that the improvements in quality 
of life and well-being for billions of people across Europe 
and the world are unsustainable in light of rising inequality 
and community breakdown, degrading ecosystems, resource 
depletion and pollution and climate change.
In just a few short years, the sense of urgency has grown 
as these developments have accelerated, and the negative 
impacts have become even more apparent. Any progress 
seems inadequate to the scale of the task. The 2018 IPCC 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) ‘1.5 degrees’ 
report was especially stark in its warning that the window of 
opportunity to avoid dangerous climate change will close by 
2030. Even as we become more aware of the extent of our (un)
sustainability, we continue to collect, produce, consume and 
discard as if nothing’s wrong. Europe is struggling to keep up 
with the magnitude of the challenge and to adapt to the need 
for fundamental change.
In this context, it is an open question how the European 
elections and the (s)election of a new EU leadership will 
affect the European Union’s (EU) ability to effectively address 
climate change and its consequences. The likely increase of 
eurosceptic Members of European Parliament (MEPs) will 
affect Parliamentary business by making majorities more 
difficult to secure and Parliamentary opinion less predictable, 
resulting in a more fragile EU in the years to come. However, 
a wider coalition of pro-European parties is still expected to 
predominate in the next politico-institutional cycle, based 
on a likely enhanced representation of ALDE and the Greens, 
even if the two largest groups – the European People’s Party 
(EPP) and the Socialists – will no longer be able to form a 
‘grand coalition’ in the European Parliament (EP).
Perhaps the deeper significance of the likely outcome of 
the 2019 EP elections relates to the broader rejection of 
the binary left-right thinking and allegiances represented 
by traditional political parties In this context, the European 
election campaign and the debate that has been launched 
about ‘the future of Europe’ are much less about institutional 
introspection or another round of Treaty reform than it is 
about a search for a new mission. This new mission must be 
built upon an updated application of the EU’s established 
principles, be even more clearly relevant to the key challenges 
of the 21st century, and more genuinely popular. It must 
inspire solidarity and enable progress.
It is an open question 
how the European 
elections and the  
(s)election of a new 
EU leadership will 
affect the European 
Union’s (EU) ability 
to effectively address 
climate change and 
its consequences. 
Tackling this 
sustainability crisis 
could be the way 
to reconnect the 
EU’s core principles 
and purpose to a 
genuinely popular 
idea, one that is 
rooted in economic 
innovation and 
modernisation as 
much as it is in shared 
values and common 
interests.
The new EU 
institutions would 
take a bigger political 
risk by dismissing 
these demands or 
offering only timid 
policy response, than 
by embracing them 
and taking bold 
action.
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This is why environmental and sustainable 
development issues are now so crucial. 
For all its resilience, successes and 
continuing potential, if Europe’s current 
model of development is proving to be 
socially and politically unsustainable, the 
evidence that it is environmentally so 
is now overwhelming. The urgency and 
scale of the changes necessary to address 
climate change, biodiversity loss and 
wider ecosystem breakdowns require an 
immediate and enormous collective effort. 
Tackling this sustainability crisis could be 
the way to reconnect the EU’s core principles 
and purpose to a genuinely popular idea, 
one that is rooted in economic innovation 
and modernisation as much as it is in shared 
values and common interests.
 Seizing the moment: Building on the  
 current agenda for climate neutrality 
Despite  widespread concern about 
the insufficient progress made on the 
sustainable development agenda, as well as 
the threat of national populists to the EU’s 
transnational liberal democratic legitimacy, 
there are some positives, including a legacy 
from the 2014-2019 institutional cycle 
which offer hope.
The most relevant is the European 
Commission’s vision and strategy for 
“A Clean Planet for All” published in 
November 2018, along with the institutional 
innovations proposed in its  recent 
assessment of its efforts on the 2030 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
In this sense, there are some grounds 
for cautious optimism that the elections 
and the next term for the Parliament, 
Commission and other EU institutions do in 
fact represent an opportunity.
Surveys, public demonstrations and 
changing consumer behaviour in Europe 
are all signalling a growing momentum 
for real change, and a genuine desire for a 
new economic agenda, notably in response 
to climate change. Quite probably, the 
new EU institutions would take a bigger 
political risk by dismissing these demands 
or offering only timid policy response, than 
by embracing them and taking bold action. 
According to Eurobarometer, EU action 
on climate change can count on a lot of 
(growing) support. It is a policy area where 
international cooperation is considered 
obvious and essential to European citizens 
from all member states. Politicians who 
dismiss the surge in support for the Youth for 
Climate campaign, initiated by the Swedish 
school-girl Greta Thunberg, risk missing the 
boat. A whole new generation realises that 
their future is being decided today and they 
expect their political representatives to take 
much bolder decisions. The new Extinction 
Rebellion movement of civil disobedience 
reflects similar sentiments of frustration 
and impatience, as its own rapid progress 
underlines. These are restless times indeed. 
These kind of concerns are not exclusive 
to climate: high-profile campaigns on the 
extent of plastic production, consumption 
and pollution, notably in oceans, has struck 
a chord among European consumers. Local 
air pollution from cars, power plants or 
heating systems are driving communities 
to demand bans on the dirtiest products 
or processes. Vegan diets and digitally-
enabled, less material-intense life-styles are 
stimulating demand of new products and 
services, from new plant-based or insect-
derived foods to zero-emission mobility 
solutions. 
4
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Consumers now have alternatives to high-
emission power or fuel. There are both 
desirable and affordable options for power 
generated from solar and wind sources, and 
storage. Battery technology’s costs have 
declined so quickly that it is now estimated 
to be cheaper to own a small electric vehicle 
than to buy its internal combustion engine 
(ICE) counterpart. The Union’s legislative 
and regulatory framework, and its financial 
support, have played a significant role 
in enabling change. It has facilitated the 
deployment of renewable energy, the 
improvement of interconnections between 
power grids, tightened emission standards 
for cars and higher levels of investment in 
energy and mobility innovation, all helping 
to spur the demand for and supply of new 
technologies, business models and changed 
consumer behaviour.
All in all, the economic case for the transition 
is stronger and clearer than ever. The 
Commission’s own assessment for its ‘Clean 
Planet for All’ strategy confirms that the net 
zero emissions scenarios are those which 
are most positive for GDP growth, industrial 
development opportunities, employment 
increases, health and well-being for its 
citizens. Also, EU domestic climate action is 
an essential climate diplomacy asset becoming 
increasingly important as the EU’s economic 
and environmental weight on the global stage 
continues to shrink. But it also confirms the 
enormous investment needs, the uneven 
impacts of transition across different regions 
or demographics, and the need for transitional 
measures for businesses to enable them to 
compete in the current global market place 
whilst innovating for the transition. A clear 
agenda should therefore emerge.
 Three priorities for a new economic  
 agenda for a climate neutral Europe 
To achieve a net zero carbon ambition, 
setting priorities is essential. The notion of 
a ‘New Green Deal’ could positively resonate 
with the wider public, by linking the scale, 
urgency and benefits to citizens to a well-
known successful predecessor. The following 
priorities for innovation could lead the way 
in the months and years to come.
PRIORITY 1: RE-ORGANISE FOR 
IMMEDIATE ACTION AROUND THE 
LONG-TERM ECONOMIC GOAL 
Transformational and structural innovation 
requires both a clear sense of direction and a 
shared understanding of the necessary pace 
for success. The essential starting point for 
the new EU leadership will be to confirm 
the ambition to achieve a climate neutral 
economy for Europe by mid-century at the 
latest. This should also include defining 
a European carbon budget, consistent 
with that objective. To drive immediate 
investments in innovation and associated 
actions, there should also be a 2030 target 
of a 55% reduction in emissions and an 
immediate action plan for 2020-2025 that 
sets the EU on the right course. These efforts 
should be intimately associated to the other 
2030 SDGs (Sustainable Development 
Goals). 
A clear political signal should be given 
by including carbon neutrality and 
sustainability among the top political 
priorities of the EU, both in the framework 
of the European Council’s Strategic Agenda 
likely to be adopted in June 2019, and in the 
new Commission’s Strategic Priorities, due 
to be confirmed later in the year. With a 
clear economic focus, these themes should 
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become central to the activities within the European Semester, 
with associated reporting and monitoring. 
Building on the success of the clustering approach of the 
current Commission with regards to ensuring a better co-
ordination of different DG’s input into the implementation 
of the Commission’s strategic priorities, one of the Vice-
Presidents (VPs), should be appointed with the responsibility 
for ‘Climate Neutrality and Sustainability’, with all relevant 
Directorates-General (DGs) reporting primarily to him/her. 
This would be consistent with the options presented by the 
Commission in its assessment report on progress on the SDGs. 
The relevant DGs would include those responsible for Climate, 
Environment, Energy, Transport, Agriculture, Industry and 
Internal Market, Research and Innovation, Regional and Social 
Affairs, all of which are closely concerned with the mid-century 
strategy. There is also a case for the DGs for Competition and 
Trade to work closely within this cluster. With such a clear 
organisational priority and authority, short-term initiatives 
across key areas would then be developed, in line with the 
“Clean Planet for All” agenda.
PRIORITY 2: AN INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY FOR CLIMATE 
NEUTRALITY AND CIRCULAR ECONOMY
There is a combination of circumstances that now favours a 
stronger and more ambitious European industrial strategy, 
strengthening or even replacing the current approach of 
coordinating national ones, and it is essential that this is 
developed and pursued in parallel to the overarching climate 
neutral economy goal. This strategy should also apply to 
industries related to Artificial Intelligence (AI), which has huge 
potential for development and is a crucial potential enabler of 
more obviously relevant industries from a climate neutrality 
perspective. 
Key elements of such an industrial strategy for Europe would 
include measures on mainstreaming circular economy across 
all industries, the electrification of processes and carbon 
neutral infrastructure development – and how to finance of 
all of this rapidly. An industrial strategy should also consider 
activities in the context of circular value chains, and include 
not just resource and energy intensive industry segments 
(such as materials extraction and processing of steel, cement 
and chemicals) but also major associated manufacturing or 
construction industries (including mobility, infrastructure and 
buildings, as well as bio-economy, food, nutrition, and health 
value chains). Opportunities stemming from the pervasive 
and enabling role of big data are evident, as is the potential 
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for industrial leadership in Europe in a wide 
range of different areas.
A policy agenda for advancing this kind of 
strategy includes an integrated package of 
cross-sectoral measures which would seek to:
q Enable investment in innovation at the 
early stage deployment and at the scaling up 
of zero emissions process technologies.
q Establish industrial partnerships to 
develop world-leading industrial combinations 
of companies, investors and other stakeholders 
– such as the batteries alliance.
q Lead and mainstream market development 
through public procurement, a wide-ranging 
revision of existing or new standards for 
products, processes and services, additional 
fiscal incentives.
q Integrate energy market design and 
development with industrial priorities and 
clusters.
q Develop infrastructure, including for a 
minimum capacity of carbon capture and 
storage linking industrial clusters with 
energy distribution and off-shore storage.
q Adopt possible interim measures to 
ensure fair trade with competitors through 
border adjustments. 
PRIORITY 3: CONNECTING A PAN-
EUROPEAN STRATEGY WITH LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES THROUGH ENERGY, 
MOBILITY AND BUILDINGS
As a complement to the ongoing and 
further development of the clean energy 
and mobility packages, there is still a need 
for more initiatives in the areas of energy, 
mobility and buildings. 
Institutional innovations that could help 
in the next period include a European 
Parliament Standing Committee on the 
European Energy Transition and an Energy 
Transition Support Service to help member 
states develop and implement their national 
plans. Both services could help to ensure 
rapid and effective operationalisation of the 
new legislation and regulations. Flagship 
initiatives with clear and understandable 
goals could be launched by the Commission 
to that end, too. An example would be to 
deeply renovate 1 million buildings by 2025.
In addition, a bigger push to accelerate 
experimentation and the take-up of new 
technologies and services that have public 
support would constitute a ‘bottom-up’ 
economic strategy, in which companies 
and entrepreneurs could play a leading 
role along with researchers, public 
administration and civil society actors.
The High-Level Panel of the European 
Decarbonisation Pathways Initiative has 
proposed that a significant budget from 
Horizon Europe could be allocated to the 
development of a number of ‘Transition 
Super-Labs’ for this purpose. These are 
conceived as real-life laboratories where 
systemic innovation for fully climate neutral 
economies can be undertaken, notably in 
locations where such transitions could be 
particularly difficult. These might include 
mining-industrial complexes, conventional 
agricultural regions or metropolitan areas, 
with funding coming from a range of 
different sources in addition to those from 
Horizon Europe. 
This would also become an important 
element of a fully developed regional 
strategy to ensure a ‘just transition’, given 
how each local will be impacted differently 
by the transition to a carbon-neutral 
economy. Public support throughout the 
extended period of significant structural 
change is paramount. A dedicated strategy 
to mitigate the social implications of these 
rapid structural transformations should also 
be envisaged, based on a concerted process 
of upstream and ongoing stakeholder 
discussions. This must result in a range of 
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actions, with an appropriate mix of short-
term remedial measures and long-term 
legislation on vocational education and 
training, and on targeted investment in 
regional development.  
 Conclusions 
Tackle the environmental and sustainability 
crisis at the EU level could be the way to 
reconnect the EU’s core principles and 
purpose to a genuinely popular idea, one 
that is rooted in economic innovation and 
modernisation as much as it is in shared 
values and common interests.
The new EU leadership would take a bigger 
political risk by dismissing these demands 
or offering only timid policy response, than 
by embracing them and taking bold action. 
The economic case for the transition is 
stronger and clearer than ever, whilst the 
costs of delayed or inadequate action both 
obvious and even higher.
The notion of a ‘New Green Deal’ could 
positively resonate with the wider 
public, by linking the scale, urgency 
and benefits to citizens to a well-known 
successful predecessor. Three key areas 
for intervention include institutional 
organisation, industrial strategy and 
engaging local communities in innovation.
The essential starting point for the new EU 
institutions will be to confirm their ambition 
to achieve a climate neutral economy for 
Europe by mid-century at the latest. To 
demonstrate that this is an absolute priority, 
one of the Commission’s Vice-Presidents 
should be made responsible for ‘Climate 
Neutrality and Sustainability’.
Key elements of  a climate-friendly 
industrial strategy for Europe should 
include measures on mainstreaming 
circular economy across all industries, 
the electrification of processes and 
the development of carbon-neutral 
infrastructure – and ideas on how to 
finance of all of this rapidly. In addition, 
research instruments should be devoted 
to achieve a better understanding of the 
impact of this transition, for instance by 
way of real-life laboratories as suggested 
by the High-Level Panel of the European 
Decarbonisation Pathways Initiative.
The priorities of the new EU leadership 
should reflect the fact that environmental 
and sustainable development issues 
are pivotal. The urgency and scale 
of the changes necessary to address 
climate change, biodiversity loss and 
wider ecosystem breakdowns require an 
immediate and enormous collective effort. 
In the next politico-institutional cycle, 
the EU and its member states need to 
collectively live up to the challenge – now 
is the time to act.
4
q A picture taken on 7 May 2014 shows cows and the Malbrouck Castle, built in 1434 and a French national  
heritage site, in Manderen, on the French eastern border with Germany, with in the backround one of the seven 
German	200	metre-high	wind	turbines,	located	just	over	the	border. © JEAN-CHRISTOPHE VERHAEGEN / AFP
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Framework for a new 
European economy
Gunter Pauli – Founder of ZERI and author of The Blue Economy 
A decade ago, my report to the Club of Rome entitled: ‘The 
Blue Economy: 100 innovations, 10 years, 100 million jobs’ 
presented a vision. This vision was based on an understanding 
that nature in general, and a wide range of ecosystems, have 
overcome nearly every imaginable challenge over the past 
millions of years, and therefore provide an inspiration of how 
our society can chart a pathway towards the future. 
We can build on the ingenuity of ecosystems that provide a 
wealth of products and services on which life depends, and then 
strengthen social systems that build up culture, tradition and 
social capital. This provides resilience in adverse times and can 
generate more joy in our lives. It also permits us to learn how to 
live within the obvious limits of the planet, while evolving from 
scarcity to abundance as we have successfully implemented 
in more than 200 projects across the globe1. A new approach 
to creating a sustainable, competitive European economy is 
needed – and this should become a strategic priority for the 
European Union (EU) in the next politico-institutional cycle 
(2019-2024). 
A new approach to 
creating a sustainable, 
competitive European 
economy is needed 
– and this should 
become a strategic 
priority for the 
European Union  
in the next  
politico-institutional 
cycle (2019-2024). 
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q While there is a broad support for the circular economy, 
the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament are not going far enough to 
ensure the transformation towards a truly competitive and sustainable economy.
WHAT TO DO: 
q  Take seriously the concerns of young consumer-citizens, who favour a more radical 
transformation of the modes of productions and devise policies accordingly.
q  Continue the work on the circular economy and expand standards and norms 
beyond macro-economic generalities.
q  Provide the right framework and incentives for developing and deploying new 
solutions against plastic pollution.
5
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It is possible to achieve a relatively 
fast shift from traditional business and 
economic development, which builds on 
globalisation and efforts of enterprises 
to reduce costs and search for ever higher 
economies of scale, to a more sustainable 
and competitive ‘Blue Economy’. 
 The ‘invisible hand’ – The existing 
 economic model is flawed 
There are fundamental shortcomings in the 
existing economic model. It has a narrow 
focus and is based on a limited set of core 
businesses and competences, and favours 
companies that target narrowly defined 
market niches and outsource the majority 
of their activities. This paradigm blinds 
us, making it impossible to see the range 
of opportunities that we could pursue, as 
a company, a region, or a nation. When 
companies adhere to short-term objectives, 
devoid of social and environmental 
considerations, the ‘commons’, the cultural 
and natural resources that should be 
accessible to all members of a society, 
are exploited (as we do with excessive 
consumption of water) or they become 
a place to release our excesses (as we do 
with the release of greenhouse gases into 
the atmosphere). The commons include 
biodiversity, drinking water, the supply 
of oxygen in the air, the availability of 
grazing land for herds, the evolutionary and 
symbiotic path of biodiversity, the cycling 
of nutrients, the build-up of top soil, and so 
much more. 
The logic of enlightened self-interest 
whereby “an individual who intends only 
to improve his own gain, is, as it were, led 
by an invisible hand to promote the public 
interest” (Adam Smith, 1776) has not 
worked. Enlightened self-interest turns into 
destructive behaviour when deployed in the 
realm of the commons, where services and 
production systems are supplied freely by 
nature and have no inherent commercial 
value. Businesses and society have privatized 
the commons for commercial exploitation. 
For example, giving an exclusive licence 
for some to bottle and sell water, deprives 
ecosystems due to the depletion of water 
tables. The commons are also abused 
by the license to dump toxic waste that 
undermines the very premises that guarantee 
the conditions of life. The notion of the 
invisible hand has been criticised since the 
19th century, but this has conveniently been 
omitted from current economic teachings.
In 1833, William Forster Lloyd wrote a 
pamphlet that put forward the concept «the 
overuse of the common by the commoners» 
which was later developed by Garrett Hardin 
as ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, whereby 
individuals acting on their self-interest 
behave contrary to the common good by 
over-using or spoiling common resources. 
Picture an open pasture, where herdsmen 
are allowed to let their animals graze. To 
maximise individual gains, each ‘rational’ 
herdsman would bring as much cattle as 
possible on these commons. However, 
while receiving additional revenue from the 
sale of additional animals, he – together 
with others – would promote overgrazing, 
and thus damage the commons. When the 
problem of overgrazing is recognised, the 
herdsman who has added extra animals does 
not feel responsible – since others have also 
applied the same rationale.
Modern society believes in the freedom to 
exploit the commons and offers companies 
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a license to act accordingly. We have confused the free market 
with the free exploitation of the commons. Now we realise that 
there is not only over-grazing. The «freedom to add extra sheep 
to graze on public land» leads to soil erosion, loss of water 
retention and desertification. Thus, the freedom to pursue 
one’s own interests leads to the destruction of the very basis 
of the ecosystem that supports life. The ‘laissez-faire’ approach 
that has been applied to the market, is unconsciously applied 
to the commons. 
The same logic applies to the miners who pursue their gold, the 
petrochemists who exploit fossil fuels to be turned into plastics, 
those that pollute water or air, and the individuals and institutions 
that pursue the goal of ‘more for me’. This ‘me-first’ attitude 
has led to irreversible climate change, health problems such as 
respiratory diseases, the accumulation of toxic waste around us, 
the depletion of top soil, and the permanent loss of biodiversity. 
The mistreatment of the commons goes hand in hand with our 
free market’s incapacity to fulfil the basic needs of all living people 
on Earth. It is no surprise that poverty is rampant and increasing 
in spite of all the glamour of Sustainable Development Goals. We 
are continuously undermining the ecosystem services that make 
life on Earth viable. 
 The tragedy of the  
 commons: The need for  
 a new approach 
The key for business is not to implement the latest strategy 
for cost reductions, the newest technology, nor the return on 
investment that pleases shareholders beyond expectations 
and surprises analysts. Businesses need to urgently rethink 
their basic model of operations. We need business models that 
strengthen the very conditions on which life depends. How 
could we ever have given a license to a company that destroys – 
often unknowingly – the very environment on which life exists? 
This has to be a clear mission for the new Commission taking 
office at the end of this year.
In the past decades, there have been more efforts to create 
business models that can respond to our basic needs, ensure 
thriving commons, and offer a financial return. We should stop 
pretending that the invisible hand will guide us, and rather 
make a conscious decision to stop, not ‘lessen or slow down’ 
5
There are 
fundamental 
shortcomings  
in the existing 
economic model. 
Modern society 
believes in the 
freedom to exploit 
the commons and 
offers companies 
a license to act 
accordingly.
We are continuously 
undermining the 
ecosystem services 
that make life on 
Earth viable.
Businesses need  
to urgently rethink 
their basic model  
of operations.
Stealing less is still 
stealing! Polluting 
less is still polluting!
46 CHALLENGE EUROPE  –  YES, WE SHOULD! EU PRIORITIES FOR 2019-2024
the exploitation of the commons. The logic is the same as with 
stealing. Stealing less is still stealing! Polluting less is still 
polluting! 
The example of the herdsmen has modern-day analogies. Cattle 
farmers have learned that productivity increases by adding 
antibiotics to animal feed. The additional and faster sales of 
meat offers farmers (and pharmaceutical companies) benefits 
and profits. The downside is that due to the unnecessary 
inclusion of antibiotics in the food chain, bacteria build up 
resistance leading to superbugs that have in 2015 caused an 
estimated 700,000 casualties, and are expected to increase to 
a staggering 10 million additional deaths by 2050.2 Epidemics 
that were thought under control or even eradicated are 
emerging without any antidotes known to the medical world. 
The cost of resistant bacteria has, for example, been estimated 
at $20 billion annually in the US, which is far more than the 
profits obtained by the suppliers of the synthetic drugs.
The healthcare sector provides other worrying examples. 
Resistance to antibiotics is exacerbated by the fact that doctors 
are directly or indirectly rewarded for prescribing antibiotics 
to people. In the US, some 40 million people are prescribed 
antibiotics for respiratory problems every year. In 2013, a 
paper published in the Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy 
estimated that two-thirds of those people may well not have 
needed antibiotics3. The tragedy of the commons is prolonged 
and extended: pharmaceutical companies and doctors earn the 
additional revenue, the economy grows, but the cost is borne 
by society. At the same time, market mechanisms fail to bring 
medical treatments needed to patients who are in urgent need. 
There is demand but no supply, because innovation is stifled by 
the search for ever lower costs and ever larger and standardized 
volumes, which means that ‘specialty illnesses’ receive little to 
no research funding. It is clear that the financial reward for 
innovations in health must be decoupled from sales.
But sustainability and competitiveness can be two sides of the 
same coin. For example, a transition from petrochemistry to 
biochemistry is an enormous opportunity with many winners. 
It can speed up the shift towards the bio-economy, with a 
strong impact in the regions where this transformation is 
taking place. Converting, for example, low value materials like 
straw, or waste such as weeds, into bioplastics and functional, 
high-value products creates jobs, injects cash in the local 
economy, and helps to address a major challenge of today: 
plastic pollution. 
Europe already has a strong emerging bioplastics industry. 
For example, in Italy more than 150 factories and over 
The Commission 
will have to take 
the concerns of this 
new generation of 
consumer-citizens 
seriously and devise 
policies accordingly. 
The institutions 
of the EU have 
to collaborate 
with ambition, 
both in reaching 
environmental targets 
but also in terms of 
guaranteeing the 
competitiveness 
of its primary and 
secondary sectors. 
The Commission must 
develop a strategy 
that will make the 
European economy 
truly sustainable.
In the next 
institutional cycle, 
EU institutions can 
choose to protect 
the old system, or 
embrace new paths 
that respect the 
ecosystem.
47EUROPEAN POLICY CENTRE
4000 employees are contributing to this 
promising business transformation that has 
led to converting old defunct industrial sites 
into production units, dramatic reductions 
of CO2 emissions and hundreds of new 
patents, including: biodegradable capsules; 
compostable fruit and vegetable bags used 
to support treatment of organic municipal 
waste; and an agricultural mulch film 
preventing herbicides and plastic residues 
accumulation in soil. There are hundreds 
of more examples. These achievements 
are the result of joint research efforts 
over decades, made possible by EU public 
and private funds, and driven by a new 
generation of entrepreneurs. Bioplastics can 
be a frontrunner in the emerging circular 
economy, where waste is turned into value 
and soils and water are no longer polluted. 
The next Commission should strengthen 
the entrepreneurial framework that allows 
stranded assets and available biomass to 
be converted to healthy and competitive 
emerging industries.
 The way forward – Leadership and 
political will 
We need to focus on how disruptive 
technologies and disruptive business models 
could transform the present production and 
consumption system to a market economy 
that considers the role and the importance 
of the commons. We need to respect the 
global ecosystem, recognising that without 
it the whole system will degenerate and 
ultimately collapse. We need to put a value 
on the ecosystem, and avoid the ‘tragedy of 
the commons’.
To move in this direction, three things will 
be key:
First, the principles that guide business 
management, such as outsourcing, supply 
chain management and sticking to one 
core business, only assign value to 10% of 
harvested and processed natural resources, 
while 90% ends up as waste: only 0.2% of 
the coffee bean is consumed, 40% of the 
fish is discarded, and weeds are considered 
the wrong plant in the wrong place only 
to be subjected to herbicides. How will 
enterprises explain the shipping of wheat, 
butter, sugar and milk across the globe to 
bake cookies, which are then also shipped 
around the world, to the cohort of new, 
young consumers, who favour a more radical 
transformation of our production and 
consumption patterns? The Commission 
will have to take the concerns of this new 
generation of consumer-citizens seriously 
and devise policies accordingly. 
Second, the present production, distribution 
and consumption patterns do not only 
squander resources and infringe on the 
commons, but the linear and focused 
approach on one core business has blinded 
everyone to the possibility of a vast portfolio 
of opportunities that would come from a 
smarter use of our resources. In 2018, I wrote 
PLAN A with 10 new industrial sectors for 
Argentina. We called it Plan A, because there 
is no Plan (nor planet) B. It is essential that 
the EU institutions continue the work on 
the circular economy and expand standards 
and norms beyond the macro-economic 
generalities. 
The Commission and the European 
Parliament have to work on concrete 
material efficiency targets. Cascading and 
clustering can increase material efficiency 
and create added value. This is technically 
viable and commercially implemented. For 
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example, coffee waste can be turned into 
a substrate for mushrooms, which in turn 
- after harvesting the fungi - is an ideal 
chicken feed. Broken car windshields and 
bottles can be converted to a glass foam 
insulator with a 98% carbon capture rate or 
to abrasives for the wood and paint industry, 
without the need for sand mining of rivers 
and coves. 
Third, plastic pollution is a concrete 
challenge recognised by the industry. 
Plastics in the sea have caught the public’s 
attention, with dramatic images of fish, 
turtles, birds and even whales suffering 
horrific deaths due to polymer products, 
flooding social media. A lot of these products 
can instead be made of compostable and/or 
readily available biological raw materials, 
which do not compete with food and are 
able to regenerate the soil. It is essential 
that the EU institutions provide the 
necessary framework and incentives for 
developing and deploying new solutions. 
The EU institutions should impose the use 
of these materials through public purchase 
guidelines. 
Bioplastics, which degrade in the soil, sun 
and sea, replenish farmland, regenerate the 
local economy and reduce emissions, is a 
prime example of how the circular economy 
can cluster agriculture and chemistry, 
generate higher value and increase Europe’s 
competitiveness. It was therefore a surprise 
that the European Commission’s proposal 
for a Directive on Single-use Plastics in 2018 
did not recognise the role of bioplastics, 
while paper covered with petroleum-based 
polymers were exempted from the directive 
and can still be freely used without any 
limitations. While only a tiny fraction of 
single-use paper products are made in 
Europe, a dominant share of bioplastics are 
produced in the EU. It would surely be in 
the EU’s interest to build on the potential 
that new materials like bioplastics could 
bring. Chemicals represent the largest 
industrial sector of Europe; the EU will have 
to facilitate the acceleration of the sector’s 
transformation towards true sustainability.
The institutions of the EU have to 
collaborate with ambition, both in reaching 
environmental targets, but also in terms 
of guaranteeing the competitiveness of 
its primary and secondary sectors. The 
Commission must develop a strategy 
that will make the European economy 
truly sustainable. However, to succeed, 
businesses must be able to count on a 
legal framework without excessive norms, 
standards and regulations, which permits 
them to introduce innovative products, 
like the substitutes for the much debates 
glyphosate-based herbicides. In the next 
institutional cycle, EU institutions can 
choose to protect the old system, or embrace 
new paths that respect the ecosystem. They 
can choose sustainable growth, or only pay 
lip service to global fora, and the bio- and 
circular economy. Are the European Union 
and its member states really prepared to 
lead this endeavour? This will require an act 
of leadership, which is not easy to find in the 
present political environment.
1.  See here for more information on The Blue 
Economy	project.
2.		Assessment	by	Jim	O’Neill,	formerly	chief	
economist at Goldman Sachs, on behalf of the 
British government and the Welcome Trust.
3.  “The Grim Prospect of Resistance to Antibiotics”, 
The Economist, 21 May 2016.
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Give citizens what they 
want: The case for 
Social Europe and  
fiscal justice
Claire Dhéret – Head of the Social Europe & Well-being Programme, European Policy Centre
Since the financial crisis of 2007-2008, social unrest, 
widespread anger, and violent protests have become part of 
the political landscape in most European countries. Unfettered 
globalisation and the rise of new technologies have created 
unprecedented levels of wealth both in Europe and the rest of 
the world, but have also led to an increase in inequality and 
feelings of insecurity among European citizens. The old recipe 
of redistribution is running out of steam and the European 
dream of economic and social convergence seems further away 
than ever. 
The policy answers to these challenges have, so far, been 
too weak, lacked credibility or have favoured a retreat into 
nationalism, revealing policymakers’ inability to address public 
outcry, on any political level. That is why robust solutions to 
The European dream 
of economic and 
social convergence 
seems further away 
than ever. 
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q Build a more social Europe based on clear initiatives 
(especially	when	it	comes	to	fair	taxation)	that	can	address	people’s	grievances	while	
breathing	new	life	into	the	European	project.
WHAT TO DO: 
q  EU citizens should turn their anger and frustration into an effective vote that  
is coherent with their preference for a more social Europe.
q 	Identify	clear,	concrete,	and	visible	initiatives	that	would	‘give	a	face’	to	Social	
Europe	and	re-energise	Europe’s	social	fabric.
q  More actions at the EU and international level against tax fraud and evasion.
q  Kick-start a serious dialogue with multinational corporates and identify possible 
solutions to increase their support and contribution to the European  
welfare systems.
6
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these trends must be central to the new 
upcoming politico-institutional cycle of the 
European Union (EU) and a priority in the 
future design of ‘Social Europe’. Building 
a more social Europe, based on clear, 
concrete and visible initiatives can address 
people’s most fundamental grievances 
while breathing new life into the European 
project. 
It will not solve all the economic and social 
challenges of the 21st century, which would 
require a profound change of our growth 
model and a reinvention of our social and 
institutional frameworks. But it will definitely 
make Europe stronger in the face of the 
ongoing transition and better prepared for 
upcoming changes. It will also bring more 
stability and enhance trust in the future. 
EU citizens should now seize the opportunity 
of the upcoming European elections in 
May 2019 to make it possible. Their vote 
is necessary to ensure that ‘Social Europe’ 
will feature highly on the post-2019 policy 
agenda. This will require more than an 
implementation and consolidation of previous 
agreements, but also real progress on sensitive 
issues such as taxation and a thorough rethink 
of the social contributions of businesses. 
 The sleeping giant of social unrest 
More recently, the French gilets jaunes 
(yellow vests) have become the embodiment 
of the social and political malaise plaguing 
Europe. While their initial target was the 
French government’s plan to increase fuel 
prices, demonstrations soon turned into a 
protest against poor working conditions, 
rising inequality, a decline in purchasing 
power, and most importantly, against the 
French President Emmanuel Macron. Social 
discontent and resentment have become 
the unifying banner and common factor of 
different parts of society, which may have 
different views on the necessary policy recipes. 
Some commentators argue that the revolt 
of the gilets jaunes belongs to France’s 
cultural heritage. Although the movement’s 
national peculiarities are undeniable, it 
would be too simplistic to reduce it to a 
cultural phenomenon. Social unrest is not 
new in Europe. Over the course of the past 
decade, Europe has already witnessed a wave 
of protests, such as the Indignados in Spain 
and the spread of the Occupy movement 
to several European cities, with hundreds 
of thousands of people occupying public 
squares and calling for more social justice.1 
Evidently, today’s protests are no longer 
targeted at anti-austerity measures as 
was the case with the Indignados or the 
Occupy movement. Expressions of dissent 
and frustration might take different forms 
and do not affect EU countries to the same 
extent. But despite the variety in the timing 
and scope of the protests, their repetitive 
nature and sequence are not a coincidence. 
They have much in common. They are 
symptomatic of a sense of insecurity that 
is shared by many Europeans and the 
expression of what is often described as a 
deep social malaise.2
This feeling of insecurity stems from a 
combination of factors, both real and 
imagined. Many people feel threatened by 
the ongoing changes, such as globalisation, 
increased economic competition, the massive 
use of new technologies and the emergence 
of new business models, the consequences 
of migration, or the disappearing of public 
services, and the continuous need for swift 
adaptation. In a context of aging societies, the 
combination of increased inequality on the 
labour market and subdued growth has fuelled 
anxiety among nearly all social and age groups. 
51EUROPEAN POLICY CENTRE
Young people feel that they will not fare as well as their parents 
did. The middle class fears a race to the bottom and to be 
‘socially downgraded’. Many older people withstand changes in 
an attempt to protect their assets, by, for instance, opposing tax 
reforms aiming at intergenerational redistribution. Europeans 
are also slowly coming to the realisation that economic and 
political power has shifted to other world regions, exacerbating 
the feeling that they have lost control over their own destiny 
and that Europe is no longer ‘making history’, but is rather 
threatened by gradual marginalisation.
Against this background, mainstream politicians strive to (re)-
gain people’s trust. However, the solutions developed so far fall 
short of people’s expectations and fail to address the causes of 
their call for more social justice. In a nutshell, people have lost 
trust in Europe’s social dream.
 Europe’s fading  
social dream 
THE EROSION OF REDISTRIBUTIVE MECHANISMS
Despite differences across Europe, European welfare states 
rely on large redistributive mechanisms, offering a relatively 
high level of social cohesion to citizens. As a corollary, the level 
of taxation in Europe is, on average, high compared to other 
regions (the tax-to-GDP ratio in the EU was 40.2% in 2017 
compared to 34% for all OECD countries and 25.9% in the US). 
However, evidence suggests that the efficiency of redistribution 
has started to erode and that the existing systems have failed 
to eradicate the recurrent and perennial issues of extreme 
poverty, precariousness and inequality. More than 112 million 
people, amounting to 22.4% of the EU population, were at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion in 2017 (women and young people 
especially). Homelessness is increasing in all EU member states 
except Finland and income inequality has risen in sixteen EU 
countries between 2009 and 2017.
ONGOING DIVERGENCES IN EUROPE
In addition to the persistence of social issues in Europe, the 
EU has recently witnessed diverging trends in member states’ 
economic and social performances. Taking the unemployment 
Building a more social 
Europe, based on 
clear, concrete and 
visible initiatives 
can address people’s 
most fundamental 
grievances while 
breathing new life 
into the European 
project.
Many people feel 
threatened by the 
ongoing changes, 
such as globalisation, 
increased economic 
competition, the 
massive use of new 
technologies and the 
emergence of new 
business models, 
the consequences 
of migration, or the 
disappearing of public 
services, and the 
continuous need for 
swift adaptation.
The scope for EU 
measures on social 
policy is limited 
by two general 
principles: the need 
to comply with the 
proportionality and 
subsidiarity principles 
and the fact that 
social policy is a 
shared competence.
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rate as example, one can see that despite better results for the 
total population aged 20-64 across the EU, certain countries, 
in particular Greece, Cyprus, Denmark and Portugal, witnessed 
an increase between 2002 and 2017. The poverty gap also 
continues to widen between member states, with over 30% 
of people in Bulgaria, Romania and Greece that are at risk of 
poverty and social exclusion compared to less than 20% of the 
populations in Finland, Slovakia or the Czech Republic.
AMBITIOUS OBJECTIVES VS INABILITY TO ACT
Promoting inclusion has been one of the three overarching 
objectives the EU has formulated in its latest growth strategy, 
Europe 2020. Addressing social issues at the EU level is in 
line with citizens’ expectations. In fact, the most recent 
Eurobarometer on social issues (2017) found that almost 
two thirds (64%)3 of European respondents are in favour of 
harmonising social welfare systems within the EU. In 2017, 
the EU and its member states adopted the European Pillar of 
Social Rights, a set of principles aiming to foster economic 
and social convergence among member states. At the 
international level, the EU has committed to implement the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), which set ambitious 
social objectives, such as the right to decent work and reducing 
inequalities, by 2030. 
While these commitments should be welcomed, they are 
at odds with the EU’s ability to act. In fact, most of the 
instruments, (financial) means and competences to deliver on 
these promises remain firmly in the hands of member states. 
The scope for EU measures on social policy is limited by two 
general principles: the need to comply with the proportionality 
and subsidiarity principles and the fact that social policy 
is a shared competence, for which the EU can only establish 
minimum requirements that support and complement the 
activities of the member states. 
Furthermore, EU actions, such as legislation on social 
protection, require unanimity, which reflects that member 
states still consider social policies to be a strong bastion of 
national sovereignty. Finally, national governments as well 
as national social partners have different views on whether or 
not it is necessary to build a stronger Social Europe and devote 
more powers to the EU in this area. Such a process could, in 
certain countries, be perceived as a prerequisite for achieving 
upward convergence between member states. This is, for 
instance, the position defended by the French government, 
which is advocating the establishment of a minimum wage 
defined by EU standards in every member state. Countries with 
Policy fragmentation 
on critical issues 
such as labour 
regulation, minimum 
social standards 
and taxation might 
put individual 
member states 
in a competitive 
advantage in the 
short term, but it 
undermines the 
desired objective of 
social cohesion and 
prosperity for all in 
the long term.
National actions to 
combat tax fraud and 
evasion only have a 
limited impact. 
With the EP elections 
approaching very 
soon, citizens will 
get the opportunity 
to turn their protests 
into a constructive 
and effective vote.
53EUROPEAN POLICY CENTRE
high social standards such as the Nordic 
countries, on the other hand, believe that 
EU actions in this area would interfere too 
much with national mechanisms and might 
damage their national social models. And 
still others, such as Germany, which are 
economically stronger than the rest of the 
EU, fear that it would lead to social transfers 
across EU countries. In this context, any 
hope that EU policies can deliver on 
ambitious social objectives is merely wishful 
thinking. 
  The way forward – More of the same? 
In 2019, new EU leaders will take office in 
the European Commission, the European 
Council, the European Parliament as 
well as the European Central Bank (ECB). 
However, there is a real risk that nothing 
much will change in the next politico-
institutional cycle with respect to social 
policy. The political mood of the moment 
is likely to favour further consolidation 
instead of a radical breakthrough in EU 
social policies. This is due to a number 
of factors, including a lack of political 
appetite for joint actions in national 
capitals (as already explained earlier), the 
economic recovery and the emergence of 
other stressors, such as the non-resolved 
migration challenge and the urgent need 
for reaching an agreement on the next 
EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF) covering the period 2021-2027. This 
has made social issues feel less urgent 
despite the persistence of protests. In 
addition, projections about the future 
composition of the European Parliament 
after the 2019 elections indicate that the 
most progressive forces (i.e. the left as a 
whole), who are the strongest supporters 
of an enhanced Social Europe, are expected 
to only get about 35% of seats. Without a 
clear majority for progressive forces in the 
European Parliament, advancing on social 
issues will prove to be very difficult. 
Considering social questions as a subsidiary 
topic is, however, short-sighted. Not only 
will it reinforce people’s opinion of the 
EU as unresponsive and unable to reflect 
citizens’ actual concerns, but it will 
also, once again, kick the can down the 
road when it comes to dealing with the 
unanswered question of how to repair or 
reinvent the social fabric of the 21st century. 
A more constructive alternative lies in the 
hands of EU citizens. 
A CLEAR MANDATE FOR A STRONG 
SOCIAL EUROPE
Europeans are often bogged down in never-
ending discussions about the contours 
and parameters of their common destiny, 
losing sight of the added value of common 
actions and neglecting the global context 
in which Europe operates. This is a self-
defeating strategy. Policy fragmentation 
on critical issues such as labour regulation, 
minimum social standards and taxation 
might put individual member states in a 
competitive advantage in the short term, 
but it undermines the desired objective of 
social cohesion and prosperity for all in the 
long term. 
To reverse this, Europe needs a clear 
and undeniable push from the bottom. 
Change is not likely to come from national 
governments as highlighted earlier, but 
rather from citizens themselves, who do not 
oppose a stronger Social Europe, as many 
might argue. On the contrary, studies have 
shown that they are ready to support it when 
policy design and implications are clearly 
explained.5
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EU citizens should fully grasp the risks 
involved in not having social policy as 
an EU strategic priority in the post-
2019 institutional-political cycle. They 
should acknowledge the implications 
that such a scenario would have on the 
divergences among European countries, 
their social rights and their quality of life 
in the long run. In doing so, EU citizens 
should turn their anger and frustration 
into a constructive vote that is coherent 
with their preference for a more Social 
Europe. They should identify the political 
parties that take a progressive stance on 
issues they consider to be critical to their 
future and which will be able to influence 
the European Parliament’s position 
accordingly. In other words, citizens hold 
the keys to giving the EU the necessary 
tools and means to deliver on ambitious 
social objectives, which can help Europe 
influence the global agenda and become a 
voice and driver of progressive changes. 
To guide people’s vote in that direction, the 
pre-election campaign is a strategic time 
for both the EU institutions and the pro-
European political parties to communicate 
about the cost of a non-social Europe and 
help citizens make informed choices. At 
the same time, they need to identify clear, 
concrete, and visible initiatives that would 
‘give a face’ to Social Europe and allow 
citizens to understand how EU policies could 
help re-energise Europe’s social fabric. 
Much will have to be done to build solid 
foundations for Social Europe. It includes 
the implementation and enforcement of 
previously agreed initiatives, such as the 
European Pillar of Social Rights, which now 
needs to be turned into national policies, 
or the creation of the European Labour 
Authority, which will have to serve as a 
watchdog that will safeguard EU labour law, 
guarantee decent working conditions for EU 
mobile workers, and coordinate the fight 
against social fraud. But the policy area that 
has remained untouched, so far, but requires 
immediate action is taxation, given that 
it can address some of the root causes of 
people’s grievances. 
THE ROLE OF FAIR TAXATION 
The future of Social Europe, and more 
generally of the European welfare states, 
hinges on the fairness and sustainability 
of our tax systems. Re-designing European 
tax systems so that they serve the general 
public’s interest and ensuring that all actors, 
including multinational corporates, play 
a role proportionate to their means needs 
to become a top priority in the EU’s next 
Strategic Agenda.
Oxfam data shows that while the profits of 
multinational companies have increased 
significantly, global corporate tax rates 
have fallen from an average of 27.5% in 
the early 2000s, to 23.6% in 2016. Effective 
ways to address this fiscal imbalance in a 
comprehensive manner have not been found 
yet. Taxation remains one of the crucial 
areas where policy fragmentation prevails, 
both at the European and international level. 
Corporate tax rates vary greatly in Europe, 
which encourages corporates to shop around 
for the best tax regimes. The recent failure 
of the Commission to get member states’ 
support on taxing digital giants’ turnover is 
a case in point. 
In recent years, the media has regularly 
published about the excesses of the world’s 
worst tax havens and reported on major 
scandals of tax fraud and evasion in great 
detail. National actions to combat tax 
fraud and evasion only have a limited 
impact. Workable solutions would require 
more action at the EU, and at a later stage, 
international level. The harmonisation of 
the corporate tax base will be needed in the 
long term. However, despite the European 
Commission’s recent plea to replace the 
unanimity rule by the qualified majority vote 
in certain areas of taxation, such a move still 
looks difficult to achieve given the strong 
opposition of many member states.  
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To pave the way towards such a long-term 
objective, the next European Commission 
needs to undertake two actions. First, 
it should provide political leadership 
by encouraging member states to reach 
agreements between countries who 
are willing to cooperate on the matter. 
Cooperation among a limited number of 
countries is better than no deal at all as it can 
create peer pressure. Second, it needs to kick-
start a serious dialogue with multinational 
corporates while launching a consultation 
process on how to increase their support 
and contribution to the European welfare 
systems. Getting corporates on board is a 
pre-condition for getting the member states 
on board and a necessary step to maximise 
the chances of success. Leadership on 
social impact is increasingly regarded as a 
competitive advantage by the private sector. 
This new context creates an opportunity 
to redefine the social responsibility 
of businesses, one that the European 
Commission should not miss.
Fighting against tax competition is one of 
the very concrete areas where EU actions 
and a truly Social Europe would bring added 
value to European citizens’ lives. It would 
improve the sustainability of European 
welfare states by striking a better balance 
between the contributors and beneficiaries, 
and reinjecting money into public services. 
But beyond financial considerations, it would 
also provide a credible answer to the gilets 
jaunes and all other Europeans who have lost 
trust in the ‘system’ to deliver social progress 
and in Europe’s ability to protect them. 
Furthermore, endowing EU institutions 
with a strong social mandate would have 
the double benefit of creating increased 
homogeneity in social standards within 
the EU and turn Europe into a force of 
progressivism internationally. By doing 
so, the EU could finally become a credible 
voice to move social questions up the global 
agenda and influence discussions on critical 
issues, such as taxation. 
With the EP elections approaching very 
soon, citizens will get the opportunity to 
turn their protests into a constructive and 
effective vote. Obviously, it is also their 
responsibility to ensure that their vote at the 
European level will be backed by a coherent 
choice in national elections, thus avoiding 
the European Parliament being blocked by 
national governments in the Council. This is 
the only way for Europeans and their leaders 
to build a Social Europe that works for all and 
ensure that fiscal and social justice will be at 
the centre of the next paradigm change.
1. 	In	addition	to	social	justice,	the	Indignados’ 
demands as well as those of other similar 
movements, which emerged in the aftermath of 
the	financial	and	economic	crisis	and	persist	until	
today, relate to the current state of democracy. 
Although these two protest banners are often 
intertwined, this paper focuses mostly (for the 
sake of space and clarity) on the social dimension. 
For more information on previous European 
protests, see Stratulat, Corina and Dhéret, Claire 
(2012), “A tale of modern-day capitalism and 
democracy: in view of the European protests”, 
Brussels: European Policy Centre. 
2.  The geographical scope of this social malaise 
is debatable. Whereas some argue that it goes 
beyond European borders and characterises 
the entire Western world, others believe that 
other regions around the globe share the same 
symptoms, such as for instance in North Africa. 
3.  Special Eurobarometer 467 (2017), Future of 
Europe – Social issues.
4.  See Votewatch	Europe’s	projections.
5.  See for instance Vandenbroucke, Frank, Burgoon, 
Brian, Kuhn, Theresa, Nicoli, Francesco, Sacchi, 
Stefano, van der Duin, David, Hegewald, Sven 
(2018), “Risk Sharing When Unemployment Hits : 
How	Policy	Design	Influences	Citizen	Support	For	
European Unemployment Risk Sharing (EURS)”, 
Amsterdam: AISSR. 
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Values
q Romanian protesters march in downtown 
Bucharest demanding an independent 
justice	system	on	3	March	2019.	Protests	
were triggered by a decree adopted the 
week before by the social-democratic 
government, changing the rules for 
nominating	various	categories	of	judges	
and giving additional powers to a new 
disciplinary body.  
© DANIEL MIHAILESCU / AFP
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Restoring credibility 
and trust by enforcing 
the rule of a law
Christian Calliess – Professor for Public and European Law at Free University of Berlin1
Over the past years, the gap between promise and delivery in 
the European Union (EU) has widened.2 Too often, European 
policies have failed to deliver on essential elements defining 
the rule of law. While some national governments have been 
successful in putting political pressure on institutions, others 
have been incapable, or indeed unwilling, to implement agreed 
rules defining European goods and interests. Consequently, the 
EU has lost credibility among its citizens and the trust of its 
member states. 
Therefore, in the next politico-institutional cycle, the EU has to 
find a convincing and efficient answer to the ongoing pressure 
on the rule of law in individual member states. To that end, the 
Union should prevent rule of law backsliding in individual EU 
countries by making full use of its available legal instruments 
and by enhancing the implementation of European law through 
the introduction of a new concept of cooperative enforcement 
(‘agencyfication’). The new EU leadership should push in this 
direction if it wants to regain trust and credibility with regard 
to the defence of European values in the eyes of its citizens. 
During the past 
few years, national 
governments in some 
member states have 
enacted laws that 
have undermined the 
separation of powers, 
the rule of law, and 
human rights. 
The EU has been 
unable to prevent 
this kind of rule 
of law backsliding 
for several, mainly 
political, reasons.
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q	The	EU	has	to	find	a	convincing	and	efficient	answer	 
to the ongoing pressure on the rule of law in individual member states.
WHAT TO DO: 
q  Complement the political procedure stipulated in Article 7 TEU by making full use 
of all legal instruments available. This should include a legal re-interpretation 
of the Article 7 procedure and a restructuring of the European Structural and 
Investment Funds (ESIF) to include rule of law conditionality.
q  Enhance the implementation and execution of European rules with a new concept 
of cooperative enforcement based on a network of national authorities and 
European agencies. 7
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 The challenge of rule of law 
backsliding 
According to Article 2 of the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU), the EU “is founded 
on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of 
law, and respect for human rights.” As these 
values are at the same time “common to 
the Member States”, the countries of the 
EU form a “community of values”.3 While 
accepted and confirmed by all member 
states as a prerequisite for their accession 
to the EU (Article 49 TEU), the fundamental 
values of Article 2 TEU form the basis 
of their national constitutions and their 
membership in the Union. The assumption 
of the Treaties that all member states share 
a certain degree of homogeneity in terms of 
the rule of law, democracy, and fundamental 
rights highlights the importance of unity, 
solidarity, and mutual trust for the proper 
functioning of the EU.
However, during the past few years, national 
governments in some member states have 
enacted laws that have undermined the 
separation of powers, the rule of law, and 
human rights. The Hungarian government, 
for example, has gradually adopted 
legislation that strengthens the political 
control over the independent judiciary 
and media, threatens non-governmental 
organisations, and limits academic freedom. 
Taking cues from Hungary, in 2015, the 
Polish government limited the competences 
of the Supreme Court and used a new 
retirement law to try to force its president 
and other judges out of office before the end 
of their constitutionally mandated six-year 
tenure. As the Supreme Court is able to rule 
on issues such as the validity of elections 
and the legality of protests, these measures, 
aiming to assert political control over the 
judiciary, undermine the rule of law and core 
democratic principles. In 2016, Romania 
has begun to walk down a similar path. The 
social democratic government intervened 
to end the public prosecution’s preliminary 
investigations into certain party politicians, 
as well as to regain political control over the 
judiciary. 
These three national governments did so 
in spite of international criticism, domestic 
protests, and the European Commission’s 
launch of infringement procedures against 
their legislative changes. The EU has been 
unable to prevent this kind of rule of law 
backsliding for several, mainly political, 
reasons. For one, the procedure stipulated 
in Article 7 TEU, which allows the Union 
to intervene in case member states breach 
the fundamental principles of Article 2 
TEU, failed to prevent national sovereignty 
from prevailing over the rule of law. The 
Polish government, for example, proved 
unwilling to comply with the Commission’s 
recommendations. Instead, it publicly stated 
that its actions were “in line with European 
standards” and, as such, they “cannot be the 
basis for formulating the claim that there is 
a systemic threat to the rule of law”.4 
Moreover, party cooperation within umbrella 
groups such as the European People’s Party 
(EPP) has protected in particular the Orbán 
government from open condemnation. 
Furthermore, the Juncker Commission and 
the member states recognise that action 
against rule-breakers would threaten the 
EU’s unity in the face of growing external 
challenges, especially Brexit. 
Questions related to the EU’s ability to resist 
challenges to the principle of the separation 
of powers, the rule of law, and human rights, 
and regain its credibility as a community of 
values, will continue to hang over the next 
politico-institutional cycle like the sword of 
Damocles.5
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While these issues threaten the rule of law 
as a core value of the EU enshrined in Article 
2 TEU and therefore also the Union’s very 
foundations, it also silently wears down the 
integrity of the rule of law in practice, at the 
European level. This occurs when member 
states refuse to respect European rules, 
in general, and the rulings of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), in 
particular.
 The challenge of the implementation 
 and enforcement gap 
By virtue of the rule of law, the EU is a 
“community of law” (“Rechtsgemeinschaft”) 
– a notion coined by the Commission’s first 
president, Walter Hallstein, to emphasise 
that the authority of European law is a 
precondition and tool for integration. Law 
serves as a confidence-building bridge by 
creating reliable common rules that member 
states and European citizens can trust. In 
the words of the CJEU: 
“In permitting Member States to profit 
from the advantages of the Community, the 
Treaty imposes on them also the obligation 
to respect its rules. For a state unilaterally 
to break, according to its own conception of 
national interest, the equilibrium between 
advantages and obligations flowing from 
its adherence to the Community brings 
into question the equality of Member 
States before Community law and creates 
discriminations at the expense of their 
nationals, and above all of the nationals of 
the state itself which places itself outside 
the Community rules. This failure in the 
duty of solidarity accepted by Member 
States by the fact of their adherence to the 
Community strikes at the fundamental 
basis of the Community legal order.”
The “duty of solidarity”, rooted in European 
law (see Article 4(3) TEU: principle of loyal 
cooperation), is a key tool to achieve unity 
in an ever more culturally, socially, and 
politically heterogeneous Union.
While in Europe’s multi-tier system of 
governance the European level depends on 
the national governments, administrations, 
and courts to implement and enforce 
the Union’s law, mutual trust among the 
member states that each of them will deliver 
on the duty of solidarity is a precondition 
for the EU’s unity and credibility among 
its citizens. Nevertheless, there are two 
challenges to this pre-requisite for the 
Union’s proper functioning:
q First, national politicians tend to 
describe unpopular decisions or criticism 
from the EU as the foreign rule of “Brussels’ 
bureaucrats”. Despite the duty of solidarity 
that requires a member state to comply 
with European law even if it is not to 
its advantage, the Brexiteers’ politically 
effective soundbite, “We can have our 
cake and eat it”10, sums up the attitude in 
many member states. More and more EU 
countries tend to welcome the advantages 
of the single market, the euro area, or the 
freedom of movement for their own citizens 
within the Schengen area, but they do not 
want to bear the associated burdens and 
responsibilities for the ‘European goods’ 
entailed by the rules of the Treaties and 
expressed by the duty of solidarity.
q Second, the incapacity of some member 
states’ governments to govern leads to 
an implementation and enforcement 
gap regarding European law that throws 
into question the principle of uniform 
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application, mutual trust among member states, as well as 
the credibility of the EU as a whole. It is not by chance that 
this challenge was addressed by the Commission’s White 
Paper on the Future of Europe in scenario 4 called “Doing less 
more efficiently”.11 Occasionally, EU action is still hampered 
by a lack of competence at the European level but, mostly, 
it is obstructed by the failure to fully operationalise and 
implement the Union’s competences. 
This mismatch between promises by the EU and expectations 
of its citizens, on the one hand, and delivery, on the other, is 
linked to the gap between strong legislative action and little 
enforcement or implementation efforts, which, in principle, 
remain in the hands of the member states due to the EU´s 
system of “executive federalism”.12 The diesel car emission 
scandal, mentioned as an example in the White Paper, 
illustrates this disparity, where EU legislation promises clean 
air and national authorities in many cases fail to deliver. This 
gap stems from a lack of EU enforcement powers, insofar as 
the implementation and execution of EU law is still largely in 
the hands of member states, who must ensure compliance by 
private parties. This situation is clearly different in the United 
States, where a federal agency fulfils this task. Examples 
may also be found in the context of the so-called migration 
crisis, where the EU has been heavily criticised for its slow 
reaction, often due to the division of responsibilities between 
the EU and the member states, particularly in the context of 
implementation and enforcement.
 Key recommendations 
IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 2 TEU  
TO PREVENT RULE OF LAW BACKSLIDING
If a member state does not comply with the common values 
enshrined in Article 2 TEU, the Treaties provide in Article 
7 TEU for a political sanctioning procedure comprising two 
stages. Both of them require a Council decision:
q According to Article 7(1) TEU, the preventive mechanism 
(stage 1) establishing the “clear risk of a serious breach” 
requires ‘only’ a 4/5 majority of the member states.
q Whereas a decision (stage 2) on finding the “existence of 
a serious and persistent breach” (based on which a decision 
Mismatch between 
promises by the EU 
and expectations 
of its citizens, on 
the one hand, and 
delivery, on the other, 
is linked to the gap 
between strong 
legislative action and 
little enforcement 
or implementation 
efforts.
To complement the 
political procedure  
of Article 7 TEU,  
the EU should make 
full use of the legal 
instruments available.
The EU should 
restructure the 
European Structural 
and Investments 
Funds (ESIF) in a 
way that would 
include a rule of law 
conditionality.
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for sanctions could – but does not have to – 
follow), would have to be taken unanimously, 
in line with Article 7(2) and (3) TEU.
In 2018, after years of dialogue with the 
European Commission, measures to 
strengthen political control of the judiciary 
in Hungary and Poland led to the activation 
of the Article 7(1) procedure. As stage 1 lacks 
any sanctions, the intervention of the EU 
appeared to be ineffective.13 Only at stage 
2 (pursuant to Article 7(2) and (3) TEU) can 
a member state be sanctioned if a “serious 
and persistent”, and in this sense evident, 
breach of the rule of law is determined by 
the EU. In this regard, one major obstacle in 
the deployment of the sanction mechanism 
is its rigorous unanimity requirement in 
the European Council. More specifically, 
opposition from only one member state 
in the European Council is sufficient to 
block the political evaluation of a breach 
as “serious” and “persistent”, as well as the 
decision on sanctions that could lead to 
the suspension of that state’s membership 
rights.14 In the case of Poland, the Hungarian 
government was expected not to support the 
decisions implied by stage 2.15
To prevent rule of law backsliding in the 
member states in a more efficient manner 
than so far, and thus to help the EU regain 
its credibility with regard to European 
values without Treaty change, four different 
options are available:
q First, based on the principles of equity 
and good faith, as well as loyal cooperation 
(Art ic le  4(3)  TEU), the  unanimity 
requirement in Article 7(2) and (3) TEU could 
be interpreted by the EU institutions involved 
in such a way that any country being subject 
of a pending Article 7(1) procedure should 
be excluded from voting in the European 
Council on the Article 7(2) determination.16
q Second, to complement the political 
procedure of Article 7 TEU, the EU should 
make full use of the legal instruments 
available. Being the guardian of the 
Treaties, the Commission should activate 
an infringement procedure by which the 
case would be submitted to the CJEU 
(Article 258 TFEU). In this context, the 
Commission would have to argue for an 
extension of the infringement from single 
cases breaching a specific law to systemic 
breaches of the rule of law. In practice, two 
procedures have already been launched 
targeting specific laws, which – according 
to the Commission – among other things, 
threaten the independence of the judiciary 
and, therefore, violate Article 19 (1) TEU.17 
A systemic infringement procedure would 
reach out further and could be launched 
to directly enforce Article 2 TEU, alleging 
a systematic and evident violation of the 
rule of law based on a bundle of measures 
strengthening political influence on the 
independent judiciary by the member state 
concerned.18
Critics argue against this approach 
suggesting that the masters of the Treaties 
created Article 7 TEU as the only procedure 
for enforcing compliance with the values 
of Article 2 TEU.19 However, as there are 
important structural differences between 
the purely political procedure of Article 7 
TEU and the judicial procedure of Article 
258 TFEU, a parallel applicability seems 
justifiable.20 Although the CJEU has not ruled 
on this subject matter, its jurisprudence 
suggests that Article 19 (1) TEU, as “a 
concrete expression of the value of the 
rule of law as stated in Article 2 TEU”21, is a 
suitable standard of review for infringement 
procedures.22 In this context, compliance 
with the rule of law could potentially be 
enforced through a suspension of EU funds. 
This could be accomplished by simply 
applying Article 260(2) TFEU23 given that 
the Treaties do not specify that a sanction 
has to be paid out of the member states’ 
treasury but can instead be deducted from 
its transfers by the EU.24
q Third, the EU should restructure the 
European Structural and Investments Funds 
(ESIF) in a way that would include a rule of 
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law conditionality. This Article 2 TEU value 
conditionality has already been built into 
the Commission’s proposal for the next 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 
for 2021-2027. This idea won widespread 
political support in some member states, 
as well as among civil society, but also 
elicited strong criticism from a number 
of member states and the Council’s legal 
service. According to the latter, Article 7 TEU 
prevents any other form of enforcement of 
the values of Article 2, as it constitutes a lex 
specialis in this area. Although the CJEU has 
not yet pronounced itself on this specific 
issue, it interpreted Article 19(1) TEU in 
another case as “a concrete expression of 
the value of the rule of law as stated in 
Article 2 TEU”. 
 Better implementation  
 by ‘agencyfication’ 
To tackle the described implementation 
and enforcement gap, the EU is in need of 
a new concept of cooperative enforcement. 
It should be based on the principle of 
subsidiarity (Article 5 TEU), expressing 
a  presumpt ion  of  member  s tates ’ 
responsibility by putting the burden of proof 
for action on the EU, on the one hand, and 
the principle of solidarity, on the other.  
According to the new concept of cooperative 
enforcement, national authorities and the 
Commission would build up a network 
of governance with regard to an efficient 
implementation of European rules. This 
network would be based on a toolbox of 
cooperation, ranging from the exchange 
of information to specialised, personnel, 
or technical support by the European level 
(following the example of the Commission’s 
newly established Structural Reform Support 
Service (SRSS)). Where national authorities 
lack the needed capacities, these would have 
to be built up with European assistance. 
Above all, however, safeguards should be 
put in place so that the Commission or a 
European agency could intervene if national 
authorities are unable or unwilling to deliver 
on the agreed objectives.
Similar cases of cooperative enforcement 
were initiated in the Schengen area, where 
the shortcomings in border management, 
asylum procedures, as well as the need to 
enhance efficient cooperation in the area of 
counterterrorism and cybersecurity, became 
key issues. Building on the Treaty principles 
of subsidiarity and solidarity, a European 
agency could step in when a member state 
proves unable or unwilling to implement 
European goals. 
The example of the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) offers a perfect 
blueprint for this kind of ‘agencyfication’. 
Because of the shortcomings exposed during 
the migration crisis, the EBCG was created 
as a model of joint responsibility for border 
management, in which the member states, 
in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity, 
retain primary responsibility for their share 
of Europe’s external border. Functioning – 
and therefore effective – border management 
is, however, in the interest of not only the 
member states with an external border but of 
all EU countries that have abolished controls 
on internal borders in the Schengen area. 
Applying the principle of solidarity means 
that whenever a member state is unable or 
unwilling to effectively protect its national 
external borders, thereby undermining 
the ‘European good’ (effective border 
management for example), the EU acquires a 
fall-back responsibility. 
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With regard to the member states’ 
sovereignty, the application of any means 
of cooperative enforcement should be 
progressive. In a first instance, the agency 
should issue recommendations and 
provide financial, personnel, or technical 
support to countries in need. If national 
authorities are not willing to cooperate, the 
agency should have the competences and 
capabilities to intervene by complementing 
or taking over the responsibilities of 
national authorities in implementing and 
enforcing jointly-agreed rules defining 
European objectives. As this would be 
possible without the specific request of 
the member state concerned and therefore 
probably against its will, this intervention 
would have to be based on a Council 
decision adopted by qualified majority. 
If the member state concerned would not 
be ready to accept this intervention, it 
would be excluded from certain European 
benefits. In the example of the Schengen 
area, this would mean that the member 
state concerned would face internal border 
controls and its citizens would lose their 
right of free movement (Article 21 TFEU), 
which is inevitably linked to a proper 
functioning of the Union’s external border 
management.
This vision is mirrored also in scenario 4 
of the Commission’s White Paper on the 
Future of Europe: As a result of “doing 
less more efficiently”, the EU would be 
able to act faster and more decisively in its 
chosen priority areas. For these policies, 
stronger tools are given to the EU to directly 
implement and enforce collective decisions, 
as is already the case today in competition 
policy or banking supervision.
 Conclusions 
For the past few years, the rule of law – a core 
value and fundamental principle of the EU and 
its member states – has been under pressure 
in the EU. This happened not as a result of 
major political events but rather through a 
process of constant erosion. Therefore, in the 
next politico-institutional cycle, the EU should 
stop this gradual wearing down of its rule of 
law by reinforcing the “community of law”. To 
this end, the EU should:
q Complement the political procedure 
stipulated in Article 7 TEU by making full 
use of all legal instruments available.
q Enhance the implementation and 
execution of jointly-agreed European 
rules with a new concept of cooperative 
enforcement based on a network of national 
authorities and European agencies.
This does not mean a blanket demand for 
a more centralised Europe but a call for a 
more operational EU, able to deliver on its 
citizens’ legitimate expectations. In this 
regard, the rule of law calls for a new working 
method based on the European principles of 
subsidiarity and solidarity. If the incoming EU 
leadership does not pay enough attention to 
this process of erosion, mutual trust among 
member states, the credibility of the EU in 
the eyes of its citizens, and the unity of the 
EU itself will continue to diminish, thereby 
undermining the political legitimacy of the 
European project.
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 Disinformation  
 threatens the core  
 of our democracy 
Disinformation undermines the foundation of our democracy. 
Democracy is based on public deliberation. Public discourse 
enables us to find the best solutions for important social and 
economic problems, and is essential to build popular support for 
policy proposals. This is particularly important during election 
campaigns, when political candidates seek to make their case 
directly to the citizens and compete for their vote. The European 
Parliament (EP) elections and the (s)election of a new European 
Union (EU) leadership for the next politico-institutional cycle 
are therefore a crucial test for the strength of European public 
discourse.
The core of our 
liberal democracy 
– the competition 
for political power 
through elections 
– can only work 
if facts about the 
candidates and their 
political programmes 
are not distorted or 
misrepresented. 
Protecting democracy 
in the EU: Tackling the 
disinformation problem
Stefan Heumann – Co-Director, Stiftung Neue Verantwortung
8
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q The EU member states should develop hard and clear 
rules and update their legal frameworks against disinformation.
WHAT TO DO: 
q Draft clear rules for social media platforms.
 -  Develop a framework that governs the access to data for research.
	 -		Set	firm	requirements	for	transparency	in	political	advertisements.
	 -		Make	companies	disclose	how	they	adjust	algorithms	to	prioritise	quality	 
information	and	journalism.
 -  Set up mechanisms for more information sharing between platforms  
and authorities.
q Hold political parties and campaigns accountable.
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Democracy is all about competition between ideas and for 
voters’ political support. But this competition can only work 
if some ground rules are observed. The most important one is 
that public debate must be rooted in facts. This is particularly 
crucial when we confront highly controversial and polarising 
issues such as the euro or refugee crises. If we do not get our 
facts straight, there is no chance that we can constructively 
debate these issues and argue over the best solutions and 
approaches. 
Even more, the core of our liberal democracy – the competition 
for political power through elections – can only work if facts 
about the candidates and their political programmes are 
not distorted or misrepresented. This is why disinformation 
campaigns – the dissemination of false information with the 
intention to mislead – are such an essential threat to our 
democracy. Disinformation undermines public discourse, fair 
electoral competition, and, on a more basic level, citizens’ trust 
in our democratic institutions.
 Disinformation in  
 the context of new  
 digital communication  
 technologies 
Disinformation has always been a challenge for democracies. 
But due to the rise of new technologies, the scale of the problem 
has become unprecedented. Over the past decades, traditional 
media’s gatekeeping function regarding the publication and 
dissemination of news and information has been dramatically 
eroded. The worldwide web has given anyone who can use a 
computer the ability to publish information. Social media 
provide alternative channels for the distribution of news and 
information on a massive scale, bypassing traditional media 
organisations. 
At the same time, many news organisations have struggled 
to make a successful transition to digital media. Newspapers 
and media organisations have been downsized, and many 
have gone out of business altogether. Quality journalism, with 
its emphasis on thorough and independent fact-checking, 
is in decline, while the opponents of fact-based democratic 
discourses, whether domestic or foreign, are making ever-
Given that the 
problem affects all 
member states, we 
need an EU-wide 
response. 
Amplification by 
domestic actors 
is what makes 
disinformation 
campaigns really 
effective and 
impactful.
To better understand 
the threat landscape 
and vulnerabilities 
across its member 
states, the EU  
should develop  
and implement  
a ‘Disinformation  
Index’.
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8
bolder attempts to dominate and distort 
the new media environment. Digital and 
social media provide them with cheap 
and widely accessible tools to develop and 
launch disinformation campaigns with an 
unparalleled reach.
 Important first steps,  
 but much more needs to be done 
Disinformation’s threat to our democracy 
is serious and very real. Just within the 
last two years we have seen numerous 
examples of its disastrous impact. The 
spread of disinformation in the context of 
the Brexit referendum in June 2016 is only 
the tip of the iceberg. Since the broader 
public became aware of the problem 
during the 2016 presidential election in 
the US, disinformation has played a role 
in every subsequent election and political 
crisis in Europe. Given that the problem 
affects all member states, we need an 
EU-wide response. This is especially the 
case for the regulatory elements affecting 
the large online platforms discussed further 
below. Otherwise, we risk further regulatory 
fragmentation undermining the concept 
of the European digital single market 
or – even worse – lacking the political 
muscle to effectively enact the rules at all.
European institutions have realised the 
gravity of the threat. The European External 
Action Service (EEAS) has set up a strategic 
communications unit to detect, analyse and 
expose Russian disinformation campaigns 
targeting the EU, and particularly its eastern 
member states. The European Parliament 
has conducted hearings and commissioned 
expert reports. In December 2018, the EU 
Commission took on a leadership role 
with the publication of the comprehensive 
action plan against disinformation, which 
is supposed to guard the integrity of the 
EP elections in May 2019. While the plan 
contains some important first steps, such as 
more resources for detection and analysis, 
a code of practice on disinformation for 
major Internet platforms, and the setup of a 
Rapid Alert System to improve information 
sharing and coordination between the EU 
and its member states, the next Commission 
needs to step up its game. These are the top 
priorities that the new Commission together 
with the European Council and the new EU 
leadership in general should address in the 
next institutional cycle (2019-2024):
 Broadening the scope  
 of the action plan 
T h e  p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  d i s t r i b u t i o n 
mechanisms of disinformation are highly 
complex. Some disinformation is pushed 
by foreign actors. But as Stiftung Neue 
Verantwortung has shown in its research on 
the spread of disinformation in the context 
of the German national elections in 2017, 
amplification by domestic actors is what 
makes disinformation campaigns really 
effective and impactful.1 A lot of fake news 
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also originates within member states, and 
the spreading of disinformation is a central 
component of a deliberate strategy by right-
wing populists such as the Alternative for 
Germany (AfD) to mobilise support and 
push their political agenda.2
Effective disinformation campaigns are 
also crafted to appeal to local context. 
They take advantage of social and cultural 
divisions within society and generally 
seek to polarise society even further. 
Disinformation campaigns are particularly 
effective where trust in established 
quality media has been eroding, and 
they particularly appeal to those parts 
of the population who have turned to 
social media as their main source of 
political information. To craft effective 
policy responses, we need a much more 
comprehensive approach at the EU level 
than the current focus on identifying 
and countering foreign, and particularly 
Russian, disinformation within the context 
of the EEAS. EU institutions should also 
look at how they can promote media 
literacy and quality journalism, as well as 
the development of new analytical tools, 
a deeper understanding of what makes 
societies resilient against disinformation, 
and clearer  rules  for  social  media 
companies and political campaigns.    
 An EU Disinformation Index 
A more comprehensive EU-wide approach 
needs  to  be  based on a  thorough 
understanding of the causes and mechanisms 
that drive disinformation campaigns. The 
Action Plan already emphasises research 
and the development of tools for the 
detection, analysis and subsequent exposure 
of disinformation. But as described above, 
broader social, economic, and political factors 
determine how vulnerable EU member states 
are to disinformation. 
To better understand the threat landscape 
and vulnerabilities across its member states, 
the EU should develop and implement 
a ‘Disinformation Index’. The index 
would be based on indicators that seek to 
measure member states’ resilience against 
disinformation. Factors and conditions 
mapped by the index across the EU should 
include: 
q Media markets: media consumption 
patterns, particularly the role of online 
and social media; audience size of different 
media channels; public trust in different 
media channels.
q Political system: number of political parties, 
stability / volatility of recent governments, 
measures of inter-party cooperation / 
polarisation, public trust in government 
institutions.
q Socio-economic conditions: economic 
inequality levels and trends, social mobility, 
cultural diversity / polarisation, migration 
patterns.
q Geo-strategic context: foreign3 ownership 
of media outlets, the reach of foreign media 
channels, past exposure to foreign influence 
campaigns. 
The Disinformation Index would provide 
an overview of the vulnerabilities and 
resilience of EU member states regarding 
disinformation campaigns. This index 
could serve many purposes, including inter 
alia the following more specific tasks and 
objectives: 
q Research into strengths and weaknesses: 
based on findings from the index, the 
Commission could propose a research 
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programme that looks at these factors in more depth and 
investigates their potential for strengthening the resilience of 
democratic societies and institutions against disinformation. 
q Provide input for regulatory responses: the Index could 
also inform member state policymaking with respect to risk 
assessment, vulnerability management, and ultimately market 
regulations on the EU level that seek to steer the power of 
technology back towards democratic outcomes.
q Inform the public: the index will further help to increase 
awareness in government and the broader public about the 
disinformation problem and what factors are linked to it.
q Raise awareness about neglected aspects of the 
disinformation problem: the current debate is too narrowly 
focused on foreign influence campaigns and technological 
aspects, such as the role of bots. The index would perhaps kick-
start a much needed, broader debate about the social, economic 
and political criteria and factors that are important for making 
member states and the EU as a whole more resilient against 
disinformation campaigns.  
 From voluntary code  
 to hard rules 
The European Commission has recognised the importance 
that large Internet platforms play as an infrastructure for 
the distribution of disinformation. In order to push the 
private sector to step up its efforts, a Code of Practice on 
Disinformation was developed and published in September 
2018. The Code is an important first step, the implementation 
of which must be closely monitored. But it cannot substitute 
the need for the EU member states to develop hard and clear 
rules and update their legal frameworks accordingly. 
Across the EU, member states have failed to update their 
legal frameworks regarding political campaigns to account 
for online campaigning and social media. It is not only social 
media companies that must be held accountable, but also 
political parties and campaigns. Political parties and political 
campaigns should not only publish how much money they 
spend on social media campaigns, but also disclose their 
messages and targeting parameters. In general, member states 
need to review their campaign regulations, identify gaps given 
It is not only social 
media companies 
that must be held 
accountable, but also 
political parties  
and campaigns. 
We need to integrate 
domestic forces 
behind the production 
and spread of 
disinformation as 
well as institutions 
that counter the 
effectiveness of 
disinformation  
into our research  
and analysis.
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the rapid technological changes and new 
practices, and adjust their legal frameworks 
accordingly. The EU should help its member 
states to meet this challenge through 
dialogues on sharing best practices and 
developing basic standards for how such 
regulation should be integrated in its rule of 
law framework.   
At the same time, we need clear rules for 
the social media platforms.4 A voluntary 
code will not be sufficient. We are already 
confronted with a situation whereby 
different companies are taking very different 
measures to address the problem.  Rather 
than having the member states take the 
initiative, leading to further fragmentation 
of rules and requirements, the Commission 
should foster the development of EU-
wide rules for online platforms to counter 
disinformation. The Code of Practice and the 
evaluation of its implementation will serve 
as a strong foundation for these efforts. The 
following issues should receive particular 
attention:
 q The EU should develop a framework 
that governs the access to data for research. 
It should spell out what kind of data must 
be made available and under what kind of 
circumstances and restrictions it can be 
used. This framework needs to balance the 
public’s interest in more transparency with 
data protection regulation and the legitimate 
business interests of the platforms. Rather 
than closing access altogether, the framework 
should clearly spell out usage restrictions 
(for example restricting the use of the data to 
publicly-funded research on disinformation 
and other issues affecting fundamental 
rights) and their enforcement; 
q Besides rules for parties and political 
campaigns as mentioned above, the EU should 
also set firm requirements for transparency in 
political advertisements and their targeting 
parameters on online platforms.
q Companies should also be required to 
disclose how they adjust their algorithms 
to prioritise quality information and 
journalism over unverified information and 
disinformation. This includes disclosing 
how they determine the reputation and 
trustworthiness of news sources.
q New mechanisms for more information 
sharing between the platforms and public 
authorities also need to be explored. The EU 
should, for example, study how regulatory 
cyber-security frameworks could be applied 
to the disinformation problem.5
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Conclusion: A comprehensive  
 programme to strengthen the EU  
 against disinformation 
There are no silver bullets or quick fixes to 
solve the disinformation problem. Instead, 
a holistic approach with a comprehensive 
strategy and a wide range of measures is 
needed. 
Important first steps have been taken with 
the Action Plan. But its scope must be 
broadened. As part of the EU Disinformation 
Index, we need to integrate domestic forces 
behind the production and spread of 
disinformation as well as institutions that 
counter the effectiveness of disinformation 
into our research and analysis. This will 
put EU institutions in a position to further 
develop their understanding of what makes 
democracies resilient against disinformation 
and develop policies accordingly.
The new Commission also needs to move 
from voluntary codes to real accountability. 
Instead of leaving it to social media 
companies or political parties to decide what 
is acceptable democratic practice and what 
is not, we need a strong legal framework 
for the protection of the integrity of our 
elections. 
This legal framework must address two 
dimensions. First, what are the rules for 
online campaigning in politics? Second, 
what are the obligations of online platforms 
regarding transparency of political 
advertisements, exposure to disinformation, 
and the protection of free speech, as well as 
the health of our democratic debates? This 
is no easy task. But given what is at stake for 
democracy in Europe, the new leadership of 
the EU institutions will have little choice but 
to take on this challenge. 
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q A member of Doctors Without Borders (MSF) looks at the coast as the Aquarius rescue vessel,  
chartered by French NGO SOS-Mediterranee and Doctors Without Borders (MSF) arrives at the Marseille  
harbour on 29 June 2018. © PAU BARRENA / AFP
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Migration  
and Schengen
q	A	French	police	officer	stands	at	a	border	post	on	the	French-Spanish	border	during	a	border	control	 
(December 2015). © IROZ GAIZKA / AFP
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Safeguarding Schengen 
The next EU leadership should return  
to fact-based policies
Marie De Somer – Head of the European Migration and Diversity Programme at the European Policy 
Centre. She is also a Guest Professor at the KU Leuven Centre for Public Law
Safeguarding the continued existence of the Schengen zone 
should be an immediate priority of the next generation of 
European leaders. At the time of writing (April 2019), the 
Schengen free movement zone has not been border-control free 
for more than three years.
If the next institutional leadership fails to bring Schengen 
back to its normal, that is, pre-2015 state of affairs, the long-
term consequences will be grave. In order to do so, EU leaders 
must counter the distorted discourses that currently surround 
the EU’s valued free movement acquis. 
 Three years of sustained   
 internal border controls 
Starting in September 2015 and following the large arrival 
numbers of asylum seekers over the preceding weeks and 
months, Germany reintroduced checks along its land border 
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q Safeguard Schengen by lifting it out of the negative and 
factually	flawed	discourses	surrounding	it.
WHAT TO DO: 
q   End the spill-over of negative, discursive dynamics in EU affairs. This includes  
the following:
	 -		Member	states’	unsubstantiated	justifications	for	re-extending	internal	border	
checks should not be accepted.
	 -		The	Commission	should	stop	copying	flawed	discourses	around	the	necessity	of	
border controls in the context of its own activities.
9
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and proportionality 
requirements.
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with Austria. A chain reaction followed. Austria and Slovenia 
(still in September 2015) were next to re-introduce border 
controls, initially to avoid becoming ‘culs-de-sac’ where 
asylum seekers could get stranded.1 Between October and 
December 2015, France, Hungary, Sweden and Norway (in 
that respective order) followed suit. In early 2016, Denmark 
and Belgium decided to reintroduce border controls, 
bringing the total to nine countries. Of these nine states, six 
(France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Austria and Norway) 
have continued to uphold border checks until today.
These extended controls have been the subject of much 
controversy. Criticism relates, first, to states’ practices of 
accumulating different legal bases for introducing what 
are intended to be ‘temporary’ controls and, second, to the 
limited justifications adduced for doing so.
With respect to the first point, what has been particularly 
contentious is the constant shifting from one legal basis to 
another for re-introducing (but de facto extending) internal 
border controls once the temporal limits of a certain legal 
basis have been exhausted. The European Parliament 
has publically2 called this out for constituting unlawful 
behaviour3, and certain member states have done so in 
internal documents as well.
As regards the second point, the justifications provided 
for re-instating the controls have been weak and fail to 
meet the legally prescribed necessity and proportionality 
requirements.4 Since 2015, states have predominantly cited 
threats resulting from so-called ‘secondary movements’ 
of asylum seekers from Greece and other states at the EU 
external border into northern-western European states 
as the reason for introducing border checks.5 Arrival rates 
of asylum seekers have, however, dropped significantly 
since mid-2016. While exact figures are hard to come by, 
secondary movements have in parallel, and as reported by 
the European Commission, become ‘limited’. The downward 
trend in secondary movements could, among other things, 
be observed in the decrease of asylum applications “received 
at the internal borders of the member states concerned”.6
In late September 2018, the European Council reported 
that arrival rates at the EU’s external borders had dropped 
with 92% in comparison to the fall of 2015, when border 
checks were first instated.7 However, only a few weeks later, 
France, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Norway 
nevertheless announced that they would, again, re-extend 
the controls at their internal borders. Three of them (Austria, 
Norway and Germany) referred, again, to “continuous 
Justifications provided 
for re-instating the 
controls have been 
weak and fail to 
meet the legally 
prescribed necessity 
and proportionality 
requirements.
These checks seem 
to be informed, 
predominantly, 
by political 
considerations aiming 
to appease the 
electorate.
It will always be 
possible to claim  
that the control  
is not “complete”  
or “fully effective” 
and to continue 
promoting, on that 
basis, a retrenchment 
into nationalist, 
populist solutions  
at the expense of EU 
cooperation.
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significant secondary movements”, whilst 
other notifications mentioned, e.g., security 
threats linked to a “situation at the external 
borders”.8
 Distorted discourses 
The more time passes, the more it becomes 
clear that the internal border controls, 
repeatedly extended despite sustained low 
arrival rates, are not grounded in fact-based 
public policy considerations. Instead, these 
checks seem to be informed, predominantly, 
by political considerations aiming to appease 
the electorate.
It is notable that the six states with 
extended internal border controls are 
all governed by centrist or right-centrist 
governments that are facing considerable 
heat from (far-)right wing political parties 
on the topic of immigration. In Germany, 
mediatised, anti-immigration messaging 
comes from the AfD (Alternative für 
Deutschland) or even from certain CSU 
(Christlich-Soziale Union) politicians. In 
France, it is Marine Le Pen and her National 
Rally party that rail against migrants, 
while in Austria, the anti-immigration 
rhetoric of the Freedom party (FPÖ) can 
be highlighted. Further north, in Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway similar dynamics are 
at play involving, respectively, the Sweden 
Democrats party, the Danish People’s party 
and the Norwegian Progress party.
In such political environments, sustaining 
internal border checks and imparting – in 
that way – an image of a tough immigration 
policy could seem like an intuitively 
sensible response to far-right discourses. 
Even if the controls provide little merit 
from a public policy point of view – given 
the low rate of migration movements – at 
least their symbolic value may provide a 
counterweight to the highly emotionalised 
anti-immigration or ‘loss of control’ 
messaging expounded at the far-right end 
of the political spectrum.
In the long run, however, buying into such 
flawed discourses is self-defeating for 
two reasons: 
q First, in doing so, governments risk 
reinforcing and thus legitimising, even if 
only indirectly, the kind of rhetoric they 
seek to outdo. On that basis, they also 
widen the potential for such rhetoric to 
gain further traction and wider acceptance 
at later stages.  
q Second, the end goals  of  these 
discourses, e.g., “full control over the EU’s 
external borders” or “zero immigration”, 
are unattainable. While there is scope for a 
better control of migration flows, a certain 
degree of unpredictability will continue 
to define the volume and the direction 
of migration flows, as it has always done. 
Accordingly, it will always be possible to 
claim that the control is not “complete” 
or “fully effective” and to continue 
promoting, on that basis, a retrenchment 
into nationalist, populist solutions at the 
expense of EU cooperation.
Domestic developments in Germany around 
the introduction and later extension of 
internal border checks provide a telling 
example of such discursive, repeated-game 
dynamics. The first introduction of internal 
border checks, in September 2015, was, to 
a large extent, a response to the political 
pressure and mediatised claims from right-
wing CSU politicians. Faced with rising 
immigrant arrival rates along the Bavarian-
Austrian land border at that time, politicians 
such as Markus Söder, Bavaria’s then-finance 
minister (now state premier), publicly stated 
that “when the EU’s external borders are not 
protected, the German government needs 
9
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to think about how it will protect German 
borders”.9 Responding to these calls by 
introducing internal border controls and, 
afterwards, continuously re-extending them, 
did not help in assuaging the demands. If 
anything, the opposite happened when in 
the spring of 2018 the then-leader of the 
CSU and Germany’s minister of the interior, 
Horst Seehofer, started advocating for even 
wider as well as intensified internal border 
checks. He envisaged an increased number 
of border control posts, which were to be 
upheld for an undefined period of time; or 
at least “so long as the EU fails to effectively 
control the external border” which, as he 
added, he didn’t “see it being able to do” 
anytime soon.10 These and other demands 
he made would have, effectively, implied a 
dismantling of Schengen. 
Seehofer’s calls provoked a domestic political 
crisis that almost brought down the then 
newly-formed German grand coalition 
government and spilled over onto EU level, 
leading to a tense political atmosphere ahead 
of, and during, the June 2018 EU Summit. 
Eventually, through bilateral negotiations 
between Germany and several southern 
member states, the dust settled. Nevertheless, 
and on a broader level, these kind of discursive, 
repeated-game dynamics, registered in 
Germany and elsewhere, continue to 
jeopardize the future of the Schengen zone. 
 Risks of losing Schengen 
A Europe without Schengen, or with a 
hollowed-out version of Schengen, would 
come at a high cost. At least three immediate 
effects can already be gauged on the basis of 
the effects of the sustained internal border 
checks of the past three years.
q First, in economic terms, a study 
commissioned by the European Parliament 
on the set-up and operationalisation of the 
border checks estimates that costs range 
between €1 to 3 billion in annual operating 
expenses, and can potentially run up to 
€19 billion in one-off costs.11 The broader 
costs connected to the obstacles for the 
road transport of goods (accounting for 
more than 70% of good transport) are much 
larger.12
q Second, there have, and continue to 
be, immediate and obvious consequences 
for tourists and other travellers as they are 
subjected to prolonged identity checks. 
Several media have reported on difficulties, 
for instance, in German airports as travellers 
from Greece were subjected to protracted 
passport controls and connected waiting 
times. In this context, the Financial Times 
also reported on incidents of racial profiling.13
q Third, the sustained controls are a 
source of political tension between different 
member states. For example, the above 
mentioned increased controls targeting 
Greek airlines and travellers led to a row 
between German and Greek authorities.14 
In addition, the internal controls, and the 
economic costs they entail, have been 
criticized repeatedly – and sometimes very 
vocally – by other European states, including 
Poland, Hungary and Slovenia, who are 
feeling the impact of the controls on their 
goods transport sectors and who question 
the sincerity of the stated public policy 
considerations underpinning them.15
Of a less direct but potentially much more 
problematic nature are the larger, long-
term negative effects on public opinion 
on the European project. A Eurobarometer 
survey on ‘European Perceptions on 
Schengen’ published in December 2018 
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documented that a large majority of European citizens 
(seven in ten respondents) agree that the Schengen area 
constitutes one of the EU’s main achievements.16 This 
confirms trends in broader Eurobarometer polls of the past 
few years, which have repeatedly shown that a majority of 
European citizens consider the “free movement of people, 
goods and services” to be the Union’s most important 
achievement, even surpassing that of bringing about 
“peace among the member states”.17 Accordingly, a Europe 
without Schengen would entail fundamental legitimacy 
risks for the European project as a whole. 
 The way forward:  
 Lifting Schengen out  
 of negative discourses 
Safeguarding Schengen is an immediate priority. This needs 
to start by changing the negative and factually flawed 
discourses surrounding the EU’s valued free movement acquis. 
q Border checks need to be lifted at once: the currently low 
number of arrivals and connected secondary movements 
can no longer be used as a sincere justification for sustained 
internal border controls. The six countries upholding 
checks should thus abolish them as soon as possible. Whilst 
this may look like a political hard sell, there is hardly any 
alternative. As the past three years have shown, buying time, 
hoping for the dust to settle or the political pressure from 
the (far-)right to ease is not a viable strategy. If anything, the 
sustained nature of these controls, plays – for the reasons 
described above – into the hands of those advocating for a 
return to nationalist approaches and, ultimately, a Europe 
without Schengen.
Collective and coordinated action involving all six states that 
still uphold controls may make this task easier. As is clear 
from the simultaneous and coordinated announcements to 
the media on national decisions to re-extend border controls 
in October 2018, acting in unison on this file is possible. 
Such unity can, and should, now move in the opposite 
direction, towards a restored Schengen zone. Member states 
should stop referring to one another’s continued border 
checks when framing separate national decisions to that 
effect.18  They should apply the opposite strategy, jointly 
9
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conveying the message that the need for 
internal border controls is no longer there.
q The spill-over of negative, discursive 
dynamics into EU affairs needs to be stopped. 
Responsibility in this respect rests, first and 
foremost, with the European Commission. 
The next Commission should have two 
priorities:
First, member states’ unsubstantiated 
justifications for re-extending internal 
border checks should not be accepted. The 
Commission should make stronger use of the 
proportionality and necessity control tools 
available to it under the Schengen Borders 
Code. This would include sincere reviews of 
the need for sustained border checks against 
the low volume of migration movements. 
Similarly, the repeated allegation that these 
controls amount to unlawful behaviour 
under EU law, including by the European 
Parliament and other member states, merits 
a stronger and more detailed response from 
the Commission.
The Juncker Commission’s poor record 
in terms of procedural control within the 
current framework also casts doubts on 
whether we should expect much from 
the reform of the Schengen Borders 
Code, which the Commission proposed in 
September 2017.19 One of the stated aims 
of these reforms is, precisely, to increase 
procedural control over (re-)introduced 
border checks. However, as the past period 
has made clear, procedural control tools 
do not provide solutions if the will to use 
them is lacking. Political resolve will need 
to come first.
Second, the Commission should stop copying 
flawed discourses around the necessity 
of border controls in the context of its 
own activities. A particularly problematic 
instance of imitating such discourses was 
recently observed in the Commission’s 
proposal to strengthen the European 
Border and Coast Guard (Frontex), among 
other things, by creating a “standing corps 
of 10,000 border guards”.20 According to 
the Commission, an increased mandate 
and resources for Frontex would lead to a 
more effective management of migration 
flows and help to guarantee a high level of 
security within the Union. This constituted, 
in the Commission’s words, a “key condition 
to preserve the Schengen area”. 
Buying into these flawed discourses 
constitutes a self-defeating strategy. For 
instance, and to the visible frustration of the 
Commission’s leadership21, and that of other 
member states22, the proposal immediately 
led to opposition – again – from nationalist, 
populist forces within the European Council 
as Italy and Hungary voiced objections 
related to possible infringements on 
national sovereignty.   
At the same time, this road to nowhere 
carries further risks as, in copying such 
discourses, the Commission implicitly 
acknowledges and thus reinforces the flawed 
logic that internal border checks continue 
to be necessary. This then also hinders the 
creation of political opportunities for lifting 
these checks in future. The next Commission 
should urgently return to factually correct 
messaging and to drawing the obvious and 
correct policy conclusions from such facts. 
In sum, at the national level, and against 
the background of continuously low 
migration numbers, border controls need to 
be lifted at once. Sustaining these checks 
to counter far-right, anti-immigration 
narratives is a self-defeating strategy. In the 
long run, governments risk reinforcing and 
thus legitimising, even if only indirectly, 
exactly the kind of rhetoric they seek to 
outdo. 
At EU level, efforts should, as a priority, go 
towards preventing the further spill-over 
of these national dynamics into European 
affairs. This will require, first, a more 
critical stance on national governments’ 
unsubstantiated justifications for continued 
internal border controls. Second, EU actors, 
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notably the Commission, should refrain from 
taking over flawed discourses themselves; 
e.g., in presenting a strengthened mandate 
for Frontex as “key” to preserving the 
Schengen area. Failing to do so reinforces 
the negative, repeated-game dynamics at 
national level, and hinders the creation of 
political opportunities for collectively lifting 
internal border controls in future. 
There are no alternatives. As the past three 
years have shown, buying time, hoping for the 
dust to settle or the political pressure from 
the (far-)right to ease is not a viable strategy. 
What is at stake is the EU’s most important 
achievement in the eyes of its citizens. 
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Solidarity in EU  
asylum policy: From 
an emergency-driven 
approach to the fair 
sharing of responsibility
Evangelia (Lilian) Tsourdi – Departmental Lecturer of International Human Rights and Refugee Law  
at the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, and a visiting professor at Sciences Po Paris
Policymakers conceptualise the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS) as a “common area of protection and 
solidarity”. And yet, the absence of solidarity and fair sharing 
in the legislative design and implementation of the European 
Union’s (EU) asylum policy is glaringly salient. Increased 
arrivals in the summer and early autumn of 2015, dubbed a 
crisis, overwhelmed the EU and triggered several political and 
legal reactions at the national level. This piece argues that 
rather than a refugee crisis, i.e. a crisis due to the numbers of 
protection seekers, we are actually dealing with a governance 
crisis. The crisis has laid bare the inadequacies of the EU asylum 
policy. In this contribution, I explore the scope and impact of 
the legal principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility 
This piece argues that 
rather than a refugee 
crisis, i.e. a crisis due 
to the numbers of 
protection seekers,  
we are actually 
dealing with a 
governance crisis. 
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q Redesign the CEAS so that it structurally embeds solidarity 
and the fair sharing of responsibility in terms of allocation arrangements and in the 
funding design.
WHAT TO DO: 
q Greater integration between EU and national administrations.
q  Have	a	more	rational	approach	around	protection	seekers’	agency,	their	personal	
circumstances, family and social links.
q  Meaningfully address – rather than merely eschew – the issue of solidarity by 
structurally embedding fair sharing of responsibilities in law and in practice.
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in EU asylum law; I critically analyse the 
EU’s efforts to implement solidarity; and I 
reflect on meaningful ways forward towards 
realising the fair sharing of responsibility. 
The next politico-institutional cycle needs 
to result in a redesign of the EU asylum 
policy, which embeds solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibility structurally, 
rather than linking it with the notion of 
emergency. 
 We need to talk about the CEAS 
Two key factors explain the CEAS’ poor 
performance:
q A first important factor is path dependence, 
which has led to the entrenchment of a 
responsibility-allocation scheme that was 
conceived almost a decade before the EU 
came to exercise powers in the policy area. 
The Dublin system, initially established in 
a 1990 convention outside of EU law, was 
largely blind to fair sharing, let alone to the 
preferences of asylum seekers. It created 
asymmetrical burdens by assigning the 
primary duty to examine an asylum claim 
and to provide materially for asylum seekers 
to the state ‘responsible’ for the asylum 
seeker’s presence in the EU. 
q A second important reason for the CEAS’s 
current troubles is the over-reliance on 
legislative harmonisation as the main 
avenue for achieving the goals of a common 
policy, at the expense of implementation 
efforts. The EU has failed to properly 
consider the administrative dimension of 
the asylum policy. It has sought to provide 
what is effectively a regional public good, 
asylum, by allocating the vast majority 
of obligations – including financial ones 
– to member states with different levels 
of economic development and different 
conceptualisations of welfare.
The principle of solidarity and fair sharing 
of responsibility enshrined in the EU 
Treaties remained a dead letter for several 
years. Eventually the ‘implementation gap’ 
in the EU asylum policy led to the slow 
emergence of measures with a solidarity 
potential: the institutionalisation of 
practical cooperation efforts through an 
EU agency, the European Asylum Support 
Office (EASO); the creation of exceptions to 
the normal responsibility allocation system 
through ad hoc programs of redistribution of 
protection seekers between the EU member 
states (relocation); and the emergence of 
an EU funding component that is geared 
towards complementing national financial 
allocations rather than compensating 
member states for implementing their 
obligations under the CEAS. 
 Solidarity and fair sharing of   
 responsibility in EU asylum law 
Solidarity in asylum matters is not merely 
an aspiration; it is a legally binding 
duty established by the EU Treaties. The 
principle of solidarity and fair sharing 
of responsibility under Article 80 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
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Union (TFEU) profoundly impacts the goal 
of EU asylum policy, dictates a certain 
‘quality’ in the co-operation among the 
different actors, and arguably unsettles its 
implementation modes. Article 80 TFEU 
states:
“The policies of the Union set out in this 
Chapter and their implementation shall be 
governed by the principle of solidarity and 
fair sharing of responsibility, including its 
financial implications, between the Member 
States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts 
adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall 
contain appropriate measures to give effect 
to this principle.”
This provision creates binding legal 
obligations and should impact both the 
legislative and implementation phases. 
The Article’s wording not only permits, but 
in fact requires the adoption of concrete 
measures, whenever necessary. Special 
importance should be attached to the 
Article’s reference to “solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibility”, which implies 
that member states have a duty to go 
beyond simple solidarity mechanisms. The 
aim is to provide support up to the point 
where each member state is contributing 
its fair share. More ambitiously, the 
objective should be to structure the policy 
and its implementation in such a way that 
asymmetrical burdens do not occur in the 
first place. 
Inter-state, intra-EU solidarity is therefore 
a vital legal principle in the context of the 
EU asylum policy. It is structural to this 
policy area and should have far-reaching 
effects. Merely limiting its scope to 
adopting partial, compensatory measures, 
such as short-term deployments, is not 
enough. It requires measures that offset 
the effects of the CEAS that existing 
solidarity measures do not compensate for. 
It can even require a redesign of the CEAS’ 
legislative instruments and, possibly, its 
implementation modes. 
 The prevalence of emergency-driven  
 solidarity in the CEAS 
Notwithstanding the importance of inter-
state solidarity and fair sharing, the CEAS 
currently lacks a genuine system for 
allocating responsibility among the member 
states based on objective indicators. 
EU countries often assert that they are 
‘overburdened’, but such claims cannot be 
objectively substantiated and they raise 
the suspicion, among other member states, 
that the failure to comply with EU law 
obligations derives not from inability but 
from unwillingness. 
Generally speaking, the claim of migratory 
‘pressure’ is not based on pre-defined, 
objective criteria but is merely ascertained 
on a common sense basis. Even when 
objective criteria are evoked to support 
common sense assessments, e.g. the number 
of migrants arriving, there is no clarity 
as to whether migratory pressure should 
be evaluated on an absolute or a relative 
basis. Instinctively, almost any observer 
would agree that the arrival of, say, 20,000 
asylum seekers (an objective metric), will 
have a different impact in Germany than in 
Malta. A more complete understanding of 
fair sharing would seek to put this ‘pressure’ 
into perspective by taking into account 
characteristics of the receiving state, such 
as population, GDP, unemployment rates, 
and so on. 
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Nevertheless, the tweaks to the implementation design of the 
EU asylum policy that aim at operationalising solidarity are 
modest; they are often not embedded in the policy design but 
constitute exceptional, emergency-driven responses. First, 
in what concerns operational support, EASO’s operational 
deployments are targeted at addressing particular pressures 
on the national asylum and reception systems. They were 
supposed to be limited in time. EASO deployees have begun 
to move away from expert consulting and undertake more 
hands-on tasks. In Greece, this includes independently 
conducting parts of the asylum process that entails discretion, 
while final decisions are adopted by the Greek Asylum Service. 
The proposal for a future European Union Agency on Asylum 
(EUAA) uncouples operational support from particular 
pressure, extends the minimum limits of the deployment 
of individual experts and clearly foresees more operational, 
hands on tasks for those deployed. However, deployments of 
the future EUAA are still expected to be limited in time, rather 
than structurally involved in assisted or common forms of 
processing of asylum claims. 
Next, emergency relocation decisions adopted in 2015 
established people-sharing arrangements for the benefit of 
Greece and Italy. They basically consisted of intra-EU transfers 
of asylum seekers between member states as a short-term 
exception to the normal rules on assigning responsibility. These 
relocation schemes established quotas that were obligatory, 
thus representing a first attempt to frame solidarity and fair 
sharing as an obligation, rather than as a discretionary act. 
However, these measures were a temporary derogation to the 
workings of the normal responsibility allocation regime and 
concerned a fixed amount of asylum seekers. A legislative 
proposal on the reform of the responsibility allocation system, 
currently under negotiation, aims at creating a relocation 
mechanism that would be automatically triggered as soon as 
a predetermined threshold is overpassed. In its initial design, 
this mechanism prioritised the goal of externalisation over fair 
sharing, thus undercutting its effectiveness to deliver the latter. 
It saddled member states with additional obligations, while 
excluding asylum seekers found inadmissible from relocation. 
Even for those eligible, the administrative workings of the 
mechanism promised to be unworkable. 
The component of EU funding that is more akin to an 
instrument of solidarity is emergency funding. Emergency 
funding, as its name suggests, was and continues to target 
situations of heavy migratory pressure. The emergency 
component of EU migration funding has been redesigned to 
make it more flexible and has no co-financing requirement, 
The principle  
of solidarity and 
fair sharing of 
responsibility  
under Article 80  
of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the 
European Union 
(TFEU) profoundly 
impacts the goal  
of EU asylum policy, 
dictates a certain 
‘quality’ in the  
co-operation among 
the different actors, 
and arguably 
unsettles its 
implementation 
modes. 
Rather than 
emergency needs in 
the area of asylum, 
these pressures 
point to structural 
needs, and call for 
an overhaul of the 
CEAS implementation 
modes, in view of 
operationalising the 
principle of solidarity 
and fair sharing.
But exporting the 
challenges and 
responses to them is 
not the panacea that 
several policymakers 
think it to be; it is  
not the EU’s newest 
quick fix.
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meaning that the emergency amount 
comes exclusively from the EU budget. 
Nonetheless, emergency funding draws 
from an extremely small overall Home 
Affairs financial portfolio and can only 
partially compensate member states for 
their spending. There is an increasing 
number of contenders for it, including well 
developed economies such as Germany 
and France. Intra-EU humanitarian aid, a 
new non-migration specific funding line 
was established in 2016. It taps financial 
resources from the general EU budget 
and was immediately activated to support 
Greece. However, it is also a time-limited 
measure, with a maximum three-year 
duration. It is geared at responding to an 
emergency situation rather than a structural 
form of financial assistance.
Every effort is being made to suggest 
that it is not necessary to depart from the 
initial implementation design, and that 
solidarity measures seek to address passing 
emergencies, created by force majeure, the 
‘external’ pressure. And yet, some member 
states, such as Greece and Italy, have drawn 
almost constantly from ‘emergency funding’ 
since its inception, while the EASO steadily 
continues to renew ‘emergency plans’ with 
‘special support plans’ on the ground.
Rather than being purely external, the 
pressures are also internal, created by the 
misconception of the implementation 
design of the EU asylum policy itself, and 
the lack of fair sharing. Increased arrivals 
in 2015 have magnified pressures, but they 
did not create them. Rather than emergency 
needs in the area of asylum, these pressures 
point to structural needs, and call for an 
overhaul of the CEAS implementation 
modes, in view of operationalising the 
principle of solidarity and fair sharing.
 Moving forward: Embedding fair 
sharing   of responsibility in law  
and in practice 
The inability of a collective of 28 member 
states, with a population of roughly 500 million 
people, to manage arrival numbers that only 
moderately surpass those that Lebanon, with a 
population of 6 million people, had to deal with 
during the same period, reveals that the current 
crisis is one of governance and solidarity, rather 
than a refugee crisis. 
T h e  ex p l o s i ve  m i x  o f  t h e  i n i t i a l 
implementation construct, combined with 
a responsibility assigning system that had 
glaring disregard for fair sharing, led to 
the establishment of an administratively 
dysfunctional CEAS. Not enough has been 
done to address this. Until 2013, member 
states stubbornly insisted on maintaining the 
implementation design largely unaltered, and 
continued down the path of placing emphasis 
on enhanced legislative harmonisation. Only 
during 2015 did more radical shifts, such 
as the first signs of joint implementation 
through EASO, or baby steps towards more 
structural forms of funding (that are for 
now limited to pooling together different 
emergency funding lines) appeared. 
q But more needs to be done in the next 
politico-institutional cycle to enhance the 
ability of the EU and its members to effectively 
address the governance and solidarity crisis 
we are facing. While the Juncker Commission 
seems to be more aware of implementation 
design issues and the imperative of fair sharing 
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in its latest proposals, there is an externalisation 
pull that is undercutting the success of such 
plans. A more principled approach would be 
a redesign that aims to structurally embed 
solidarity and fair sharing in responsibility 
allocation arrangements and in the funding 
design. We need an implementation construct 
that identifies structural demands instead of 
one that attempts to ‘fix’ the situation with a 
cascade of ‘emergency measures’, hoping that 
lumping them together will somehow add 
up to a structural response. A redesign which 
fully recognises that asylum provision is a 
regional public good and draws the necessary 
consequences.
q One possible pathway is a greater 
integration between the EU and national 
administrations in implementing EU asylum 
policy. This is foreshadowed by the joint 
processing of asylum applications that is 
taking place in Greece, with EU involvement 
through EASO in different stages of the 
asylum procedure, while the final decision 
is adopted by the Greek Asylum Service. 
This will be enhanced in the new mandate 
and envisaged workings of the European 
Union Agency on Asylum proposal. The 
advantages of such an implementation mode 
are a greater steering potential towards 
harmonisation and a slight enhancement of 
fair sharing, to the extent that deployments 
would become lengthier  and more 
numerically robust. This is not to say that 
enhanced administrative integration should 
be celebrated as something that is inherently 
positive. This type of integration brings its 
own challenges, of both a constitutional and 
practical nature, and requires a rethink of 
accountability processes so that it does not 
lead to a de facto watering down of procedural 
guarantees. Alternatively, the redesign could 
realise fair sharing through a compensation 
logic behind funding where the EU covers 
national expenses related to asylum provision 
through the EU budget. This would involve a 
drastic enhancement of the overall volume 
of funding available for the area of freedom, 
security and justice.      
q Any of the two above approaches would 
need to be combined with a more rational 
approach to protection seekers’ agency. 
A future responsibility allocation mechanism 
would need to be better at taking into account 
their personal circumstances (e.g. level of 
vulnerability), family links (including extended 
family) and social links (e.g. language skills), 
without this necessarily entailing the 
establishment of a free choice model. It would 
mean distancing the policy from the coercion 
course, which it is now pursuing with renewed 
fervour. In addition, policy makers would need 
to address the absence of free movement 
rights. At the moment, only the Long-Term 
Residence Directive contains some meagre 
opportunities for free movement. The policy 
redesign would need to foresee some variant 
of post-recognition free movement rights, 
without this necessarily meaning unqualified 
rights to free movement. 
The EU and its members need to address the 
above internal shortcomings in the years 
to come. Yet, they have chosen to move in a 
different direction, given that externalisation 
is becoming the primary goal. But exporting 
the challenges and responses to them is 
not the panacea that several policymakers 
think it to be; it is not the EU’s newest quick 
fix. Externalisation ultimately rests on the 
viability of political agreements struck with 
third country partners. This renders the EU 
hostage to the whims of foreign political 
leaders. It does not address but merely 
delays the conversation on genuine intra-EU 
solidarity. It makes for shaky ground to base 
the redesign of the implementation construct 
of the policy on. Presented as the principal way 
to achieve some relief from unfairly shared 
obligations, it incentivises governments to 
become zealous participants in operations 
with dubious fundamental rights implications. 
Future political leaders and policymakers 
should follow a different path. They should 
seek to meaningfully address – rather than 
eschew – the issue of solidarity by structurally 
embedding fair sharing of responsibilities in 
law and in practice.
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Europe and  
the world
q European Council President Donald Tusk (left) walks with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang upon arrival prior to the start  
of an EU-China summit in Brussels on 2 June 2017. One of the main topics of the summit was how the EU and China can 
fill	the	void	in	the	global	push	to	fight	climate	change	left	by	the	US	withdrawal	from	the	Paris	Agreement.  
© VIRGINIA MAYO / POOL / AFP
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Rules first: The way 
forward for ‘shaping 
power’ Europe
Giovanni Grevi – Head of the Europe in the World Programme and a Senior Fellow at the  
European Policy Centre
The domestic legitimacy and international influence of the 
European Union (EU) largely depend on the EU’s ability to 
advance the well-being and security of Europeans. That 
requires governing globalisation and mitigating confrontation 
across multiple domains. Strengthening a rules-based 
international order is essential to achieving both objectives. 
Whether the EU will be willing and able to play in the top 
league of global shaping powers, alongside the US and China, 
will be critically important for the future of the international 
order and, therefore, for Europe’s own cohesion. 
Over the next five years, the EU should adopt a ‘rules first’ 
strategic approach to frame and guide Europe’s projection 
on the international stage. This approach should harness 
the EU’s considerable rule-making power to both promote 
its interests and values and support multilateralism and 
partnerships on the global stage.1 The EU has long aimed 
to advance international cooperation. This time, however, 
The EU should adopt 
a ‘rules first’ strategic 
approach to frame 
and guide Europe’s 
projection on the 
international stage. 
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q	Adopt	a	‘rules	first’	strategic	approach	to	frame	and	guide	
Europe’s	projection	on	the	international	stage.
WHAT TO DO: 
q  Preserve and reform the transatlantic partnership as a central pillar of European 
security and an essential component of the future international order.
q 	Invest	jointly	in	Europe’s	security	to	become	more	autonomous,	effective	partners	
within	NATO	and	stronger	security	providers	in	Europe’s	neighbourhood.
q  Make the extent and quality of EU-China engagement dependent on ability to 
achieve	a	level-playing	field	based	on	rules	and	reciprocity. 11
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it is different. Recent developments point to a much more 
challenging strategic context for ‘shaping power’ Europe and call 
for a new level of commitment. 
 The risk of a  
post- multilateral world 
Power shifts are leading to an international system that 
many define as multipolar. In fact, the distribution of power 
looks different depending on whether military, economic 
or technological assets are concerned. When it comes to the 
ability to shape the international order – the way in which a 
system works – the world seems to head towards a turbulent 
duopoly with the US and China as the two super-shaping 
powers. 
The recent trajectories of the US and China feature 
both discontinuity in respective strategies and growing 
confrontation. The US is struggling to redefine its leadership in 
a system where it is, and going to be, less dominant than it was. 
China is rising while advancing a political-economic model, a 
worldview and a set of values that are very different from the 
West. While both the incumbent and the emerging superpowers 
are in search of a role, both of them have changed gear in the 
last couple of years.
The Trump administration has broadly disengaged from 
multilateralism, based on the assessment that it no longer 
delivers for the US and that it has been captured by rival 
powers, notably China. Under President Xi Jinping, China has 
taken a much more ambitious, and more assertive, approach to 
international affairs. As made clear at the XIX Party Congress 
in 2017, Beijing aims to become a leading global power in the 
next three decades, while offering China’s model to the rest of 
the world. The change of gear in Washington and Beijing has 
sharpened their latent rivalry. There is a growing consensus in 
the US that China is a strategic revisionist challenger and there 
is growing impatience in China with US influence in Asia and 
on the global stage.
These developments point to two systemically important 
consequences, and a new strategic context for the EU. For 
one, there is a serious risk that Sino-American competition 
emerges as one of the main features of international affairs, 
reverberating across many aspects of world politics. For another, 
Recent developments 
point to a much more 
challenging strategic 
context for ‘shaping 
power’ Europe and 
call for a new level  
of commitment.
In a world headed 
towards a  
post-multilateral  
(dis)order the EU 
needs to change  
gear, like the US and 
China, but take a 
different route.
The EU should take a 
‘rules first’ strategic 
approach, which aims 
to boost Europe’s 
role in shaping an 
open and sustainable 
international order, 
as well as Europe’s 
resilience to cope 
with external 
challenges.
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at this stage neither of the two superpowers 
is championing a rules-based international 
order. The Trump administration has been 
occasionally calling for cooperation among 
like-minded countries but openly endorses 
a transactional worldview while promoting 
the nationalist «America First» agenda. 
China has stated its support for an open 
international economic system but there is 
a mismatch between its words and deeds. 
It has taken a selective approach to global 
governance, while closely guarding its 
sovereignty and national interests.
If unchecked, these trends will likely lead to 
a post-multilateral world. This would not be 
one where multilateralism would suddenly 
disappear, but it would become shallower 
and narrower. This quite plausible scenario 
would seriously challenge the European 
project. Europe was built to replace the 
logic of confrontation with the logic of 
cooperation in international relations. In 
a world headed towards a post-multilateral 
(dis)order the EU needs to change gear, 
like the US and China, but take a different 
route.
 The EU needs a ‘rules 
 first’ strategic approach 
The starting point is that the same trends 
that risk to undermine the EU make it ever 
more valuable for Europeans and, arguably, 
others in the world. In a context marked 
by the revival of nationalism and power 
politics, a rules-based Union of states and 
peoples seeking to establish rules-based 
international cooperation is a global public 
good.
The EU is the living proof that a way to 
conduct international affairs other than 
coercion or sheer transaction can be pursued 
and, crucially, can deliver. This experience 
should be the core of the EU’s message to 
the world – its business card. However, as 
power shifts and ideas compete within a 
harder strategic context, the way in which 
Europe’s identity, assets and rules are 
converted into international influence needs 
to change.
Building on the 2016 EU Global Strategy, 
the EU should take a ‘rules first’ strategic 
approach, which aims to boost Europe’s 
role in shaping an open and sustainable 
international order, as well as Europe’s 
resilience to cope with external challenges. 
With a view to that, Europe’s core asset is 
its rule-making power, understood here 
in broad terms as a combination of EU-
level regulatory and market power and 
the Union’s engagement in multilateral 
cooperation and other partnerships. 
Europe’s strategy should therefore be 
primarily concerned with leveraging this 
power by connecting internal policies 
and assets to external instruments and 
objectives.
This connection can be operationalised in 
multiple, mutually reinforcing ways. The 
EU should foster the implementation of the 
rules and principles included in the many 
agreements concluded with neighbouring 
countries. It should develop stronger 
normative frameworks, for example on 
investment and procurement, and use them 
more strategically as a springboard for 
bilateral or multilateral negotiations. The 
EU’s energy policy encompasses an external 
dimension that helps enhance Europe’s 
energy resilience while advancing regional 
cooperation. Domestic environmental rules 
are the bedrock of the EU’s leadership in 
global climate negotiations. The EU can 
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deploy its regulatory power to establish a level-playing field 
for the application of new technologies in Europe and to help 
shape related multilateral regimes. More broadly, the EU 
can develop industrial, competition and social policies that 
will put it in a stronger position to negotiate with others on 
the governance of a new phase of globalisation. Through a 
strategic approach to connectivity and external investment, 
the EU can extend the reach of its principles and rules in 
targeted ways, while creating a platform for cooperation with 
others. The EU can also leverage its market power to sanction 
the breach of international law. Under a rules first strategic 
approach, these and other tools and vectors of Europe’s rule-
making power should be mobilised to create leverage across 
policy domains. 
 Advancing stability  
 in a volatile world  
This approach does not ignore the revival of power politics 
and geopolitical competition on the global stage. Of course, 
rules may not be enough to cope with aggressive behaviour. 
More broadly, flexible and pragmatic measures are often 
required to cope with complex challenges and unforeseen 
events. However, a rules first approach builds on the backbone 
of Europe’s rule-making power, sets a sense of purpose and 
informs a non-adversarial posture to coping with power 
politics, while seeking to advance rules-based cooperation 
when possible. Europe should be equipped to deal with 
geostrategic competition, including a wide range of security 
threats, while not endorsing a zero-sum worldview. Europe 
should respond with rules to sheer power, with multilateralism 
to unilateralism, with rights to authoritarianism and with 
firmness to intimidation or interference. Rules can be hard, 
because they can coerce behaviour. However, if adopted 
and implemented according to the rule of law, they are not 
arbitrary.
A rules first approach is not necessarily about tight regulation 
either. Different policy issues lend themselves to different 
modes of governance, at the EU or multilateral level, whether 
binding rules or frameworks for coordination. The governance 
of new technologies will require, for example, very close 
partnerships between public bodies and private actors, based 
on a mix of regulation and codes of conduct. However, taking 
a rules first approach matters in many ways. For one, even 
A rules first approach 
builds on the 
backbone of Europe’s 
rule-making power, 
sets a sense of 
purpose and informs 
a non-adversarial 
posture to coping 
with power politics.
A rules first approach 
is not necessarily 
about tight  
regulation either.
With a view to the US, 
the principal objective 
of the EU should be to 
preserve and update 
the transatlantic 
partnership as not 
only a central pillar of 
European security but 
also as an essential 
component of the 
future international 
order.
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guidelines or coordination frameworks 
require close scrutiny about implementation 
and consistency. For another, Europeans 
should agree normative frameworks 
together, as opposed to drift separately in 
spaces where rules are lacking or outdated. 
Finally, even relatively looser normative 
arrangements create a basis for cooperation 
and help foster predictability in a more 
volatile world. 
 Rule-making, strategic  autonomy, 
and politics 
Europe’s rule-making power will be 
essential for progress towards Europe’s 
strategic autonomy. This is about the EU’s 
ability to set objectives and mobilise the 
political will and resources to achieve them, 
in ways that are not primarily defined 
by others. While progress on defence 
cooperation is necessary to achieve a 
degree of strategic autonomy for Europe, 
the next EU leadership should frame this 
debate in larger terms. The four main 
pillars of Europe’s strategic autonomy are 
the single market, the euro, the capacity 
for technological innovation and the 
capacity to provide for its own security. All 
of them require strengthening. The extent 
of strategic autonomy will differ depending 
on the policy domain. Across all of them, 
however, the aim is not for Europe to act in 
isolation but to take more responsibility for 
its security and prosperity, as a platform for 
cooperation with partners. A focus on rules 
is not sufficient for advancing strategic 
autonomy but, in a world of complex 
interdependence and transformative 
technological developments, it is a crucial 
part of that.
A rules first approach is also an antidote 
against opportunistic or hostile divisive 
tactics weakening the EU. For example, 
rules on the functioning of the single 
market or an effective approach to counter 
disinformation through norms and multi-
stakeholder engagement should be the firm 
lines of defence against country-shopping, 
or political interference, by third parties 
within the Union.
Clearly, a rules first strategic approach 
is predicated on the commitment of EU 
member states to shared principles and 
to joint responses to the challenges of a 
new, more muscular phase of globalisation. 
The recent track record of the EU is 
mixed at best. There is a precarious 
mismatch between incremental progress 
on some policy dossiers and deepening 
rifts in European politics. The agenda of 
nationalist and populist parties, whether in 
government or in opposition, weakens the 
credibility of a rules-based EU approach. 
Yet, the EU has proven more resilient than 
many expected. Most Europeans know 
that less Europe means more fragility and 
fewer opportunities. The EU has a positive 
message for citizens in Europe and beyond, 
based on sustainable growth, open societies 
and collective security. By pursuing these 
goals, the EU and national leaders can help 
shape the international order in ways that 
make a positive difference to citizens at 
home.
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 Shaping partnerships with  
the US and China  
The EU will need to work with a wide 
range of partners to implement a rules first 
approach, including state and non-state 
actors, at different levels. However, the way 
in which the EU will deal with the US and 
with China – the two super-shapers of the 
new phase of globalisation – will be critical 
to the viability of its strategy.
With a view to the US, the principal 
objective of the EU should be to preserve 
and update the transatlantic partnership as 
not only a central pillar of European security 
but also an essential component of the 
future international order. While day-to-day 
cooperation continues on a large range of 
issues and mutual economic relations are 
of unparalleled importance to both parties, 
the Trump administration and the EU look 
at international affairs through different 
lenses. This has led to serious differences, 
particularly on key matters of global 
governance, which are unlikely to melt 
away in the run-up to the US presidential 
elections in November 2020. Uncertainty 
over the outcome of these elections makes 
it impossible to anticipate major initiatives 
to redefine the partnership. But the EU 
should operate to create the best conditions 
for strategic engagement whenever the 
opportunity presents itself.
This will require, for example, Europeans 
to invest more and more jointly in their 
own security to become more autonomous, 
effective partners within NATO and 
stronger security providers in Europe’s 
neighbourhood, through the full EU 
toolbox. Close cooperation should be 
fostered on strengthening the resilience 
of all transatlantic partners against cyber 
and hybrid threats. The EU should leverage 
extensive bonds with state and non-state 
actors across the Atlantic to promote an 
inclusive debate and convergence with the US 
on the regulation of emerging technologies. 
Europe’s own efforts to uphold a rules-based 
global order at a time of unprecedented 
challenges can also be seen as an important 
investment in the future of the transatlantic 
partnership. By supporting an order that 
the US, as well as many others, have largely 
benefited from, the EU is also keeping the 
door open for Washington to re-engage.
The strategic challenge of EU-China 
relations over the next five years and 
beyond is to define the terms and the scope 
of engagement between two very different 
economic and political systems. Especially at 
a time of growing tensions between Beijing 
and Washington, the handling of the EU-
China partnership will carry implications 
that go beyond bilateral affairs.
The European Commission and the 
High Representative adopted a Joint 
Communication in March 2019 taking a 
strategic outlook to EU-China relations 
and outlining priority areas for action. The 
Communication calls for a “more realistic, 
assertive and multi-faceted approach” 
to China. It describes the EU-China 
relationship as a complex one, including 
cooperation, competition and rivalry, and 
requiring therefore “a flexible and pragmatic 
whole-of-EU approach enabling a principled 
defence of interests and values.” The extent 
of the bilateral partnership will largely 
depend on the achievement of a level-
playing field based on rules and reciprocity 
across a number of policy areas. As China 
becomes an advanced economy, a leading 
engine of technological innovation and a 
shaping power through, for example, the 
Belt and Road Initiative, the Communication 
makes clear that the core of the partnership 
agenda is shifting accordingly.
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Beyond bilateral issues, the EU should 
strengthen strategic dialogues with China 
on matters of regional and international 
order. These include the respective 
agendas to foster connectivity between 
Europe and Asia and the regulation of new 
technologies. Some progress on the climate 
change agenda shows scope for cooperation 
between the EU, China and other key 
actors. However, larger questions lie 
ahead. Beijing’s approach to connectivity, 
globalisation and global governance differs 
from Europe’s in important ways. The 
question is where China’s priorities as a 
shaping power are alternative to those 
of the EU, where they are compatible 
and where differences can be reduced 
through negotiations. The space to fudge 
this question is contracting. The next EU 
leadership should mobilise the partnership 
with China to tackle it and develop a larger 
agenda for rules-based cooperation, where 
possible.
 Conclusion – Leveraging Europe’s  
 untapped power 
Many dark predictions point to the 
international order unravelling or a new Cold 
War emerging between the US and China. 
However, the future is not preordained. 
Structural changes are inevitable, conflict is 
not. Various trends point to a context wherein 
geopolitical and geo-economic competition 
will intensify and the opportunity for 
multilateral rule-making will shrink. The 
trajectories of the US and China will be 
decisive for the scope of cooperation, 
competition or conflict. So will Europe’s 
way forward, if Europeans will leverage their 
untapped power. 
The next EU leadership should adopt a 
rules first strategic approach that defines 
the Union’s global purpose and organises 
its initiatives. A rules first approach is not 
a rules-only one. The EU and its member 
states will need to be pragmatic to defend 
their interests in specific issues, disputes 
or regions. It is also a strategy that requires 
the EU to work with a wide range of 
partners. However, the Union’s added value 
lies in leveraging Europe’s rule-making 
power to advance EU values and interests 
while striving to strengthen a rules-based 
international order. If Europeans do not step 
up to the task, instability and power politics 
on the global stage will compound political 
turbulence and divisions within the EU.
1. 	See	also	G.	Grevi	(2019),	‘Shaping	Power:	
A	strategic	imperative	for	Europe’,	Brussels:	
European Policy Centre.
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European security  
and defence: A year  
of opportunity and risk
Jamie Shea – Professor of Strategy and Security at the University of Exeter and former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges at NATO; Senior Adviser to the European Policy Centre  
on security and defence policy
2019 is a crucial year for European foreign, security and 
defence policy, with moments of great risk, but also of 
great opportunity. At the beginning of a new politico-
institutional cycle, the European Union (EU) and its member 
states will have to show their determination to assume 
more responsibility as an international security provider. 
Europeans will have to prove their readiness to produce new 
initiatives within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and avoid a renationalisation and regionalisation of 
Europe’s security, while keeping strong links with the United 
Kingdom (UK) after Brexit. To get there, three things need to 
happen: France and Germany should finally show their joint 
determination to move forward on defence; the EU needs to 
upgrade the European Defence Agency (EDA); and the Union 
should implement a number of institutional improvements in 
the years to come.   
2019 is a crucial year 
for European foreign, 
security and defence 
policy, with moments 
of great risk, but also 
of great opportunity. 
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q Prove readiness to produce new initiatives within NATO 
and	avoid	a	renationalisation	of	Europe’s	security,	while	keeping	strong	links	with	the	
UK after Brexit.
WHAT TO DO: 
q 	France	and	Germany	should	show	their	joint	determination	to	move	forward	 
on defence.
q  Upgrade the European Defence Agency.
q  Implement institutional improvements such as a formal EU defence ministers 
council, the appointment of an EU commissioner for security and defence and 
turning the EP sub-committee on defence into a full committee on defence.
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 Three decisive moments 
Looking ahead, three particular moments 
stand out: the 70th NATO anniversary; the 
European elections; and the future EU-UK 
relationship.
70TH NATO ANNIVERSARY
The first will happen in April when NATO 
foreign ministers gather in Washington to 
mark the 70th anniversary of the Alliance. A 
70th anniversary is not usually a landmark 
for special commemoration but the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) badly 
needs a show of unity and calm resolve after 
two contentious summits with President 
Trump at the new NATO headquarters in 
Brussels. NATO observers generally fall into 
two camps: those who worry about Trump’s 
threats to withdraw from the Alliance or 
at least water down the US’s commitments 
to Europe’s defence; and those who look 
instead to what the US actually does in 
practice and the $3 billion and extra troops 
and tanks that it has invested in Eastern 
Europe as part of its European Deterrence 
Initiative since Trump came to power. The 
meeting in Washington is an opportunity to 
reconcile these two trends by re-asserting 
the primacy of the transatlantic link and a 
common sense of purpose.
Of course, the burden sharing debate will 
not go away, even if with a Democrat in the 
White House. After the UK’s departure from 
the European Union, the 22 EU countries 
that are also NATO allies will spend less 
than 20% of the Alliance’s overall defence 
budgets. Yet the NATO commitment 
adopted at the Wales summit in 2014 to 
devote at least 2% of GDP to defence is 
something that the Allies are starting to 
take seriously. Since 2016 they have added 
an additional $41 billion to their budgets, 
a figure that will rise to $100 billion by the 
end of this year and $266 billion by 2024, 
the 2% target date. Around half of the Allies 
will meet the target by then, but all have 
halted the decline and are again increasing 
their defence spending. The Allies are also 
spending more on capability and readiness 
improvements, education and training and 
investing in upcoming technologies such as 
cyber, Artificial Intelligence (AI), space and 
robotics. At the same time, they are opening 
a training mission in Baghdad and staying 
the course in Afghanistan at a time when it 
seems the US is preparing to withdraw. The 
European allies have also gone along with 
the US accusations that Russia has violated 
the INF nuclear treaty even though they 
would hardly welcome a new nuclear arms 
race on the European continent.
So the celebrations in Washington in April 
could be the moment when the Alliance does 
not merely reflect on past glories, but pulls 
together around its three core missions: to 
deter Russia in the east, stabilise the south 
and build resilience against hybrid warfare 
at home. But it could go the other way too. 
Notwithstanding the still overwhelming 
support for NATO in Congress, Trump 
could still disrupt the NATO meeting. 
He could demand more and sooner on 
defence, reasserting that he has the power 
as president to withdraw from NATO, or 
criticize the efforts of France and Germany 
to advance European defence cooperation as 
anti-US, even though this is the only viable 
way to secure the equitable transatlantic 
burden sharing that he demands. So the 
dilemma for NATO’s leadership returning 
to the Alliance’s birthplace is whether to opt 
for a largely ceremonial occasion but then 
fail to convey a sense of NATO’s continuing 
relevance to US interests, or to try to 
produce a set of new initiatives that could 
prompt Trump to intervene or distance the 
US from them.
103EUROPEAN POLICY CENTRE
THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS
The second rendezvous will occur one 
month later in Brussels as EU policymakers 
and MEPs survey the results of the 
European Parliament elections. These are 
happening after the best year for European 
defence in decades. In 2018, there was a 
proposal to set up the European Defence 
Fund, with €13 billion earmarked for that 
purpose in the next Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF) 2021-2027. Two rounds 
of Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO) have produced 34 collaborative 
projects, from helicopter upgrades, drones, 
underwater missiles and acoustics, medical 
deployable units to military mobility and 
an EU Intelligence School. The EU has 
also established a Military Planning and 
Conduct Capability for its non-executive 
missions and is strenghtening its mandate 
to cover one executive operation limited 
to EU Battlegroup size by 2020. France and 
Germany are creating a Security Council 
which could be the genesis of a European 
prototype and have launched ambitious 
research programmes to develop a sixth 
generation fighter aircraft and armoured 
vehicle suite. Moreover, France has launched 
a “European Intervention Initiative” to 
develop an expeditionary culture and mind-
set among its ten participating states. This 
initiative has the advantage of involving 
the post-Brexit UK, Norway, Denmark and 
others who have been less committed to EU 
frameworks.
It has taken a long time for the EU to put 
real money on the table and give the 
European Commission a role in defence-
related R&D but now things are actually 
moving. Naturally there is still much to 
do. European strategic autonomy is a 
nice catch-phrase but it has to be defined. 
Strategic autonomy to do what, where, when 
and how? What would this concept mean 
in terms of the EU’s level of ambition for 
a range of demanding and less demanding 
missions and which combinations of these 
would need to be carried out in parallel? 
What would be the force requirements or 
gaps to be filled and how can PESCO be used 
not only to promote cooperation from the 
bottom up, but also flesh out the EU force 
package from the top down? How can the 
solidarity and mutual aid provisions of the 
Lisbon Treaty (Article 42.7 and Article 222) 
be interpreted, for instance in creating a 
European cyber force or incident response 
centre to counter hybrid attacks? 
Then there is the risk of the European 
elections resulting in more populists and/or 
nationalists of all stripes going to Brussels 
and joining the ranks of the new European 
Parliament, but also the next Commission 
and the ministerial Councils. This could re-
ignite old disputes about Western Europe’s 
neglect of Eastern Europe’s security 
concerns, attitudes towards Russia and the 
search for bilateral or regional agreements 
in preference to Brussels – as exemplified in 
Poland’s offer to the US to fund a permanent 
US division in Poland commonly referred 
to as “Fort Trump”. At a time when the 
US’ retreat from the global stage and its 
unpredictability as well as the instabilities 
all around Europe demand greater resolve 
and coherence in both the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), there 
is a danger of the brakes coming back on 
– and Europe fragmenting into a complex 
set of different arrangements, hiding 
what is in reality a renationalisation and 
regionalisation of its security. This is a 
situation that others would soon exploit and 
from which it would be difficult to recover.
THE FUTURE EU-UK RELATIONSHIP
Finally, the third crucial moment comes 
after the summer holidays in September. 
By then hopefully the passions that marked 
the UK’s departure from the EU will have 
calmed as the UK adjusts to the realities 
of its new position in Europe and the 
world. Once the intense wrangling over the 
Withdrawal Agreement slips into history, 
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attention in London will turn to the future EU-UK relationship. 
Security and defence have hardly featured in the withdrawal 
debates, especially once London realised that they could not 
be brandished as a bargaining chip to gain more concessions 
from Brussels. However, they will be a critical part of the future 
negotiations as both London and Brussels need each other 
in security and defence as much as they do in trade. Getting 
this relationship right will also be vital in addressing the two 
concerns outlined previously, namely transatlantic solidarity 
and EU defence capabilities and coherence.
The UK will still be a major defence player, a nuclear power, 
a P5 member of the UN Security Council and one of the few 
European countries with a – albeit limited – global reach 
buttressed by two brand new aircraft carriers. It represents 
25% of EU defence budgets and around 20% of its overall 
military capabilities. The illustrative scenarios that underpin 
the planning by the EU Military Staff demonstrate that it 
would be difficult for other EU countries to undertake missions 
especially over 6,000 to 15,000 km strategic distance without 
the UK’s maritime, air, space and electronic warfare assets. UK 
offensive cyber capabilities and intelligence, its expertise in 
terrorism and the contribution of its high tech industries to the 
EU defence technology base all make it a key partner. In any 
case, the UK will remain committed to the defence of Europe 
through its leading role in NATO and its battalion in Estonia.
There is no reason to believe that the UK’s departure from the 
EU will make it any less vulnerable to the sort of threats that 
EU countries face on a daily basis. The UK will either seem more 
isolated and vulnerable post-Brexit, or its desire to remain 
globally active will continue to attract adversaries. So there are 
compelling reasons for the UK to want to be closely associated 
with the EU’s defence initiatives even after Brexit, and apart 
from the business opportunities that the European Defence 
Fund can offer to UK companies. The sections of the Political 
Declaration on the Future Relationship concerning security 
and defence are arguably the most convincing of the entire 
document. But much can still go wrong.
For example, the UK will seek to obtain a special status with the 
right of co-decision and involvement in planning, which will 
be difficult for the EU to concede given its reluctance to award 
benefits to non- member states. The UK could use its place in 
NATO to lobby against EU defence projects or brand premature 
talk of a European Army as a threat to NATO. This would 
hardly restore the trust between the EU and UK necessary 
for cooperation in intelligence sharing and cutting edge 
technology developments. On the other hand, the EU will not 
want to be dependent on non-EU sources for vital capabilities 
The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization 
(NATO) badly needs 
a show of unity and 
calm resolve after two 
contentious summits 
with President Trump 
at the new NATO 
headquarters in 
Brussels. 
The celebrations in 
Washington in April 
could be the moment 
when the Alliance 
does not merely 
reflect on past glories, 
but pulls together 
around its three core 
missions: to deter 
Russia in the east, 
stabilise the south 
and build resilience 
against hybrid 
warfare at home.
It has taken a long 
time for the EU to  
put real money on 
the table and give the 
European Commission 
a role in defence-
related R&D but  
now things are 
actually moving.
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if it is serious about its goal of strategic 
autonomy. The exclusion of the UK from the 
future development of the military aspects 
of Galileo shows how difficult it is for the 
EU to share the economic and industrial 
benefits of its spending and investments 
with third party states even if they have 
much to contribute. And if the talks on 
the future relationship sour on trade and 
finance or regulation, discussions on the 
security and defence relationship could get 
complicated as well.
So we must be reminded of Emmanuel 
Kant’s observation that “out of mankind’s 
crooked timber nothing straight was ever 
made” and not expect things to go smoothly 
even in an area where the case for close 
cooperation is overwhelming. But after 
the gruelling and deeply divisive Brexit 
referendum campaign and withdrawal 
negotiations, it will be important for London 
to set a new tone, engage openly with the EU 
and put an offer on the table that makes the 
intention of the UK to support EU defence 
efforts clear. For instance, a UK offer to 
show solidarity if Articles 42.7 or 222 are 
invoked. Or to coordinate positions in the 
UN Security Council and General Assembly. 
Or to earmark logistics and lift capabilities 
for CSDP operations. There is no shortage 
of ideas if the goodwill and imagination 
are there. 
 Exploiting opportunities 
If we can pass successfully through these 
three critical moments in 2019, a more 
promising future presents itself to the new 
European Commission, Parliament and 
High Representative at the head of the EU 
External Action Service (EEAS). But to get 
there, the EU and its member states need 
to show their determination to progress in 
three particular areas.
FRANCO-GERMAN DEFENCE 
COOPERATION
France and Germany should finally show 
their joint determination to move forward 
on defence, something that was sorely 
lacking in the past. The recently concluded 
new Franco-German Friendship Treaty 
signed in Aachen will establish a joint 
Security and Defence Council as well as a 
mutual defence commitment that could be 
the kernel of a future European security 
treaty. Some will say that this mutual 
defence commitment already exists in 
NATO, that it does not pledge the use of 
armed force as the old Western European 
Union (WEU) treaty once did, and that it is 
underwritten largely by US military power. 
But it is a step forward nonetheless if 
mutual defence becomes a commitment that 
Europeans are increasingly willing to assume 
among themselves as a consequence of EU 
membership. At the moment, there is no 
appetite for more treaty change in Brussels 
to codify more formal commitments; but the 
new EU leadership could start the process by 
debating with EU member states what kind 
of commitments they are prepared to accept 
under Articles 42.7 and 222 of the Lisbon 
Treaty. Examples abound: access to each 
other’s cyber defence, forensic and recovery 
capabilities; a focal point for intelligence 
sharing; an EU Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Task Force 
for Salisbury-type incidents; or a stand-by 
European disaster relief force backed by 
dedicated airlift capability and stockpiled 
equipment at various points on EU territory. 
These measures can be reflected in a 
political declaration.
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The French and German defence ministers 
also recently signed an agreement to proceed 
with the first stage of the Future European 
Air Combat System with associated drone 
and ground segment technology. Germany 
has agreed not to procure the US F35 in 
order to have a military requirement for a 5th 
generation aircraft in the 2040 timeframe 
to replace its Eurofighters. This is a key 
requirement to maintain a viable European 
defence technology base. The challenge 
for the next Commission will be to work 
with France and Germany in bringing other 
EU states into this project to ensure its 
commercial viability and spread the benefits. 
Spain has already expressed an interest but 
the Commission could identify suitable 
technology partners elsewhere in the EU, 
especially in Central and Eastern Europe, 
which often feels detached from Franco-
German initiatives. Here the Commission, 
with its new defence R&D responsibility, 
could be more of an honest broker.
UPGRADING THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE 
AGENCY
Another upcoming challenge would be 
to turn the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) into the European equivalent of 
the US DARPA. This would cover the area 
upstream of PESCO and the European 
Development Fund (EDF) by fostering a 
culture of innovation, linking up better with 
the small and medium-sized companies 
and experimenting how civilian technology 
will impact on defence concepts and 
performance. How the new Commission will 
decide to allocate the nearly €4 billion it has 
proposed for defence research will be crucial. 
It needs to back the right technologies, focus 
rather than disperse efforts across the EU 
and link pure R&D better to development 
and commercialisation. Early industry 
involvement and co-ownership will be 
crucial.
INSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS
Finally, there are some institutional 
improvements that could be helpful. One 
would be the establishment of a formal 
EU defence ministers council. The new 
initiatives need a more formal structure of 
supervision and ownership. This, however, 
should not replace the recent good practice 
of EU foreign and defence ministers meeting 
together or back to back.
Another would be the appointment of an 
EU Commissioner for Security and Defence 
to take over from Sir Julian King, but with a 
broader portfolio to oversee defence industry 
consolidation and the technology base. 
The European Parliament should turn 
its sub-Committee on defence into a full 
committee on defence, similar to a national 
parliamentary defence committee and with 
a responsibility for CSDP missions as well as 
the status of EU committed forces, common 
budgets and procurements. 
Finally, the new EU leadership will need 
to reach out to NATO and build the same 
strong relationship that characterised 
the ties between Federica Mogherini and 
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. 
Scheduling more frequent North Atlantic 
Council (NAC)-Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) meetings on common 
preoccupations such as the Balkans, 
Ukraine and the Mediterranean as well as 
committing Commission funding for future 
European transport networks to facilitate 
NATO’s military mobility would be good 
olive branches to extend from one side of 
Brussels to the other.
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The European Union 
and the Balkans:  
In the same boat
Corina Stratulat – Head of the European Politics and Institutions Programme at the European Policy 
Centre in Brussels and member of the Balkans in European Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG)
Marko Kmezić – Assistant Professor, University of Graz and founding member of the Balkans in European 
Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG)
Srdjan Majstorović – President of the Governing Board of CEP Belgrade and member of the Balkans in 
European Policy Advisory Group (BiEPAG)
In the 1990s, the European Union (EU) was confident that 
its socio-economic and political order held universal appeal 
and could be a model for the rest of the world. The end of 
the Cold War marked the triumph of democratic capitalism 
over communism and validated the West’s efforts to promote 
democracy, peace, and trade to its neighbours. Likewise, it 
heartened surrounding countries – until 2004/2007 in Central 
and Eastern Europe and still today in the Balkans1 – to try 
to emulate the West “as the shortest pathway to freedom 
and prosperity”.2 The focus then fell squarely on the type of 
institutions and policies that needed to be transferred and 
copied, respectively.3
But if for three decades the EU has been preoccupied by 
how to transform its vicinity, the main concern today is 
The EU should 
strengthen and 
diversify the ways  
in which it reaches 
out to its allies  
in the Balkans,  
who, in any case, 
share the same 
problems and 
interests.
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q The EU should strengthen and diversify the ways in which 
it reaches out to its allies in the Balkans, who share the same problems and interests.
WHAT TO DO: 
q  Involve all Balkan governments and parliaments as observers in selected meetings and 
intensify bilateral contact with member states about policy issues of mutual concern.
q Mandate	a	specific	Commissioner	for	Balkan	enlargement.
q Balkan governments should clean up their democratic record.
q The	EU	should	provide	more	financial	and	technical	support	to	the	Balkans.
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how the West itself is being transformed 
by modern-day challenges: globalisation, 
aging societies, migration, and so on. 
These seem to throw the Union’s political, 
economic, and social model ever more 
into question. The way forward, however, 
is not to quarantine the ‘patient’ behind 
hard borders. Instead of retreating into 
navel-gazing – like the French President 
Emmanuel Macron suggested at the 
Sofia Summit in 2018 when he called for 
consolidation before enlargement – the EU 
should strengthen and diversify the ways 
in which it reaches out to its allies in the 
Balkans, who, in any case, share the same 
problems and interests.
The upcoming European Parliament (EP) 
elections, which pave the way for a new 
EU leadership, as well as the discussions 
on the future of the Union and the 
Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024, which 
will take place at the Sibiu Summit 
in May and will be finalised at the EU 
Summit in June 2019, represent a concrete 
opportunity for the Union to recalibrate 
and reinforce its relationship with the 
Balkan countries.
 Two in one ‘rocking’ boat 
THE EUROPEAN UNION’S PROBLEMS… 
Confronted with a multitude of internal 
and external threats over the past years,4 
Europeans seem to have become sceptical 
about their sacred concepts, with negative 
spill-over effects also for the EU’s 
enlargement policy towards the Balkans.
For example, the manner in which market 
capitalism and democracy – cornerstones of 
the European project – are put into practice 
came under severe fire during the global 
financial economic crunch and, in particular, 
the sovereign debt crisis. Unregulated and 
powerful financial markets were blamed 
for lopsided wealth distribution, rising 
unemployment, and the loss of future 
perspective (especially among young 
generations). Likewise, the dysfunctional 
and irresponsible banking system was 
criticised for costing governments too much 
to keep afloat.5
As a way out, ‘bankrupt’ EU economies 
accepted drastic austerity programmes 
insisted on by their European partners 
and the International Monetary Fund in 
exchange for loans, while stronger EU 
economies agreed to pour substantial 
loans into bailout funds for struggling 
countries (and their banks). None of these 
responses were expressly ‘authorised’ by 
people. Without democratic legitimacy, 
the recipe adopted strengthened voters’ 
impression that they had lost their ability to 
change policies despite retaining capacity 
to change governments. The temporary 
resolution of the Greek crisis, above all, 
became the most powerful demonstration 
that there is no alternative (TINA) to the 
EU’s economic policies, which, for many, 
meant that European democracy had been 
rendered “code for the political importance 
of citizens”6.
But when it rains, it pours. So next came the 
refugee/migration crisis, which transformed 
the EU’s core notions – like open borders, 
tolerance, and human rights – to core 
vulnerabilities, undermining the European 
liberal consensus.7 Before long, the language 
and practice of fundamental rights were 
betrayed, non-Christian refugees were 
warded off with razor wire fences, arson 
attacks were carried out on asylum centres, 
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‘illiberal democracies’ were proclaimed, and populists were both 
surpassing the establishment at the ballot box and inspiring it 
in national parliaments because, if nothing else, it was suddenly 
possible – as well as apparently acceptable – to do so.8
A sense of unity and readiness for collective action did 
eventually emerge, for example, in response to the financial 
crisis, the irregular inflow of people, terrorism, climate 
change, or trade protectionism.9 However, for the most 
part, the crises of recent years have sown divisions: the 
Eurozone crisis split the Union along a north-south axis; the 
UK’s decision to renounce EU membership in a referendum 
highlighted the core-periphery cleavage; Russia’s invasion 
of Ukraine pitted those daring against those hesitating to 
confront Putin; and the plight of refugees/migrants re-
opened past East-West schisms.10 In addition, they made 
EU capitals more assertive about which aspirant countries 
in the Balkans should advance towards accession and under 
what conditions11, and increased European citizens’ hostility 
towards potential new entrants.12
…ARE THE BALKANS’ PROBLEMS
Seeing the Union’s expansion to the Balkan region – ironically 
already a geographical enclave in the EU, surrounded as it is by 
member states – as not only a secondary policy concern in times 
of crises but also as a more general risk for the overall efficiency 
of EU decision-making disregards historical experience. The 
Union’s largest ‘widening’, which happened to Central and 
Eastern Europe, Malta, and Cyprus, and saw no fewer than 10 
countries become new members in 2004 followed by two more 
in 2007, did not hamper the functioning of the EU, not even 
during the five years in which it functioned on the basis of the 
Nice Treaty; the Lisbon Treaty was negotiated subsequently, 
and the new diversity within the Union was accommodated. 
By comparison, the Balkans’ collective population of about 18 
million – less than Romania’s 19 million people – makes the 
fuss about enlargement essentially much ado about nothing.
Moreover, fearing that enlargement would simply import 
the region’s problems into the EU fails to recognise that the 
borderline between the ‘European’ and ‘Balkan’ nature of today’s 
challenges is increasingly grey and uneven, not least due to the 
region’s already advanced level of integration with the EU.
In economic terms, the signing of Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements with all the Balkan countries has 
enabled free trade relations and a gradual harmonisation 
of national legislations with the EU acquis. By now, the 
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Union is the Balkans’ main trading and 
investment partner. Yet, the promise of 
economic growth and prosperity through 
EU integration has not materialised. In 
fact, the Balkan countries’ economic 
woes have been compounded by the cold 
winds blowing from the Union: as the 
EU’s business and banking activity in 
the Balkans contracted during the crisis, 
the region saw a steep rise in (youth) 
unemployment and state debt,13 akin to 
the situation in many member states. 
While economic and social convergence 
depends on the Balkan countries’ will to 
undertake structural reforms, the region 
remains vulnerable to European and global 
economic shocks.
Unable to generate growth on their own 
and faced with a rapidly aging population, 
the Balkan countries have been gazing into 
a future of unrelenting socio-economic 
deprivation, which has driven the majority 
of the region’s better educated young 
people to emigrate to affluent countries in 
north-west Europe. By the end of 2013, 5.7 
million people originating from the Balkans 
lived abroad, bringing the region’s average 
emigration rate to 31.2% – ranging from 
18.2% in Serbia to 45.3% in Montenegro.14
Things are not that different in the EU, 
which is also aging. The continent’s median 
age is expected to increase from 37.7 years in 
2003 to 52.3 years in 2050, casting doubt on 
the future of European prosperity. The CEE 
member states, in particular, struggle hard 
to sustain their welfare systems given their 
declining populations.15
Despite Europe’s demographic weakness, 
the EU panicked about immigration during 
the refugee/migration crisis and enlisted 
the support of the Balkan countries to stave 
it off. Since 2015, the Balkans have been a 
transit region for those seeking entry into 
the Union via the Eastern Mediterranean 
route from Turkey to the EU. The Balkan 
countries’ role in helping the EU manage 
the inflows of irregular migrants has been 
crucial and has demonstrated that the 
Union’s ability to cope with the pressure 
and provide organised and safe reception 
of refugees/migrants, heavily relies on the 
region’s capacity to process and manage 
arrivals. Although the Balkan countries 
have so far proven to be constructive 
partners in this context, the humanitarian 
solidarity of the region can be tested by 
economic insecurity, as “Eastern Europe’s 
compassion deficit”16 has shown.
Migration is, of course, not the only security 
threat that both the EU and the Balkans face: 
geopolitical instability in the neighbourhood, 
the unpredictability of big global players (see 
also the contribution of Giovanni Grevi in 
this publication), terrorism, radicalisation, 
organised crime, cyber-attacks, as well as 
the region’s own unresolved war legacies, 
are inter alia part of the reality that keeps 
the two sides on red alert. A relegation of 
enlargement to the bottom of the EU’s list 
of priorities or a slowdown in the process 
will clearly be counterproductive, because 
it may allow other actors – most notably 
Russia – to meddle in the region and cosy 
up with countries like Serbia (which refused 
to join EU sanctions against Moscow), but 
also Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
frustrating the EU’s efforts to guarantee 
Europe’s security.
F i n a l l y, a l t h o u g h  t h e  d e m o c r a t i c 
consolidation of the Balkan countries is a 
fundamental pillar of the Union’s strategy 
for the region and is rigorously pursued by 
the EU with an enhanced conditionality, the 
Balkan democracies are either stagnating 
or backsliding.17 The fragility of the Balkan 
political systems has as much to do with 
the cynical ploys of local political elites 
(who rule unchallenged) as with the failure 
of the European model of representative 
democracy promoted in the region (which, 
as in the EU itself, stems from a lack of 
meaningful policy choices).
When monitoring the Balkans’ compliance 
with the democratic Copenhagen criteria, 
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for example, the EU scrutinises issues as 
diverse as asylum and border control and 
the fight against corruption and organised 
crime. However, the EU’s careful watch 
seems to have a blind spot when it comes 
to Balkan strongmen. The European 
Commission’s latest Strategy for the 
region acknowledges the problem of ‘state 
capture’ in the Balkans, but autocratically-
minded leaders continue to govern with 
impunity throughout the region. Without 
a democratic acquis to bring to bear on 
power monopolies, party organisation and 
competition, or informal practices, it is hard 
to imagine that such Balkan politicians will 
simply pay heed to European democratic 
requirements when disregarding them is 
precisely what sustains their power. The 
worrisome degree of personal rule evident 
in the Balkan countries gives rise to feelings 
of déjà vu: consider Hungary and its Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán, who over the years 
morphed from a pro-European liberal into 
an advocate of illiberal democracy. 
At the same time, the technocratic and 
executive bias of the accession process 
means that law-making in the region 
sidesteps policy deliberation and translates 
into the mere adoption and implementation 
of EU-compatible standards. Decision-
making is conducted outside electoral 
politics and tied to EU conditions rather 
than public demands. As such, the Balkan 
polities become democracies without 
choices18, in which elites cite external 
pressure (like the EU, courts, or media) 
to evade their campaign promises and 
governing responsibility because, after 
all: TINA. The fact that the capacity of 
political parties to offer meaningful policy 
alternatives has been severely curtailed 
by the EU integration process discredits 
representative institutions in the eyes 
of the people, fuels public distrust in 
politicians and cools popular engagement 
with conventional politics – the exact same 
dynamics which are also at play in the 
member states.
 Rowing in the same direction? 
As in many long-term relationships, after 
more than 15 years, the EU and the Balkans 
resemble an old couple: the passion seems 
to be fading and the two sides are taking 
each other for granted. However, in strategic, 
political, and economic terms, the EU and 
the Balkans are in the same boat, because 
they share common interests and problems. 
This interdependence begs for joint action if 
they are to successfully navigate in today’s 
complex and unpredictable world. More 
specifically, this means that in the next 
five years, the EU should not only renew its 
politico-institutional makeup but should 
also step up its engagement with the Balkan 
aspirants, as follows: 
q The EU should involve all Balkan 
governments and parliaments as observers in 
selected meetings, including of the Council of 
Ministers and working groups, the European 
Council,19 and in particular in debates about 
reforms in areas such as the Single Market, 
the eurozone, strategic infrastructure 
projects, security, or migration, asylum, and 
immigration. The same goes for the Union’s 
efforts to tackle structural challenges like 
‘brain drain’, lack of human capital, poor 
education, and aging societies, because joint 
problems require joint solutions.
This strategy should already be put in practice 
at the upcoming Sibiu Summit in May, where 
the EU should invite Balkan leaders to 
contribute their thoughts about the future 
of Europe, and should spell out meaningful 
and systematic ways of engagement with the 
Balkans on the basis of shared values and 
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interests. The EU’s next Strategic Agenda (EUCO) and Strategic 
Priorities (next Commission) should reflect the Sibiu Summit’s 
conclusions on the Balkans.
Offering the Balkan countries a seat at the table, on a 
consultative basis, could foster a sense of togetherness and 
partnership, helping to dispel the growing perception in the 
region that the EU uses conditionality as an excuse to keep the 
Balkans out.
Moreover, engaging routinely with Balkan policymakers could 
shift the focus away from questions relating to accession dates, 
the technicalities of the European integration process, and 
other regional or country-specific ‘hot potatoes’, towards more 
tangible and relevant policy work for Europe’s common future. 
This could impel civic and political forces in the Balkans to 
reflect more carefully on their country’s own vantage point, as 
well as looking for like-minded counterparts, including among 
their neighbours, to formulate joint – and thus more effective 
– regional policy stances. Deliberation and thinking about 
common responses to concrete common challenges could then 
replace the currently hollow policy imitation in the Balkans.
Repeated interactions between representatives of the EU and 
the Balkans, at all levels and around policies of mutual concern, 
could also help to raise awareness on both sides regarding each 
other’s ideas and stakes on any given subject matter. While this 
could improve the diplomatic dexterity of the Balkan countries 
in their preparation for accession, making them into better 
future member states, it could also offer EU capitals an insight 
into the aspirants’ readiness to play a constructive role in a 
larger and more heterogeneous Union.
In parallel, the Commission should develop more intense 
bilateral contacts with member states around the Balkans, such 
as by organising meetings with foreign ministries and national 
parliaments to discuss enlargement, and should coordinate 
better with other EU-level actors (like the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), (European) Council, EP, European 
Economic and Social Committee, Committee of the Regions, 
and Regional Cooperation Council), as well as with civil 
society. This will allow the Commission to build bridges and 
restore trust between the member states and the countries of 
the region, as well as to expand the pool of data informing its 
country reports for a more reliable assessment in the eyes of 
the EU capitals, which hold the final say on the dossier.20
q The EU should mandate a specific Commissioner for 
Balkan enlargement (see the contribution of Paul Ivan in this 
publication) in the new politico-institutional cycle to reinforce 
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the Union’s commitment to completing the 
brief of the dossier. In this case, the EEAS 
rather than the Commission could become 
the key ‘institutional anchor’ dealing with 
Turkey and Neighbourhood Policy, which 
might also help to assuage European 
citizens’ fears of endless EU ‘widening’. 
This new Directorate General for Balkan 
Enlargement should devise concrete 
benchmarks to measure the fulfilment of the 
accession criteria in the fields of the rule of 
law and fundamental rights. This approach 
should replace the existing rule of law 
monitoring mechanisms that include later 
accession dates, the use of safeguard clauses, 
and post-accession monitoring.
The EU should also invest more in developing 
horizontal civil society structures by 
providing Balkan civil society organisations 
(CSOs) with expertise, technical support, 
and regional and international networking 
opportunities. To keep the transparency 
and accountability of Balkan political elites 
in check, the EU should also commission 
regular ‘shadow’ reports on the state of 
democracy to CSOs from the region.
The EU should use its pre-accession 
scrutiny of the rule of law in the Balkans as 
a testing ground for its own plans to devise 
a benchmarking system that can be used in 
the EU member states too. Developments in 
countries like Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
or Italy are undermining the credibility 
and leverage of the Union’s democratic 
conditionality for the region. The EU 
should lead by example and ensure that 
the best practices expected from the Balkan 
countries are followed in the member states. 
Likewise, the EU should remember to always 
act like a credible partner. This means 
delivering whenever the Balkan countries 
have done their share, including, for 
example, by opening accession talks with 
North Macedonia and Albania, and granting 
Kosovo visa-free travel once the predefined 
conditions have been met.
q As for the Balkans, the governments 
of the aspirant countries in the region – 
squeezed between civil society demands and 
an uncompromising European Commission, 
should clean up their democratic record: 
ensuring the rule of law, guaranteeing 
media freedom, and fighting corruption and 
organised crime, among others. The member 
states will not accept any corners to be cut 
when it comes to the consolidation of the 
Balkan democracies seeking to join the club.
Moreover, in the process of achieving the 
status of functioning market economies 
that have the ability to sustain competitive 
pressure and market forces – a sine qua non 
for EU membership – they should improve 
their respective development strategies 
and create regional frameworks for the 
development of the Balkans as a future 
region within the EU. In this sense, the 
Union should provide more financial and 
technical support to the Regional Economic 
Area and Connectivity Agenda for the 
Balkans, to encourage trade liberalisation 
and integration in the region.
Additional structural funding should be 
agreed upon in the EU’s next Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MMF) and should be 
seen as investment in the Union’s future 
trade, energy, and transport infrastructure. 
This option should be discussed in the run-
up to the Western Balkans Summit in Poznan 
this summer. Germany, which has so far 
assumed a leadership role on enlargement 
and will hold the presidency of the Council 
of the EU in the second half of 2020, when 
the final agreement on the MFF might 
happen, should consider making this issue 
one of its presidency priorities.
The interdependence between the EU 
and the region goes beyond geographic 
proximity, as underscored more recently 
by the financial, economic, and refugee/
migration crises, the illiberal democracy 
trend in the EU, and Russia’s interference 
on the Union’s borders. Anchored in the 
bosom of Europe, the Balkans are natural 
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allies for the member states – not least since 
traditional allies of the EU (like the US and 
UK) seem to be in retreat – and take the 
brunt of the decisions and developments 
inside the Union. As a result, the Balkans 
should be able to make their voices heard in 
the EU and, in so doing, they could supply 
a fresh perspective to those in the member 
states pondering the future of European 
integration. The EU should not squander 
the opportunity of consolidating its political 
space by strengthening and diversifying 
cooperation with the Balkan countries.
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EU and Eastern Europe: 
The case for continued 
engagement
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University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and an Academic Fellow at the European Policy Centre
A decade ago, the European Union (EU) went on a mission 
to change Eastern Europe in its own image. Now it is on the 
defensive. The Russian challenge and the ongoing war in 
Ukraine shifted the EU’s focus from economic integration 
to crisis management. Dealing with an assertive Russia 
overshadows all other objectives. While the Union has not 
given up on its role as a champion of reforms in the eastern 
neighbourhood, its overriding concern is the mounting 
instability at its doorstep. The widespread backlash against 
open borders by populist forces across Europe has now killed 
off any remaining appetite for enlargement. The Eastern 
Partnership (EaP), its headline initiative, increasingly looks 
like an alternative rather than a step to EU membership. 
All things being equal, it is likely to remain so in the coming 
five years. 
The widespread 
backlash against open 
borders by populist 
forces across Europe 
has now killed off any 
remaining appetite 
for enlargement.
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q The EU should adopt a more muscular approach towards 
Russia and scale-up its engagement in the Eastern neighbourhood.
WHAT TO DO: 
q 	Advance	the	pro-western	states’	integration	into	a	Single	Market	and	strengthen	
cooperation in key policy areas.
q  Maintain unity vis-à-vis Russia and limit its room for maneuver in the  
shared neighbourhood.
q  Build pro-EU constituencies in both the Eastern neighbours and in Russia. 14
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 The Eastern   
 neighbourhood:  
 The good news  
 and the bad news 
For all the doom and gloom, European integration works. 
The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreements 
(DCFTAs) signed by Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have 
deepened their economic ties with the EU. The EU28 account 
for 55% of trade flows in Moldova, over 40% in Ukraine and 
about 27% in Georgia. By comparison, Russia’s share of the 
three countries’ combined turnover is 11-12%.1 Georgian, 
Moldovan and Ukrainian citizens can now travel visa-free to 
the Schengen area, a matter of huge symbolic and practical 
significance. Europe animates politics, too. Flawed though 
it may be, the EU remains an alternative to the hardship, 
institutional dysfunction, and the rule of predatory elites 
across the post-Soviet space. That ordinary Ukrainians were 
willing to sacrifice their lives at Kyiv’s Maidan in February 
2014 testifies to that fact. 
But the EU’s economic traction does not translate seamlessly 
into geopolitical clout. Challenges to their sovereignty and 
territorial integrity constrain the European aspirations 
of countries in the region. The Minsk II accords signed in 
February 2015 by Ukraine, Russia, France, and Germany 
(the so-called Normandy Four) have led to a scaling down 
of violence, but not much more than that. Russia will not 
withdraw from the Donbas and abandon its proxies there, let 
alone pull out of Crimea, which it has now digested into its 
state structure. An all-out military showdown between Russia 
and Ukraine, which many fear, is still possible but not likely. 
Yet, Moscow has pressed sovereignty claims over the Azov 
Sea and the Kerch Strait, opening an additional frontline – 
and bargaining chip vis-à-vis Kyiv. And that is even without 
taking into account all other flare points across this volatile 
region: Nagorno-Karabakh, which in April 2016 saw the worst 
bloodshed since the early 1990s, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
and Transnistria. On all those fronts, it is Russia holding most 
of the cards, not the EU or the US. 
Domestic politics also blunt the EU’s influence. EaP’s 
record when it comes to strengthening the rule of law and 
expanding governance accountability is chequered at best. 
The EU may not be 
capable of absorbing 
its Eastern neighbours 
but it cannot simply 
ignore them either.
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As elsewhere, political elites in post-Soviet 
Eastern Europe pay lip service to Brussels’ 
conditionality and happily consume 
the benefits of integration. But they are 
loathe to lose power and resources to 
comply with demands for cleaner politics 
coming from European institutions. 
Oligarchs pull the strings from behind the 
scenes. Institutions are weak and societies 
emasculated.
 Why should the EU care? 
The EU may not be capable of absorbing its 
Eastern neighbours but it cannot simply 
ignore them either.
The first reason is that indigenous pro-
democracy changes empower the EU. 
Armenia, which made remarkable strides 
forward in 2018, is a case in point. Unlike 
Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity in 2013-
2014, the mass protests that swept former 
journalist Nikol Pashinyan to power were not 
about the choice between Europe and Russia. 
But the revolt against decades-long state 
capture adds to the EU’s influence as well as 
to its claim to be a force for positive change 
beyond its borders.
Secondly, the EU’s traction makes it a 
stakeholder in the region by default. True, 
it lacks the instruments and resources, the 
requisite unity of purpose on the part of 
member states, the freedom of action to play 
power politics. But it would be a mistake 
to sell Europe short. The Euromaidan put 
on display, even to sceptics, the fact that 
its policies and decisions have enormous 
impact on the ground.
Thirdly, like it or not, the EU is locked in a 
contest with Russia. Moscow considers the 
territories of the former Soviet Union – with 
the possible exception of the Baltics – its 
own turf. That does not necessarily mean 
that the Kremlin is hell-bent on bringing the 
Soviet Union back to life. Such an endeavour 
would be difficult, expensive, risky, and ridden 
with unforeseen consequences. But it is 
prepared to fight its corner. The annexation 
of Crimea showed that Vladimir Putin is 
strongly committed to maintaining Russia’s 
primacy in post-Soviet Eurasia. To this end, 
the Russian leadership will use all economic, 
political and even military tools at its disposal, 
short of a large-scale war. Indeed, Russia 
is taking the fight to the EU itself, wielding 
disruptive influence over the domestic affairs 
of a number of member states. For the Russian 
leadership, this meddling in other countries’ 
politics is fair game. After all, the argument 
in Moscow goes, the West has been doing 
precisely that in both the Russian Federation 
and its post-Soviet backyard since the 1990s.
Last but not least, the EU and Russia still have 
interests that overlap. Examples include the 
Iranian nuclear deal and the shared concern 
about radicalisation and foreign fighters in 
the Middle East. Russian policymakers and 
think tankers talk up their country’s pivot to 
Asia. In reality, the EU remains the leading 
trade partner as well as the largest market for 
Russian oil and gas exports. Turnover shrank 
by 44%, or from €330 billion to €191 billion 
between 2012 and 2016.2 Yet Russia ranks as 
the Union’s fourth most important economic 
partner. Around two million Russian 
Federation citizens and ethnic Russians 
reside in the EU, with Germany taking the 
lion’s share. As attested by surveys by the 
independent Levada Center in the summer 
of 2018, Russians views of Europe have 
improved considerably of late. Call that the 
effect of the World Cup 2018 or the regime’s 
falling popularity, the trend suggests that the 
‘fortress Russia’ mentality inculcated by the 
Kremlin is far from rock solid.
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 The way forward:  A more  
muscular approach 
The challenge the EU faces vis-à-vis 
both Russia and the Eastern neighbours 
is striking the right balance between 
engagement, the assertion of European 
interests and values and, in the case of 
Russia, containment. In March 2016, foreign 
ministers promulgated five principles to 
guide policy: full implementation of the 
Minsk agreements; closer ties with Russia’s 
former Soviet neighbours; strengthening 
EU resilience to Russian threats; selective 
engagement with Russia on certain issues 
such as counter-terrorism; and support for 
people-to-people contacts.
In the upcoming politico-institutional cycle, 
Europe should focus on three key priorities 
which derive from the above principles:
1.   Advance the pro-Western states’ 
integration into the Single Market and 
strengthen cooperation in key policy areas.
2.   Maintain unity vis-à-vis Russia and limit 
its room for manoeuvre in the shared 
neighbourhood.
3.   Build pro-EU constituencies in both 
Eastern neighbours and Russia. 
THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP: MIXING 
CARROTS AND STICKS 
In dealing with the EaP countries, the EU 
should craft a more effective combination 
of carrots and sticks. Reforms should 
be rewarded with greater amounts of 
financial assistance and integration into EU 
frameworks and programmes, but funding 
should also be denied or withdrawn as 
punishment. The external action instruments 
under the EU’s next Multiannual Financial 
Framework (MFF) need to establish a 
stronger connection between advancing 
the rule of law and EU assistance. Brussels 
should practise tough love. That way, it could 
signal to pro-European constituencies in the 
countries in question that the EU promotes 
cleaner government and puts a check on 
predatory elites. This message should be put 
across clearly by EU officials as well as by 
public diplomacy. 
Differentiation has no alternative. Meeting 
EU standards should translate into closer 
ties with the Union. Over time, Armenia 
should be able to narrow the gap with 
Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. That would 
involve the full implementation of the 
Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership 
Agreement signed in November 2017 
as well as progress on visa facilitation. 
Belarus, fearful of Russia’s intentions 
of ending its independence, might turn 
to the EU as well. However, concessions 
should come in response to concrete steps 
by the Lukashenka regime allowing the 
opposition, civil society, and critical media 
to operate freely. Autocratic Azerbaijan lags 
far behind the rest of the pack. Baku opts for 
a purely transactional relationship with the 
Europeans largely focused on oil and gas. 
President Ilham Aliyev is unlikely to release 
imprisoned activists and journalists in 
order to accommodate the EU’s democratic 
requirements. Nor will the Union’s member 
states push hard on that front.
The final destination should no longer be a 
taboo. The institutional relationship that 
the Union might negotiate with post-Brexit 
Britain could result in opportunities for 
flexible integration for East Europeans as 
well. To be sure, the closest possible form 
of association short of full membership is 
the best option for the frontrunners in the 
region in the short-to-medium term. Neither 
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the EaP countries in the region nor the Union will be ready to 
embark on accession talks in the 2020s. Much depends on how 
the ongoing enlargement to the Western Balkans plays out. 
Should the progress to accession deliver clear gains in terms 
of the rule of law and good governance, Ukraine, Georgia and 
Moldova will have a much stronger case for membership, too. 
Migration ought to be part of the EU offer. The building 
blocks are already there. In 2017 alone, Poland issued 235,000 
work permits. Of those, more than 80% went to citizens of 
Ukraine. Governments in Central Europe undercutting burden 
sharing when it comes to asylum seekers from the southern 
neighbourhood, should welcome migrants from the EaP 
countries. 
DEALING WITH RUSSIA FROM A POSITION  
OF STRENGTH 
The EU’s rate of success depends, in no small part, on its 
relations with Russia and its ability to address the security 
concerns of its eastern neighbours. Only if the Union 
demonstrates internal cohesion and offers a robust response to 
disruptive actions it would be able to restrain Moscow. Europe 
should bargain from a position of strength. 
That is why maintaining a common front on the sanctions is 
a must. But sticking to the lowest common denominator is a 
dead-end street. To be credible, the EU has to be able to show 
teeth too. That means escalating punishments to dissuade 
Russia from engaging in aggressive behaviour, such as the 
blockade of the Kerch Strait aimed at stifling Ukrainian ports 
on the Azov Sea. Only if the EU is able to drive up the costs of 
aggression can it play a substantive role in crisis prevention 
rather than crisis management. The EU does not have the means 
to deter the Russian military. However, it can do much more to 
keep the Kremlin elites at bay. 
A more robust posture does not preclude engagement. Those 
doing business with Russia know best that bargaining with 
Moscow, e.g. on natural gas contracts, works when it is done 
from a position of strength. 
The EU should collectively set red lines, such as the 
interference with its internal affairs. And it should not shrink 
from enforcing them if need be. Member states must build and 
strengthen existing institutions and agencies charged with the 
exchange of information and know-how on countering hostile 
influence campaigns, with cyber defence, and with the combat 
of disinformation. Currently, the European External Action 
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Service (EEAS) focuses on strengthening media freedom and 
independent media and responding to disinformation activities 
in the EaP countries. Eastern neighbours could contribute to 
intra-EU resilience as well. Georgian, Ukrainian and Moldovan 
officials, experts, civil society have a considerable amount 
of expertise when it comes to disinformation, fake news, the 
foreign infiltration of party politics, cyber warfare and the like. 
They could be of direct use to the Union’s member states and 
institutions.
BUILDING PRO-EU CONSTITUENCIES
It is imperative that the EU reaches out to societies in 
both Russia and Eastern Europe. One of the lessons from 
enlargement is that sustainable progress towards democracy 
and the rule of law can only come from within. Armenia is a 
reminder that anti-corruption sentiments and public discontent 
with incumbent elites is on the rise across the post-Soviet 
space. Russia is no exception. The rule of law remains the EU’s 
competitive advantage. It is not for nothing that middle class 
Russians have been leaving for the EU, much like Ukrainians 
and Moldovan workers. Some are in pursuit of employment. 
Others emigrate because property rights are better protected in 
the EU and the courts are truly independent. However, Europe 
is nowadays struggling to retain the moral higher ground, serve 
as a benchmark and inspire change beyond its borders. The EU 
has to practise what it preaches when it comes to the rule of law 
and democracy. Backsliding in Hungary, Poland and other parts 
of Central and Southeast Europe make its job difficult since the 
rule of law and democratic institutions are under strain in the 
Union too. The outreach to neighbours starts at home. 
1.  The percentages are as follows: Georgia, 9% of 
exports and 9.3% of imports; Moldova, 11% of 
exports, 8.6% imports; Ukraine, 11% of exports, 
17% of imports. Source: European Commission, 
Directorate-General on Trade, Factsheets on Trade 
with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Available at 
ec.europa.eu
2.  According to data from the European Commission.
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Institutions
q A general view of the room of the European Council in Brussels. © STEPHANIE LECOCQ / POOL / AFP
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The role of the 
(European) Council: 
Practical improvements 
in volatile times
Poul Skytte Christoffersen – Former Ambassador of Denmark to Belgium; former Permanent  
Representative of Denmark to the European Union; Chair of the EPC’s Governing Board
The start of the next institutional cycle coincides with the 
10th anniversary of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (2009), 
which introduced major changes in the role and workings of both 
the European Council (EUCO) and the Council of Ministers. It is 
thus an appropriate time to take stock of the experience of the 
past decade and reflect on possible adjustments to the way the 
two institutions work and interact with each other and with other 
EU institutions. Since treaty change is unlikely to happen in the 
foreseeable future, the focus of this piece will be on practical 
improvements in the upcoming period.
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q Make practical improvements to the (European) Council.
WHAT TO DO: 
q Fix the dysfunctional link between the high representative and the EUCO president. 
q Allow for a greater foreign policy role for the EUCO president.
q Enhance the role of the General Affairs Council.
q Reverse the decline in ministerial presence and promote active participation in EU work.
q  Systematically hold orientation debates at the start of the legislative procedure 
and before the start of negotiations with Parliament.
q Increase transparency in the legislative procedure. 
15
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 The European Council 
The importance of the European Council, 
bringing together the heads of state and 
government and the European Commission 
president, has increased over the past 
decades. It is now broadly accepted as the 
institution where the ultimate power lies. 
The frequency of formal and informal 
meetings has doubled (now averaging eight 
per year). But the European Council has 
managed to maintain the features that make 
it unique. It is still an ‘exclusive club’ (in 
contrast to the normal Council of Ministers): 
only its members, the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy (HR) and a handful of officials are 
present in the meeting room. Foreign 
Ministers, who previously participated, have 
been excluded. 
The restricted setting is essential to preserve 
the decision-making capacity of the EUCO. 
In fact, it would even be better to remove the 
interpreters’ cabins from the meeting room and 
instead make use of distance interpretation as 
is now the practice for dinner-discussions. It 
is important that EU leaders can look into the 
eyes of their colleagues.
The semi-permanent president  
 and the relationship with  
 the Commission (president) 
The introduction of a semi-permanent, full-
time president of the European Council has 
changed the way the EUCO works. It has led 
to more continuity and more emphasis on the 
essential challenges facing the EU.
Who occupies the post is of prime 
importance. While weaknesses at the top 
of other institutions can be compensated 
by strong deputies (vice-presidents) the 
EUCO president has no substitute. Choosing 
the wrong kind of personality could wreck 
the functioning of the European Council. 
Personal qualifications, more than political 
affiliation, should be the main criteria for 
choosing the president.
The profile of the incumbent is likely to 
be discussed again, when a successor to 
Donald Tusk is appointed in November 2019. 
Should it be a high-profile politician (a Tony 
Blair, Sarkozy or Merkel type) carving out a 
considerable degree of independence and 
freedom of action? Or a person that can bang 
heads together and find compromises, like 
the first two semi-permanent presidents – 
Herman Van Rompuy and Donald Tusk? 
EU leaders prefer continuity. But in today’s 
fast-changing world, the future president 
should be given some leeway in developing 
the job in a more presidential direction. This 
includes taking greater risks when putting 
forward solutions on divisive political issues 
as well as assuming a greater role in foreign 
and security policy.
Since there is little demand or support for 
a double-hatted president (combining the 
roles of European Council president and 
Commission president), it is more important 
than ever that the European Council and the 
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European Commission improve their cooperation, building on 
what has already been achieved. 
The EUCO president and the Commission president now meet 
regularly (weekly) to coordinate their work. Likewise, mutual 
trust between top officials has improved since Jeppe Tranholm 
Mikkelsen became secretary-general of the Council Secretariat 
and it has continued after Martin Selmayr took over the top job 
in the Commission. The collaboration between both sides of the 
Rue de la Loi has been close to perfection on Brexit. 
But there still are the occasional bouts of jealousy. With the 
ambition of a ‘political Commission’, the nostalgic vision of the 
Commission as the genuine seat of political leadership in Europe 
has sometimes taken the upper hand. 
The future Commission president would do well to look to 
Jacques Delors’ relationship with the European Council as a 
source of inspiration. Delors fully understood that the power 
of the Commission president increases in line with a strong 
European Council. He did not need to be seen as the father of 
new ideas, and understood the benefits of the EUCO taking 
ownership. No one questioned whether the Delors Commissions 
were political. Engagement from EU leaders, pushed by the EUCO 
president, is indispensable to turn vision into reality. 
 Crisis management  
 tops the agenda 
In the past decade, the European Council has made its most 
important contribution in the area of crisis management. During 
Herman Van Rompuy’s term, the sovereign debt crises (the so-
called ‘euro crisis’) was the top priority, while for Donald Tusk 
the main task was to develop a coordinated and effective EU 
response to the influx of refugees and migrants in 2015, and to 
the Brexit vote in 2016.
Existential catastrophes have - so far - been avoided and a sense of 
some kind of stability has returned. However, the EUCO has failed to 
exploit the pressure of these multiple crises, to implement sustainable 
long-term solutions. Postponing more structural responses to the 
Union’s poly-crisis to a later date does not make things easier.
In crisis situations, or when the EU is faced with major disruption 
(like Brexit), the European Council and its president are the main 
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actors. But they perform best, when they are 
part of a coordinated team effort. 
During the euro-crisis, the Eurogroup and the 
ECOFIN Council paved the way for the heads 
of state and government to make the final 
decisions. Likewise, President of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) Mario Draghi has been a key 
actor. In fact, in matters related to the common 
currency, the ECB president has become a 
quasi-member of the European Council.
The refugee and migration crisis was an 
example of failed cooperation between 
the EUCO and the Council. The Justice and 
Home Affairs Council did little to bring viable 
solutions to the table, and often served as 
a mere echo-chamber for widely diverging 
national views. It was left to the EUCO to 
take all the strategic decisions. Over the 
course of 2015 and 2016, EU leaders gradually 
abandoned their original idea of solving the 
crisis by sharing the burden. Instead, they 
doubled down on efforts aiming to reduce 
the irregular influx of migrants and refugees, 
and on engaging with countries in the 
Mediterranean in a joint effort to stop the flow. 
The lack of thorough preparation of the 
EUCO meetings by the justice and home 
affairs ministers often led to improvisation 
and the floating of half-baked ideas among 
EU leaders, which had little to no chance 
of being implemented. It is natural that an 
issue, which directly affects citizens and is 
politically explosive at the national level, 
quickly ends up on the table of the EUCO. But 
experience has proven that a more effective 
preparatory structure has to be put in place.
The Brexit process is an illustration of how it 
can be done – trust and continuity are key. The 
confidence between the European Council and 
Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier and his team 
was of crucial importance in maintaining a 
solid EU27 position throughout the process. 
The permanent chairmanship by the Council 
Secretariat of the Article 50 group and the 
leading role played by the Secretary-General 
in COREPER (Committee of the Permanent 
Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States to the EU) created continuity 
and avoided the shifting of priorities due 
to the rotating presidencies (the migration 
crisis is an example in case). The Prime 
Minister of Denmark, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, 
expressed the thoughts of many members of 
the European Council when calling for the 
appointment of a personality like Michel 
Barnier as the EU migration minister.
 Relations with the European  
 Parliament 
The European Parliament (EP) has de facto 
accepted the role of the European Council 
as primus inter pares among EU institutions. 
The link between the two institutions 
has been strengthened considerably by a 
higher level of ‘face-to-face’ interaction; 
the EUCO President frequently comes to 
the Parliaments to speak about the latest 
developments and discussions in the 
European Council; individual members of the 
European Council show a growing interest in 
appearing before the EP; and the Parliament 
president addresses national EU leaders 
before EUCO meetings begin and engages 
in a short debate with the heads of state and 
government. The Brexit negotiations have 
broken new ground in EUCO-EP relations by 
inviting the Parliament’s Brexit negotiator 
(Guy Verhofstadt) to participate in the 
SHERPA/COREPER meetings that prepare 
EUCO meetings. This practice could be used 
again in the future.
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 Priority setting by  
 the European Council 
The European Council has struggled to 
provide long-term strategic guidance for the 
Union’s development. It is doubtful whether 
serious long-term planning is even possible 
when new ‘disruptions’ and crises situations 
keep coming up. Texts produced by the EUCO, 
such as the ‘Strategic Agenda for the Union 
in times of change’ (June 2014) or the Rome 
Declaration (March 2017), which aim to set 
strategic priorities, tend to be too general and 
age quickly. The aspiration of the Romanian 
Council Presidency and the Commission to 
fix the European agenda for the next five 
years at the Sibiu Summit is overblown and 
will likely lead to deflated expectations. 
Donald Tusk’s so-called ‘Leaders’ Agenda’, 
which he launched in October 2017, is a more 
realistic effort. It provides an overview of 
the main issues that the European Council 
president intended to put before the EU 
leaders until 2019, alongside a detailed 
roadmap (time-schedule). It has been a 
useful tool for agenda management, and has 
inserted some predictability and order into 
the work of the European Council. 
Experience has shown that strategic priority 
setting becomes much more tangible when 
it takes the form of fixing financial priorities 
for the future. The launching of the European 
Defence Fund by the Commission in 2017 
has, for example, done more to promote EU 
defence cooperation than many aspirational 
political texts on defence, which often failed 
to lead to any tangible result.
The agreement on the next Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF) for the period 
2021-2027 is the best opportunity for the 
European Council to prove they can set 
strategic priorities. However, this will only 
be the case if EU leaders approach the 
finalisation of the MFF as an exercise aiming 
to set EU policy priorities and not as an 
attempt to secure the best possible budgetary 
position for their member state, as we have 
too often witnessed in the past.
 The European Council  
 and foreign policy 
At national level, prime ministers (or 
presidents) have gradually become the main 
foreign policy actors, overshadowing foreign 
ministers. In some countries, this has led 
to a downgrading of foreign ministries. But 
elsewhere an increased focus on intelligence-
gathering and the development of policy 
proposals to be used by the prime minister’s 
department has resulted in the raising of 
foreign ministries’ profiles. The EU has to 
adapt to this new reality.
The EUCO has, on many occasions, played an 
important role in foreign policy. One recent 
example is the annexation of Crimea and the 
subsequent imposing of sanctions on Russia. 
Agreement among EU leaders has ensured 
that the Union stood firm despite divergent 
views among member states. 
But when moving from decision-making to 
concrete implementation the record is less 
convincing. In 2016, the EU Global Strategy 
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prepared by the High Representative Federica Mogherini was 
briefly discussed and endorsed by the European Council – but it 
never became a serious, implementable tool. 
Foreign policy issues are regularly discussed at EUCO dinners, 
particularly the relationships with key strategic partners or 
regions such as Russia, the United States, China, or the Middle 
East. This creates a mutual understanding among EU leaders, but 
the follow-up is often missing. The EU, for example, still lacks a 
common strategy on China.
Two changes would help to improve the European Council’s role 
in the realm of foreign policy:
q the dysfunctional link between the high representative 
and the president of the European Council needs to be fixed. 
Contrary to the situation today, the European Council president 
and the high representative should work as a team, while the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) should give high 
priority to providing intelligence and preparing policy proposals 
for the EUCO president;
q the European Council should allow for a greater foreign 
policy role for its president. High-level diplomacy increasingly 
takes place among state and government leaders. The high 
representative is not at that level. In international groupings 
such as, for example, the Minsk process, the European Council 
president should represent the EU. This does not exclude 
the participation of member states with particular interests 
at stake.
 The role of the Council  
 of Ministers 
The functioning of the European Council often dominates the 
debate, while little attention is paid to the work of the Council 
of Ministers, as the main chamber representing the member 
states. The Council deserves more recognition, both for its role in 
preparing European Council meetings and as a legislative body.
THE GENERAL AFFAIRS COUNCIL
The European Council is prepared by the General Affairs Council 
only in formal terms. The fact that the General Affairs Council 
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plays a very limited role has led President 
Tusk – in contrast to President Van Rompuy – 
to skip most of the meetings. This has left the 
preparation of EUCO meetings in the hands 
of officials at the joint meetings of COREPER 
and SHERPAs (European advisors to the 
heads of state and government). The former 
practice of having separate preparatory 
meetings has fortunately been abandoned.
Preparations could improve if the General 
Affairs Council was composed of ministers 
or state secretaries that were directly 
attached to the prime ministers/presidents 
responsible for national EU coordination. 
They could step in when preparations in 
other Council formations are stalling. The 
Council could also be given greater political 
weight to ensure that summit conclusions 
are followed up on. However, this innovation 
will only take place under the impulse of 
national leaders.
For the rest of the Council formations (i.e. 
the ten specialised Council formations) the 
main challenge is to reverse the decline in 
ministerial presence and active participation 
in EU work. Too many issues are now 
pushed upwards to the European Council or 
downwards to officials (COREPER and the 
Council working parties). 
Apart from legitimacy and transparency 
issues, the lack of ownership in EU affairs 
by ministers also reduces the amount of 
attention paid to Union matters in national 
administrations. It adds to the perception 
that the EU is «Brussels» instead of a joint 
effort by all member states. The Council’s 
ability to deal with new political issues is 
often slow compared to the EP. Two glaring 
examples are the belated reactions to the 
popular call for EU action on tax avoidance or 
control over IT giants. 
THE COUNCIL AS A LEGISLATIVE BODY
The Council’s legislative role needs to 
change as well. While the EP has adapted its 
structures and working methods to reflect its 
increased legislative power, little has changed 
in the Council, which continues to be inspired 
by how national ministerial cabinets are 
functioning. 
The overall performance of the EU’s 
legislative bodies in terms of efficiency is 
not bad. The number of complex political 
files that have been brought to a successful 
conclusion during the present legislature is 
quite impressive. They outperform the US 
Congress by a wide margin. This is one of 
the reasons why the EU continues to be a 
leader in the setting of global norms. The 
challenge for the Council is to ensure that 
citizens feel that their national interests 
are defended at the EU level and that they 
understand why it is necessary to look for 
compromises. 
T h e  Co u n c i l ’s  l e g i s l a t i ve  wo r k  i s 
predominantly handled by officials. 
Political control is ensured to some extent, 
given that officials follow instructions 
coming from the capitals and work 
under the authority of a minister. But 
political issues could arise if ministers 
are absent from the legislative process. 
The Commission currently accompanies 
its proposals with an impact assessment, 
including the administrative burden. But 
once the proposal is passed to the Council, 
it enters into a ‘tunnel’ and only reappears 
– often as a very different product – at 
the final decision point. An obvious 
improvement would be to systematically 
hold orientation debates at the start of the 
legislative procedure and before the start of 
negotiations with Parliament. This happens 
today, but it is not yet institutionalised. 
More than 80% of EU legislation is 
currently adopted through the so-called 
first reading procedure, where an informal 
dialogue (or trilogue) takes place between 
the responsible members of the EP and 
an official from the rotating presidency, 
supported by the Council Secretariat and 
the Commission. The procedure increases 
15
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the efficiency of the legislative process but raises transparency 
questions.
The Ombudsman, the European Court of Justice and national 
parliaments have all voiced their concerns about the present 
practice. It would thus be a welcome development if the Council 
took the initiative to increase the transparency in the legislative 
process before it is forced to do so by others. This can be done in 
ways that do not unduly complicate the legislative procedure and 
leave sufficient political space – away from the public eye – to 
find compromises.
 Conclusions 
In the space of two decades, the European Council has become 
the Union’s supreme political authority due to its capacity to cut 
the Gordian knot when needed and to set out a general direction 
for the Union. This is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. 
But the European Council’s capacity to deliver depends on the 
engagement and willingness of EU leaders to reach compromises 
that are in the interest of the Union as a whole. Success also 
depends on whether or not the meetings are properly prepared 
through solid input from other institutions and bodies. A 
stronger role for the EUCO president, better preparation by a 
reformed General Affairs Council and reinforced cooperation 
with the Commission will improve the chances of success.
The performance of the ordinary Council of Ministers has 
been less than impressive. Change is needed for it to remain 
an equal partner to the EP in the legislative process. This calls 
for a greater level of participation and engagement of national 
ministers. Without their more active involvement, the Council 
will quickly lose out to the EP and the Commission. This would 
please European federalists – but it might not be the direction in 
which most citizens want the European Union to go.
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The European 
Commission: The need 
for a clearer set-up
Paul Ivan – Senior Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre
Fabian Zuleeg – Chief executive and chief economist at the European Policy Centre
As shown by the other contributions in this volume, the next 
European Commission will have to deal with a number of 
internal and external challenges, from defending the rule of 
law to fighting climate change and supporting a sustainable 
transition to a low-carbon economy, from advancing the reform 
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and strengthening 
the European Union’s (EU) social dimension to migration, 
and to dealing with the world’s major powers, but also with 
the Union’s neighbours, including with a post-Brexit United 
Kingdom (UK).
The structure of the next European Commission will have to take 
into consideration these and other challenges. Since there will 
likely be no appetite for substantial treaty changes in the coming 
years, this piece assumes that the current legal institutional 
framework will be maintained. Working under the same treaty 
rules, the future Commission will continue to struggle with 
some of the institutional challenges the Juncker Commission 
The institutional 
innovations of the 
Juncker Commission 
have transformed  
the executive into  
a better functioning 
one, but the 
transformation  
is not complete. 
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q The next European Commission should improve  
on the innovations introduced by the Juncker Commission by turning the Commission 
College into a more hierarchical structure. 
WHAT TO DO: 
q Vice-presidents	should	become	more	powerful	and	their	roles	clearer	defined.	
q  Vice-presidents should coordinate small teams of commissioners in order  
to streamline work and ensure policy coherence.
q  Parts	of	the	Commission’s	policy	enforcement	role,	for	example	in	competition	
policy, should be transferred to independent agencies.
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also faced, such as the consequences of the ‘one country, one 
commissioner’ principle. In addition, the future Commission 
president will have to confront the challenge of an increased 
number of Eurosceptic or populist governments nominating 
Eurosceptic Commissioners.
In general terms, the next European Commission should 
improve on the innovations introduced by the Juncker 
Commission by turning the Commission College into a 
more hierarchical structure, with powerful vice-presidents 
coordinating small teams of commissioners aiming to 
streamline work and ensure policy coherence. In the longer-
term, parts of the Commission’s policy enforcement role, 
for example in competition policy, should be transferred to 
independent agencies.
 Too many Commissioners 
After successive rounds of enlargement, the number of 
commissioners in the College is higher than the number 
of possible weighty portfolios. The large number of 
commissioners makes a meaningful distribution of portfolios 
difficult and hampers the effective operation of the College 
by contributing to the complexity of the decision-making 
process and facilitating the fragmentation and ‘siloisation’ of 
Commission services.
To address these challenges, different proposals for a more 
effective structure of the Commission have been put forward 
over the past decade.1 President Juncker and his team drew 
inspiration from these proposals and structured the College in a 
more hierarchical manner. President Juncker redefined the role 
of vice-presidents, charging the seven vice-presidents (VPs) with 
the responsibility for high priority cross-cutting policy fields, 
such as the Digital Single Market, the Energy Union and Jobs, 
Growth, Investment and Competitiveness. The vice-presidents, 
including the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Policy and Security Policy (HR/VP), were entrusted with an 
enhanced leadership role and the responsibility to coordinate a 
team of Commissioners with relevant portfolios. This new role 
for vice-presidents, which was explained in an updated working 
methods document of the Commission, was meant to improve the 
Commission’s ability to coherently tackle the challenges the EU is 
facing, by trying to break down the silos within the Commission 
and allowing for increased interaction between Commissioners, 
thus aiming to streamline the work of the institution.
Given that problems 
regarding the rule  
of law in the member 
states will likely 
remain a major 
challenge during the 
mandate of the next 
Commission, it would 
be crucial to continue 
to manage that topic 
from a first vice-
president position 
and thus give it the 
necessary political 
backing. 
Building close 
working relations 
between the 
Commission’s political 
leadership and 
the leadership of 
Commission DGs will 
be essential for the 
work of the future 
executive.
A more hierarchical 
and more political 
Commission would 
need to handle 
difficult negotiations, 
including with 
Eurosceptic national 
leaders, and would 
need at the top a 
respected and very 
senior political figure, 
one that would be  
on an equal level  
with the member 
state leaders.
133EUROPEAN POLICY CENTRE
The institutional innovations of the 
Juncker Commission have transformed the 
executive into a better functioning one, but 
the transformation is not complete. Under 
the Juncker Commission, the roles of vice-
presidents were not always clearly defined 
and most of them did not have direct control 
over Commission services. The lack of direct 
access to the Commission services limited 
the powers of the Vice-Presidents and was a 
source of frustration as well as a challenge to 
carving out a clear role for these positions. The 
limitations on and uncertainties surrounding 
their powers made leading the Commission’s 
work difficult, especially when portfolio 
Commissioners were less cooperative.
 Need for clearer hierarchies  
 and better defined roles 
To overcome these shortcomings, the next 
Commission should be organised in a more 
hierarchical way. The vice-presidents, 
including the HR/VP, should have an 
enhanced leadership role, with responsibility 
for major cross-cutting policy fields, each 
leading a defined group of commissioners 
with relevant portfolios. The teams should be 
no bigger than three to five members to avoid 
the coordination difficulties we witnessed in 
the Juncker Commission.
This would also entail an expanded gate-
keeper role for the VPs, with a veto right over 
proposals coming from the commissioners 
belonging to their teams. Structuring the 
Commission College in a clearer hierarchy 
would facilitate a more efficient delegation 
of tasks, allowing for a better distribution of 
resources regarding issues that need urgent 
solutions. It would also make it easier to 
adjust the distribution of responsibilities 
between the president and the vice-
presidents in future crisis situations, freeing 
up resources in the president’s team and 
allowing for a renewed focus on long-term 
priorities.
While the next Commission should be 
organised in a more hierarchical way, this 
will not negate the principle of collegiality. 
While the teams of commissioners will 
be led by individual vice-presidents and 
ultimately by the president (and her/his 
cabinet), each commissioner will maintain a 
vote within the College.
 Clearer job descriptions 
The next Commission should define more 
clearly the roles of the vice-presidents and of 
regular commissioners with respect to their 
powers and tools. In the Juncker Commission, 
the roles of the vice-presidents have not 
always been clear, which has affected the 
efficiency of the institution. To ensure a more 
efficient workflow, the vice-presidents should 
be given direct control over Commission 
services (DGs and agencies), as well as over the 
coordination with the relevant commissioners 
and the Secretariat-General of the Commission 
(SecGen). This implies that vice-presidents 
should be able to direct Commission services to 
provide them with information and to develop 
proposals on a given topic. 
16
134 CHALLENGE EUROPE  –  YES, WE SHOULD! EU PRIORITIES FOR 2019-2024
Assigning vice-presidents and commissioners 
responsibilities for the same policy areas and 
thus duplicating their roles within the College 
should be avoided. Clearly defined portfolios 
and roles reduce the risk of frictions between 
and within the different teams. This has not 
always been the case in the past: the partial 
duplication of roles in the energy team of the 
Juncker Commission is often mentioned as an 
example. 
 Matching portfolios to abilities 
Regarding the composition of the College, 
the next Commission president should 
focus on achieving a more even distribution 
of tasks and powers across portfolios, paying 
particular attention to ensuring that vice-
presidents’ roles are significant enough. 
This was not always the case in the Juncker 
Commission. An example of a ‘lighter’ 
vice-president portfolio was the one for 
the Digital Single Market, held by Andrus 
Ansip, whose role resembled that of Günther 
Oettinger, the Commissioner in charge of 
Digital Economy and Society. 
For this to happen, the experience, 
professional skills, political abilities, and 
capabilities of the commissioners need to 
be at a higher level, especially for the VP 
role. While a strong cabinet of the president 
can keep a tight grip on the institution, 
this cannot sufficiently compensate for 
‘weak’ commissioners and even less so 
for ‘enhanced’ vice-presidents. While 
negotiating with the member states, the 
Commission president should clearly 
voice her/his expectations regarding the 
designated commissioners and reject 
unsuitable candidates. The next Commission 
president must strive to achieve a more even 
gender balance within the College while 
also ensuring an adequate geographical 
distribution of key roles. In this, he or she 
should work closely with the European 
Parliament (EP), which has already in the 
past demonstrated its powers by forcing the 
withdrawal of several unsuitable nominees. 
The Commission president can use this as a 
lever with recalcitrant governments.
 What vice-presidents? 
The vice-president (VP) positions will 
depend to a great degree on the priorities 
of the future Commission. It is not the 
purpose of this short contribution to define 
those priorities or offer a full College setup, 
but some future challenges affecting the 
choice of VP portfolios are evident.
q Role of first vice-president: Given 
that problems regarding the rule of law 
in the member states will likely remain a 
major challenge during the mandate of 
the next Commission, it would be crucial 
to continue to manage that topic from a 
first vice-president position and thus give 
it the necessary political backing. The 
appointment in the Juncker Commission 
of a First Vice-President for Better 
Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, 
Rule of Law and Charter of Fundamental 
Rights was a step in the right direction. The 
first vice-president also has an important 
role in deciding what is included in the 
Commission’s annual work programme 
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and the College agendas. But the future 
first vice-president, with such a wide set 
of responsibilities, should also be provided 
with the proper resources to fulfil the 
role, thereby reducing over-reliance on 
the General Secretariat. Despite the high 
quantity of work, the cabinet of the First 
Vice-President Timmermans had only 
one extra staff member compared to the 
cabinets of other vice-presidents.
q VP for sustainable transition: The 
topics  of  c l imate  change  and  the 
environment were not high enough on 
President Juncker’s agenda, so the political 
profile and the resources available to the 
respective VP will undoubtedly need to be 
increased. One of the vice-president post 
should deal with the sustainable transition 
to a low-carbon economy and coordinate 
commissioners dealing with dossiers 
such as climate, energy, environment, 
sustainable development, and agriculture.
q VP for competitiveness: The EU will 
also need to increase its investment in the 
competitiveness of its economy. A vice-
president position for competitiveness, 
to coordinate, among others, the single 
market, research, innovation and skills, as 
well as industrial strategy portfolios would 
be expected.
q VP for convergence, solidarity and 
a social  Europe: The EU’s work on 
employment and social affairs will also 
need to be strengthened and a political 
signal to European citizens should be sent 
through the creation of a vice-president 
post with broader responsibilities, one that 
would also coordinate the work being done 
in the Commission DGs on issues such as 
employment and social affairs, education 
and skills or migration.
q High Representative for Foreign and 
Security Policy: The future Commission 
should maintain the integration of the 
position in the Commission structures 
and the HR-VP should continue to be one 
of the vice-presidents of the executive. 
This would be important to ensure a close 
working relationship between the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) and the 
Commission. While relations between the 
EEAS and the Commission have improved 
compared to the initial years of the EEAS 
and the mandate of the previous HP-VP, 
more should be done to improve working 
relations between the two bodies. The EU’s 
foreign policy and external representation 
would also benefit from better relations 
and a better coordination between the 
next HR-VP and the next President of the 
European Council.
A better allocation of portfolios should also 
be accompanied by a better distribution of 
human resources in the cabinets, but also 
within the Commission more generally. 
There should be a clear link between the 
workload of each team and the human 
resources made available to it. This could 
contribute to a better functioning of the 
institution and reduce the human cost 
incurred by overworked staff.
 Dealing with centralisation 
To ensure a proper coordination of efforts, 
the quality of the interaction between 
the Commission president, the first vice-
president and the vice-presidents will matter 
greatly. An improved balance between the 
coordination role of the vice-presidents 
and the horizontal responsibilities of the 
Commission president should be struck. The 
cabinet of President Juncker tended towards 
over-centralising decision-making and not 
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allowing the vice-presidents to properly 
coordinate their teams. The higher level of 
centralisation in the Juncker Commission 
created challenges regarding internal 
coordination and transparency, contributing 
to a sense of disillusionment among the staff.
To  boost  s ta f f  mora le  wi th in  the 
Commission’s services, the communication 
between the commissioners and their 
cabinets and the services will need to 
improve. To fully benefit from the existing 
expertise within the Commission, the 
Commission services need to be engaged 
more on those matters in which they are 
specialised. Communication between future 
commissioners and the higher echelons 
of the DGs also needs to improve, and the 
regular meetings that the commissioners 
have with the leadership of their services 
should become in all cases more than 
formal rituals. This should be made clear in 
the mission letters the commissioners will 
receive from the Commission president at 
the start of their mandate and should also 
be an explicit part of the job description 
of senior posts within the institution. 
Building close working relations between 
the Commission’s political leadership 
and the leadership of Commission DGs 
will be essential for the work of the future 
executive.
 Dealing with the Eurosceptics 
The increase in the number of Eurosceptic 
governments in the Union will be a 
potential challenge for the formation and 
the future work of the next Commission. 
Most of these governments will likely 
push for substantial portfolios for their 
nominees. Much will depend on how 
constructive the commissioners nominated 
by these governments will be. As noted 
above, the Commission president has the 
power to ask a member state to nominate a 
different person and can always work with 
the EP to back up such a request.
H o w e v e r ,  t h e  n e x t  C o m m i s s i o n 
president should avoid further isolating 
Eurosceptic governments by offering 
their Commissioner-nominates only light 
portfolios. The nominated Commission 
president should consider giving some of 
them weighty but not ‘politically sensitive’ 
portfolios (such as agriculture, regional 
development or transport), as this would 
send a message of engagement and would 
increase their sense of ownership in the 
European project. But, while engaging 
these governments constructively, the 
president should definitely avoid assigning 
vice-presidential  roles or sensitive 
portfolios (for example the post responsible 
for the rule of law) to commissioners 
coming from countries that have problems 
in those areas. 
This will not necessary resolve the issue 
of having uncooperative, Eurosceptic 
commissioners. But a more hierarchical 
Commission with powerful Vice-Presidents 
would also be better able to constrain 
potential unconstructive positions from 
such individuals.
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 A political vs the technocratic  
 roles of the Commission 
According to President Juncker, the 
Commission’s composition, with VPs 
responsible for major cross-cutting policy 
fields, showed that “it will be more political 
than its predecessors”. President Juncker’s 
“political Commission” was meant to move 
away from the institution’s technocratic 
image, becoming more pro-active and 
assertive. However, the Commission’s 
political character will always be constrained 
by the opposition of the member states to a 
less technocratic role for the Commission 
and by its mixed political composition, 
which will remain a reality. The executive 
must also avoid becoming ‘politicised’ and 
thus avert a (further) strengthening of the 
inevitable ideological differences among 
the members of the College. Polarisation 
along lines of political orientation would 
negatively affect the work of the College, 
making it less likely to find compromises 
and enjoy the trust of the EU member states, 
which are governed by different political 
forces.
How political the future Commission 
will be depends greatly on who will be its 
future president. A more hierarchical and 
more political Commission would need to 
handle difficult negotiations, including with 
Eurosceptic national leaders, and would 
need at the top a respected and very senior 
political figure, one that would be on an 
equal level with the member state leaders.
At the same time, a visibly political 
Commission will raise again the issue of the 
relation between the institution’s political 
and technocratic nature. The Commission’s 
political and managerial/technocratic 
functions have often been seen as being at 
odds with each other. The reinforcement of 
the Commission’s political character will 
make the more managerial and regulatory 
activities of the Commission even more 
evident. This will increase the need to make 
a clearer separation between the two, at least 
in the areas where the technocratic function 
is most visible. The regular processing 
of tasks according to rules already set 
would benefit from being separated from 
a more politically-minded body. For 
example, separating the enforcement of EU 
competition policy from the Commission’s 
competition policymaking by transferring 
it to an independent agency would have the 
benefit of demonstrating its independence 
from potential political pressure but also of 
shielding the Commission from accusations, 
for example from private actors or non-EU 
countries, that it is using competition rules 
for political purposes.
 Continuing the journey to a more  
 effective Commission 
Working under the same treaty rules, the 
next European Commission will have to 
deal with a number of significant internal 
and external challenges. Moreover, 
compared to 2014, the political climate in 
Europe has worsened, with more populist 
forces coming to power in several member 
states. These challenges will need to be 
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taken into consideration by the future 
Commission president when setting up the 
next College of commissioners. A weak or 
partially dysfunctional Commission will not 
be successful in dealing with the multiple 
challenges facing the EU. 
While the Juncker Commission has 
functioned better than some of its 
predecessors, the transformation is far from 
complete. The next Commission will have to 
improve on the innovations of the Juncker 
Commission, which were themselves based 
on the experiences of previous Commission 
colleges. This includes structuring the 
College in a clearer hierarchy, with powerful 
vice-presidents coordinating small teams 
of commissioners and a better balanced 
distribution of portfolios. Roles within the 
College should not be duplicated and the 
portfolios and roles of the vice-presidents 
and the regular commissioners will need 
to be clearly defined. This will streamline 
the Commission’s work and ensure policy 
coherence.
At the same time, the next College should 
avoid centralising the decision process 
in the Berlaymont or in the cabinet of the 
Commission president too much, as was 
the case with the Juncker Commission. The 
College should draw more extensively on 
the Commission services at its disposal to 
ensure a higher quality of policy proposals.
The next Commission will have to deal with 
many external and internal difficulties, 
including increased levels of Euroscepticism 
in some of the member states. The next 
Commission President should engage the 
Eurosceptic governments and give their 
Commissioners designate portfolios that 
would send a message of engagement and 
responsibility to the countries “they know 
best”. At the same time, the Commission 
should ensure it has the necessary means 
and processes in place to defend and pursue 
its mission if challenged by unconstructive 
actors. A more hierarchical Commission is 
critical to manage this risk.
The next Commission president should also 
organise the College and the DGs along the 
lines of the challenges it will have to tackle, 
from the need for a sustainable transition 
to a low-carbon economy, to the need to 
increase competitiveness, to an increasingly 
challenging global environment and to 
improving the lives and security of European 
citizens. Over time, parts of the Commission’s 
technocratic and regulatory activities 
should be transferred to independent 
agencies, demonstrating and ensuring the 
independence of Commission decisions.
A political Commission with a clear 
hierarchy will be better placed to deal with 
the multiple challenges the EU will face 
in the years to come. Failing to structure 
the executive in a more efficient way will 
limit the Commission’s ability to face 
those challenges and will lead to a further 
reduction in the influence of this European 
institution and of the EU as such.
1.  See for example Missiroli, Antonio (2009), The 
next European Commission: tips for the President-
elect, Brussels: European Policy Centre; Missiroli, 
Antonio (2009), “New treaty, new structure?” in 
Challenge Europe, The next Commission: doing 
more and better, Brussels: European Policy Centre; 
Zuleeg, Fabian (2014), “A more effective structure 
for the Commission”, Brussels: European Policy 
Centre.
2.  When Commissioner Oettinger took over the 
Budget and Human Resources portfolio in January 
2017, his previous digital economy portfolio was 
added to the portfolio of Ansip.
3.  In 2004 the European Parliament forced the 
withdrawal	of	Italy’s	Commissioner-designate	
Rocco	Buttiglione	and	in	2010	of	Bulgaria’s	
Commissioner-designate Rumiana Jeleva.
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Instruments
q A farmer woman pours milk into  
a container at the Groupement Agricole 
d’Exploitation	en	Commun	(GAEC)	farm	near	
Bains-sur-Oust in Brittany, on 26 March 2015. 
Brittany,	France’s	largest	milk	producing	
region, is still hoping to boost its production 
by focusing more on exports as milk quotas 
come to an end on the European market.  
© GEORGES GOBET / AFP
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The EU budget  
– including the CAP – 
should be used to finance 
the Union’s priorities 
Annika Hedberg – Head of the Sustainable Prosperity for Europe Programme, European Policy Centre
The EU’s challenges today are manifold: low productivity, 
problems with competitiveness, rising inequality, lagging 
behind in the global digital race, environmental challenges, 
climate change, migration, security, demographic trends. 
These are all examples where cooperation between member 
states could help to deliver stronger, more effective responses 
at the national and European level. Politicians are quick to 
recognize these common challenges as priorities for action 
in their speeches. However, a closer look at one of the main 
EU tools that could be used to address these challenges and 
provide added value for the EU and its citizens, the Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF), shows how far words are separated 
from action. 
As the Commission’s 
proposal for the 
new MFF is currently 
under discussion 
with the European 
Parliament and the 
member states, it is 
still possible for the 
EU to ensure that this 
time around it will 
put its money where 
its mouth is.
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q As the EU is debating the next budget for 2021-27, it is 
still possible to ensure that each euro will be invested to provide added value for the 
EU	and	its	citizens.	The	next	EU	budget	should	reflect	the	EU’s	priorities	and	goals,	and	
help to address – rather than exacerbate – its challenges. 
WHAT TO DO: 
q  Identify why and where EU investments are needed the most to address the 
challenges of today and tomorrow. 
q  Put	an	end	to	subsidies	that	are	evidently	harmful	to	people’s	well-being,	health,	
the environment and the climate, and thus costly for the economy and society.
q  Finance measures that will help to achieve long-term prosperity and provide 
added value to the EU and its citizens, in line with the Sustainable Development 
Goals and the Paris Climate Agreement.
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Unfortunately, time after time, the EU budget 
falls far behind its potential. The European 
Commission’s proposed budget of €1,135 
billion for 2021-27 - about 1% of the bloc’s 
gross domestic product – obviously cannot 
solve all the EU’s problems. However, where 
the EU decides to put its money sets out a 
direction and shows what its priorities are. 
In its current form, the MFF proposal 
suggests that the EU’s priorities lie in 
the past rather than in the future. While 
supporting the structures of the past, such 
as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), it 
underperforms when it comes to addressing 
the challenges listed in the beginning. It fails 
to devote sufficient resources to people’s 
top concerns today, which according to the 
latest Eurobarometers include terrorism, 
unemployment and the protection of the 
environment. As the Commission’s proposal 
for the new MFF is currently under discussion 
with the European Parliament and the 
member states, it is still possible for the EU 
to ensure that this time around it will put its 
money where its mouth is.1
 Why a new approach is needed 
First, the EU’s internal developments 
require a complete rethink of its finances 
and spending. The UK’s departure from the 
EU leaves a budget gap of about €10 billion 
per year. Simultaneously, the economic, 
social, environmental, climate change and 
security challenges are creating significant 
uncertainties. European leaders can no 
longer ignore that Europe and Europeans’ 
needs have changed.
Second, the global context has transformed 
dramatically. In 2015, EU and other global 
leaders committed to the 2030 Sustainable 
Development agenda and the Paris Climate 
Agreement. Together they set a clear 
direction, with clear goals to be achieved for 
sustainable development and climate action. 
For the sake of its credibility and moral 
leadership on the international stage, the 
EU’s budget must reflect these commitments. 
Climate change is ultimately the biggest 
life-threatening challenge Europe and the 
world is facing. The impacts can already be 
seen in the form of record-breaking storms, 
forest fires, droughts, heat waves and floods, 
and the economic, societal, environmental 
and security implications are only expected 
to worsen if global warming continues.
In this context, the Commission’s long-
term vision for a prosperous, modern, 
competitive and climate neutral economy 
by 2050, published in November 2018, and 
the reflection paper towards a sustainable 
Europe by 2030, published in January 
2019, provide important starting points for 
dialogue and action. They suggest where 
the EU needs to go. And if the EU is serious 
about achieving a new economic, industrial 
and social model while becoming climate 
neutral by 2050, the investments in this 
transition must start now. 
EU money should be spent on preparing 
m e m b e r  s t a t e s , d i f fe r e n t  s e c t o r s 
and citizens in this transition. The 
Commission’s suggestion to raise the climate 
mainstreaming target from 20% to 25% in 
the new budget is an important signal. At 
the same time, funds should not be spent on 
activities that undermine these objectives, 
for example, in the fields of digitalisation, 
regions’ smart specialisation, agriculture 
and energy developments. For instance, 
under the ongoing MFF, more resources 
have been allocated to natural gas than to 
electricity interconnection projects under 
the Connecting Europe Facility programme. 
While these investments may bring about 
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some positive benefits, such as progress towards a coal phase-
out or energy security, at the same time, they undermine the 
efforts to decarbonise and electrify the European economy. The 
investments in the infrastructures of tomorrow are done today 
and we should get them right. 
The Commission’s proposal contains some progressive 
elements on which the member states and the Parliament 
should build on. It suggests increased funding for migration 
and security. It proposes more support for research and 
innovation as well as digitalisation, which, if used well, can 
help to enhance Europe’s competitiveness. Credit goes to the 
Commission for simplifying the revenue side by removing all 
rebates. Politically, it has also shown some backbone by asking 
to link the budget with the observance of the rule of law.
However, the proposal still falls short by a margin. This is well 
exemplified by the CAP, which constitutes one third of the 
spending package.2 By only moderately reducing the budget for 
the CAP, which seems to be almost untouchable within the MFF, 
the Commission has proposed preserving a traditional spending 
area at the cost of other priorities. While there have been efforts 
to modernise the budget, the figures speak for themselves: for 
instance, only €9.1 billion is allocated for the digital agenda, 
compared to €365 billion for the agricultural sector.
More worrying than the figures themselves is what will be done 
with the money, and what has (or has not) been learnt from 
past mistakes.3 The CAP has been widely criticised for failing 
to limit its adverse effects on the environment and the climate, 
and for the absence of health considerations. There is no clear 
indication to what extent these inefficiencies and inherent 
contradictions may be addressed. 
 The time of sacred cows  
 should be over 
If the EU is serious about using taxpayers’ money to improve 
the lives of Europeans, the CAP should help to increase people’s 
welfare and protect the planet. As with other parts of the MFF, 
every euro that is spent under the CAP should be justifiable and 
provide added value for the EU and its citizens. 
First, the economic cost alone should raise concern. Taxpayers’ 
money is used to support farming practices that are not 
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competitive or economically viable for 
producers or for society. According to 
Commission statistics, up to 90% of cattle 
farmers’ income comes from subsidies.4 
While the dependency on EU money is 
lower for dairy farmers and many field crops 
(mainly used for animal feed), they are also 
on permanent life support.5
Livestock and dairy farming, especially, play 
a central role in European agriculture.6 65% 
of the EU’s agricultural land is dedicated to 
livestock,7 and two thirds of cereal production 
is fed to animals.8 European livestock farming 
depends on subsidies, directly and indirectly 
(as is the case when EU money is spent on 
producing feed for animals).
While the CAP is often portrayed as an 
instrument for supporting small European 
farmers, the biggest benefiters are the 
big players in the farm sector, including 
wealthy landowners.9 In the ongoing 
negotiations, there is still strong support 
for granting direct payments simply based 
on land acreage. At the same time, many 
of the most innovate, small farms and new 
food sector businesses are booming without 
EU support.
The potential with producing nutritious, 
sustainable and economically viable food 
for humans is greater than often realised. 
Vegetable and fruit farmers already 
compete on the market with little to no 
income support from the EU.10 The market 
for meat and dairy alternatives is seeing 
double-digit growth and there is untapped 
potential in cultivating plant proteins for 
humans.11 Europe already has competitive 
agricultural production that could provide 
a livelihood for farmers while delivering 
on environmental and societal benefits as 
well – these are the practices the EU should 
build on. If the EU is serious about using 
tax payers’ money to increase Europe’s and 
the agricultural sector’s competitiveness, it 
is hard to find justification for supporting 
livestock farming, whether it is directly 
or indirectly. 
Second, the impact on the climate is alarming. 
So far, political efforts and investments have 
zeroed in on reducing energy and transport 
emissions, which hopefully will produce 
tangible results in some decades. However, 
if the EU is serious about climate action, it 
also needs to tackle the emissions from food 
production and consumption. 
According to the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO), the livestock sector 
accounts for 14.5% of global emissions.12 As 
a major producer and consumer of livestock 
products, Europe has a huge responsibility in 
addressing related emissions.13 Delivering on 
the Paris Climate Agreement and achieving 
climate neutrality by 2050 requires reducing 
livestock-related emissions and promoting 
plant-based diets as well as healthy soils 
to capture carbon.14 In fact, this would be 
an efficient way to cut emissions in the EU, 
as well as globally: while transforming the 
energy and transport systems as a whole 
and seeing the related benefits will take 
decades because of the needed infrastructure 
investments, making even small changes to 
diets and farming practices now would bring 
immediate benefits. 
Thirdly, agriculture has a significant 
environmental footprint, impacting soil, 
water, air and biodiversity. The nutrients 
and pesticides used in the sector pollute 
land and water. Ammonia emissions from 
livestock waste are a significant source of 
air pollution.15 Agriculture also contributes 
to growing water scarcity: it uses more than 
40% of the available fresh water in the EU, 
with a significant share used for livestock 
production.16
Lastly, by sponsoring the Europeans’ 
unhealthy diets, the CAP is damaging 
people’s health and burdening healthcare 
systems with unnecessary costs. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) guidelines 
for a healthy diet are built on a plant-
based diet.17 The WHO classifies processed 
meat as a carcinogen, known to cause 
cancer and red meat as a possible cause of 
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cancer.18 Scientific research also links the 
consumption of animal (meat and/or dairy) 
products to an elevated risk of numerous 
other diseases.19 Preventable chronic 
diseases, mostly due to unhealthy diets, 
account for 86% of deaths in Europe.20 
What does the EU do? It subsidises not only 
livestock production but also consumption. 
For example, the EU has been encouraging 
school kids to consume dairy products 
since 1977, amounting to €100 million this 
school year.21
For anyone who suggests that the EU should 
not tell people what to eat and drink: this is 
exactly what it has done by supporting the 
production and consumption of livestock 
products. The farming lobby often argues 
that it is better to subsidise animal farming 
in the EU than to import from countries with 
lower standards, that livestock is needed for 
food security, or that European lands are 
more adequate for growing food for animals 
than for people. However, the current 
approach is failing Europeans and the planet, 
in a big way. Science is clear on what makes 
a food system sustainable and what makes a 
diet good for human health, the climate and 
the environment.22 It is time to ensure that 
EU money is used for – not against - these 
objectives. 
During the EU budget negotiations, no 
sector should be off limits. One can certainly 
question spending one third of the EU budget 
on agriculture. However, as it is politically 
difficult to even imagine a radical cut to the 
CAP, at least a frank debate is needed about 
how the money is spent. If the EU insists on 
financially supporting the agricultural sector, 
the investments must be tied to performance 
and the aim should be to encourage 
sustainable and economically viable farming 
– or even better: creating a sustainable food 
system - that is good for the environment and 
contributes to people’s well-being. Actively 
participating in this transition is in the 
farmers’ best interest, too: it will help them 
to secure their livelihoods for the future. 
Changing consumers’ habits will have a major 
impact as well, but it is still up to the EU and 
national policymakers to create a framework 
that can provide the right financial incentives 
for a change.
 What should happen now? 
As the budget negotiations are ongoing, 
it is up to the European Parliament and 
the member states to step up their game. 
There are three pressing issues.
First, member states must reflect on the 
EU’s principles and values, and identify 
why and where EU collaboration and 
financing is needed. They should recognise 
that achieving the shared benefits requires 
going beyond the pursuit of narrow 
national interests. The world and people’s 
needs have changed, and the EU budget 
should reflect that. This should also apply 
to the CAP.
Second, smart spending requires putting 
an end to subsidies that are evidently 
harmful for people’s well-being, their 
health, the environment and climate 
– and thus costly for the economy and 
society. The EU’s support for livestock 
farming but also, for example, for fossil 
fuel infrastructures are a case in point. 
Justifications for continuing to finance 
either of these today are hard to find. 
Ending harmful subsidies could help to 
reduce the EU budget, as advocated by net 
contributors like the Netherlands, and/or 
provide additional financial support for 
implementing today’s priorities.
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Third, smart spending calls for financing measures that will 
provide added value to the EU and its citizens, in line with the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Climate 
Agreement. Payments must be tied to meeting the core objectives 
of the EU and achieving long-term prosperity. In the case of 
the CAP, it should be used to develop a competitive European 
agricultural sector that produces nutritious, sustainable food 
that contributes to people’s well-being.
If the EU is serious about achieving a new climate neutral 
economic model by 2050, this requires huge investments. The 
member states must agree to use the EU budget to address the 
most pressing challenges and priorities of today and tomorrow 
in alignment with this vision. The EU could condition the 
payment of funds to the development of National Energy 
and Climate Plans (NECPs).23 In addition, the money could 
be used to attract additional public and private investments 
for climate-friendly projects. No money should be spent on 
activities that go against these set goals, and how climate funds 
are spent must be properly controlled. 
Member states’ current disagreement on the size of the overall 
EU budget and the sectoral appropriations misses the point: 
the debate should be about the justification and leverage of 
proposed expenditures. Beneficiaries should demonstrate the EU 
payments’ added value for Europe and how they help to address 
the Union’s challenges. If this is not the case, funding must be 
phased out. 
The EU budget is not a magic wand that can solve all the 
EU’s problems. But in terms of setting a direction, it matters 
enormously. Where the EU decides to put its money shows 
European citizens and the rest of the world what its priorities 
are. The outcome of the discussions must be an EU budget that 
is in line with the EU’s principles and goals. It must deliver on 
the objectives the Union has committed to under the SDGs and 
the Paris Climate Agreement. In the new budget, each euro 
invested should provide added value for the EU and its citizens 
in the face of new internal and international pressures and help 
to address rather than exacerbate the EU’s challenges.
Science is clear on 
what makes a food 
system sustainable 
and what makes a 
diet good for human 
health, the climate 
and the environment. 
It is time to ensure 
that EU money is used 
for – not against - 
these objectives. 
Smart spending 
requires putting an 
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A nimble and 
responsive EU?
Predicting unpredictability: A new approach  
to EU policymaking
Marta Pilati – Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre
Fabian Zuleeg – Chief Executive and Chief Economist of the European Policy Centre
For decades, the integration process at the European Union (EU) 
level advanced in an incremental manner. Today, as the global 
environment becomes more complex and rapidly changing, 
the EU needs more flexible policymaking that can effectively 
respond and adapt to unexpected events. A change of mind-set 
is required to move away from the existing framework, which is 
too rigid and often ineffective. The EU must ensure that, in the 
next institutional cycle, instruments are created or reinforced 
that allow it to react quickly and flexibly to new crises. The next 
European Commission should aim to avoid being boxed in by 
a rigid set of priorities. It should rather retain significant spare 
capacity, both in resources and in political focus, to be able to 
react to future challenges, which nobody can (fully) predict at 
this point in time. The EU and its members need to introduce 
new contingency procedures and emergency mechanisms, so 
that they are able to react more efficiently and rapidly in an 
increasingly more dynamic, faster, unstable und uncertain 
environment. There is need for a policymaking framework 
Resolving a crisis 
with last-minute 
agreements or ad hoc 
solutions is not a 
sustainable approach 
to emergency 
policymaking and 
crisis management.
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q The EU must ensure that, in the next institutional  
cycle,	instruments	are	created	or	reinforced	that	allow	it	to	react	quickly	and	flexibly	 
to new crises.
WHAT TO DO: 
q Establish an emergency decision-making procedure.
q Put in place an emergency funding mechanism.
q  Work	towards	a	‘cultural	change’	to	make	policies	more	reactive	and	flexible	in	
their day-to-day implementation. 18
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that can respond adequately to these 
challenges, one that includes the right tools 
and procedures for reacting to unexpected 
events, with sufficient spare capacity. 
 A new policy environment 
In the past, the elaboration of new treaties, 
the delegation of new powers and the 
creation of new instruments took years 
to be agreed on and implemented. This 
allowed time for lengthy decision-making 
procedures and, at times, for controversial 
actions, even created enough space for the 
necessary political consensus to solidify 
in the member states. Predictability, 
stability, pre-allocation and unanimity 
became, among others, key features of EU 
policymaking.
Once the need for immediate reactions 
materialised, i .e. when crises were 
hitting the EU and its member states, the 
limitations of a policymaking framework 
solely based on a long-term horizon became 
evident. When the financial crisis hit, the 
system’s inadequacy was striking. With no 
procedures in place for taking emergency 
actions, EU leaders had to create new 
tools and mechanisms from scratch. Under 
intense pressure, existing elements of the 
E(M)U system were stretched to the limit.
Since being exposed to unexpected external 
events, such as intense market pressure in 
the financial and sovereign debt crisis or 
the overwhelming increase in numbers of 
refugees and other migrants in 2015/2016, 
the existing policy framework entered a 
quasi-permanent ‘crisis mode’, with obvious 
limitations. Policymaking at EU level 
was designed for being predictable, not 
flexible, and was unable to react adequately 
to emergencies. As a consequence, the 
response has often been the creation of 
ad hoc instruments outside of the traditional 
framework.
These shortcomings are likely to be 
amplified in the future, as unpredictability 
becomes the new norm. The speed and 
scope of change that affects societies is 
increasing. Technological advancement, 
increasing political diversity, changing 
demographics, and increasing economic and 
social interconnectedness are factors that 
intensify the world’s complexity at a rapid 
pace. This inevitably results in greater risks 
for the EU; the next crisis is bound to come. 
Global interdependence makes the EU more 
vulnerable to factors outside its control such 
as, for instance, escalating trade frictions or 
instability in the neighbourhood.
FLEXIBLE WHERE NEEDED
The current EU policy framework functioned 
better in the past, when the world was 
more predictable and change took place at 
a slower pace and with EU action confined 
to a more limited range of policy areas. A 
framework that provided stability but at 
the cost of a slow speed of implementation 
generally fitted the needs of the Union. The 
Single Market, for example, took decades 
to formulate, accept, and ratify. The need 
for speed was not compelling, thus it was 
possible to wait for political leadership to 
push forward ideas and allow compromise 
to be built.
Today, however, additional tools are needed 
for effectively responding to current and 
future challenges. While the existing 
framework is well-suited for some policy 
areas, others require measures guaranteeing 
responsive and quick decision-making.
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A NEED FOR STABILITY…
Some areas of policymaking benefit from 
a long-term, predictable approach and 
thus are best addressed by the current 
policymaking framework. The bulk of 
the Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF), for example through the European 
Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), 
pre-allocates resources to member states 
and regions at the beginning of the period, 
aiming to provide a stable source of funding 
that is not influenced by political choices 
and external events. Similarly, actions to 
deepen and strengthen the Single Market, 
which is already mostly implemented and 
functioning, intend to gradually change the 
structure of the economy to obtain long-
term gains. The same applies to trade with 
the rest of the world. The formulation of a 
free trade agreement can take years but, as 
it brings additional benefits to an already 
functioning system, it is not necessarily a 
pressing priority.
These policy interventions do not have a 
compelling need for speed. As they focus on 
long- term actions, they can be formulated 
and changed through a lengthy and 
thorough decision-making procedure.
... OR A NEED FOR SPEED?
Then there are the fields of policymaking 
where a different approach is needed: 
for example, economic policy, financial 
affairs, and foreign policy. These areas are 
characterised by external factors having 
a disproportionate impact (geopolitics, 
markets, political instability) and where self-
reinforcing consequences can quickly escalate. 
These areas can be affected by unexpected, 
sudden events (shocks) and thus demand 
flexible instruments that can be adjusted to 
a changing environment, and contingency 
mechanisms and procedures to be used in 
case of necessity. Responsiveness is critical in 
an emergency, and as of today, the EU mostly 
lacks the appropriate processes. 
For example, EU leaders and institutions 
had no pre-established procedures or 
instruments to take urgent decisions 
during the financial  and sovereign 
debt crises. Existing provisions were 
stretched to their legal limit and new 
instruments were established outside of 
the EU’s existing treaty framework, raising 
questions on democratic control and 
accountability. For instance, the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) was set up 
as an organisation based in Luxembourg 
through an ad hoc intergovernmental treaty 
and an amendment of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. 
Another example is the EU’s reaction to 
the unexpected increase in the number 
of arriving refugees and other migrants 
in 2015/2016, which could have been 
quicker, more coordinated and much more 
effective. Instead, the EU and its members 
concentrated on ad hoc solutions (like the 
EU-Turkey Statement) and in many cases 
failed to make structural progress due to 
the opposition of some member states (e.g. 
against the relocation scheme).
Resolving a crisis with last-minute 
agreements or ad hoc solutions is not 
a sustainable approach to emergency 
policymaking and crisis management. In the 
future, when new challenges will inevitably 
arise, the EU should have the necessary 
procedures and spare capacity to address 
them in an efficient and speedy manner.
EMERGING FRICTIONS
But to move towards more responsive 
and swift decision-making, the EU has 
to overcome two major internal hurdles. 
The first is the tension between, on 
the one hand, the need for flexibility 
in policymaking and, on the other, the 
member states’ demands for predictability 
and rigid rules. When it comes to the 
common budget, pre-allocating the large 
majority of resources at the beginning of 
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the seven-year period leaves little space to shifting funds to 
policy areas with urgent needs. The current construction of 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) also reflects this 
tension. From the start, member states attempted to put in 
place strict rules, such as the Stability and Growth Pact, which 
puts limitations on government debt and deficits. However, 
once confronted with crises, many realised that enforcing 
those rules is practically impossible when in acute distress. 
While member states understand the need for more flexibility 
in principle, in practice they do not allow it. Convincing 
member states is a long-term, step-by-step process, making 
the chances of not being ready when the next crisis hits and 
spreads even greater.
The second challenge is the basic power struggle between 
member states’ recognition of the need for coordinated action 
and joint crisis management, and their resistance to delegating 
more powers to the EU. One example is the MFF: member 
states demand the EU to foster investment, job creation and 
growth, while conceding only a minimal amount of finance 
to achieve these objectives (the EU budget amounts to only 
around 1% of the bloc’s Gross National Income (GNI)). Another 
example is the EMU. Eurozone members realised they must 
work together to tackle the financial crisis, but at the same 
time refused to move beyond their red lines, e.g. on automatic 
stabilisers such as transfer mechanisms or the introduction of 
a European unemployment insurance scheme. The only long-
term solution will be to pool certain response capacities at 
the European level; as a first step, this can be applied in less 
controversial areas, such as the response to humanitarian or 
natural catastrophes.
NOT ONLY IN CRISIS
Unpredictability is not relegated to emergencies only. As the 
scale, scope and speed of change increases, it has become a 
permanent feature of economies and societies. This speed of 
change generates significant challenges to the effectiveness of 
forecasts and ex ante assessments. Day-to-day implementation 
of policies can be rendered ineffective by the instability of the 
environment in which they operate. The passage of time can 
make a rigidly designed policy irrelevant or, in the worst case, 
even detrimental to its original objectives.
This requires a much more continuous and rigorous review 
and evaluation of policies and their impact on the ground. 
An existing programme that attempts to address some of 
these challenges is the Regulatory Fitness and Performance 
Programme (REFIT). Aiming to reduce red tape and enhance 
The passage of time 
can make a rigidly 
designed policy 
irrelevant or, in the 
worst case, even 
detrimental to its 
original objectives.
The existence  
of a rigid system  
of rules that is strict  
in theory but 
inevitably (and 
rightly) set aside 
in emergencies 
undermines the 
credibility of EU 
policymaking.
The EU needs  
to start readying  
its institutions,  
its decision-making 
and its funding 
mechanisms for  
the challenges  
of a more dynamic, 
faster, unstable 
und uncertain 
environment.
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simplification, REFIT looks at existing EU 
legislation and identifies opportunities for 
burden reduction. It aims to systematically 
implement ex post evaluation, impact 
assessments and revisions of existing law. 
REFIT is a step in the right direction, helping 
to reduce unnecessary costs. However, its 
scope and focus are quite limited when it 
comes to improving the flexibility of existing 
EU policies. 
The solution is not a complete overhaul 
of the structure of EU policymaking, but 
an adjustment to better reflect the needs 
of member states and the demands of the 
contemporary world.
 An EU that is ready to act 
In a fast-changing environment, flexibility 
is critical. This implies building in spare 
capacity to react to crises. Assuming that 
further emergencies will not materialise 
would be naïve. In particular, two 
innovations are necessary to increase the 
EU’s ability to react more decisively and 
swiftly in future crisis situations:
q Emergency decision-making procedure: 
this procedure should be formulated and 
put in place as a tool to use when a quick 
reaction is required at EU level. The crisis 
procedure should enable the EU to take 
decisions in a shorter period of time. But 
to make it effective, it would need to have 
provisions that do not allow individual 
member states to have veto powers. For 
example, Commission proposals could 
be approved with a qualified majority 
vote or rejected with a reverse (qualified) 
majority vote instead. If the next politico-
institutional cycle lacks the political will 
for a treaty change, member states could 
identify priority policy areas where an 
emergency procedure is promptly needed, 
and move away from unanimity, for instance 
through the use of passerelle clauses. This 
requires member states to recognise that 
these powers are necessary at EU level in 
exceptional situations. To forge consensus 
one could start expanding the possibilities 
in less contentious policy areas such as, for 
example, the EU’s response to humanitarian 
or natural catastrophes.
q Emergency funding mechanism: the EU 
budget already has some contingency funds 
with an emergency logic. The European 
Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF, with an 
annual budget of €500 million in 2011 
prices, i.e. approximately 0.3% of the total 
7-year common budget) provides resources 
for member states hit by major natural 
disasters (upon member state application 
and approval by the European Parliament 
and Council of a Commission aid proposal). 
The non-pre-allocated nature of the funding 
makes this instrument more flexible than a 
majority of other EU budget instruments. 
The EUSF could be taken as inspiration for 
similar emergency funding mechanisms that 
can be triggered if the circumstances call for 
it, ideally on the Commission’s initiative 
and approved with qualified majority voting. 
Given the expected political resistance, it is 
probably necessary to start with relatively 
small amounts, but it is important to 
establish the principle. A similar mechanism 
could, for instance, be used in case of a 
sudden economic downturn in a member 
state that could harm the stability of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
or in case of a crisis in the banking sector. 
Instruments that require unanimous 
agreement do not necessarily allow for 
quick decision making. The new eurozone 
budget should, at least in part, be designed 
with this in mind. In the future, instruments 
for the automatic stabilisation of changes 
in levels of unemployment, investment or 
18
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growth across the EU could be considered 
as contingency measures, which would only 
be triggered in the event of a crisis (see also 
contribution of George Pagoulatos in this 
volume).
But beyond these concrete mechanisms, 
a ‘cultural change’ to make policies 
more reactive and flexible in their day-
to-day implementation i s  c ruc ia l . 
Ex ante, policymaking should systematically 
incorporate contingency planning. The 
possibility of unforeseen events, or of a 
sudden change in the socio-economic 
context should be taken into account from 
the conception and throughout the design 
of any policy. Early-warning mechanisms 
should be put in place that try to anticipate 
adverse shocks and contemplate the 
necessity of a policy shift. 
Policies must also build in flexibility 
from the start. As it is often impossible 
to anticipate changes, there is a need for 
meaningful ex-post evaluations (including 
checking implementation on the ground) 
and, if necessary, the revision or even 
reversal of existing actions. This cultural 
shift also implies a fundamentally different 
approach to economic governance in 
crisis situations, away from a more-or-less 
rigid rule-based framework towards real 
decision-making powers, i.e. the ability to 
autonomously allocate significant resources 
and policy action without having to get 
permission to act. Similarly, the importance 
of flexibility implies that there should be 
some spare capacity, both political and 
financial, at the disposal of EU decision-
makers, to be used if needed. 
While setting policy priorities is important, 
they should not become the prerogatives 
of EU action. Unforeseen problems could 
emerge at any point and become the EU’s 
main concern. When that happens, there 
should be enough capacity, i.e. resources 
and political will, to allow for an effective 
and swift response. The existence of a 
rigid system of rules that is strict in theory 
but inevitably (and rightly) set aside in 
emergencies undermines the credibility of 
EU policymaking. 
Contingency procedures and mechanisms 
for emergency situations would not only 
make EU policymaking more effective 
in such circumstances, but also improve 
accountability, transparency and democratic 
control, which the current mechanisms 
sorely lack. Crises would no longer have to 
be solved by EU leaders huddled together 
in overnight summits creating ad hoc 
instruments from scratch. Instead, clear 
procedures would be followed, subject to the 
scrutiny of the Parliament. 
Failing to allow for a more flexible 
policymaking framework makes the 
EU vulnerable to unpredictable events. 
The consequences are serious: not only 
does the EU responding too slowly and 
inappropriately incur higher costs, but 
it also furthers the socio-economic and 
political fragmentation between member 
states and undermines the legitimacy of its 
actions. Without reform, the Union’s ability 
to contain future crises and effectively 
embrace change cannot be taken for granted.
The choice lies with the member states. If 
they want a responsive EU, there is only one 
way forward: delegate emergency powers to 
the EU level. 
It is unlikely that this issue will be tackled 
fully in the next political cycle. But wherever 
possible the EU needs to start readying its 
institutions, its decision-making and its 
funding mechanisms for the challenges 
of a more dynamic, faster, unstable und 
uncertain environment. The world will not 
wait for us:  the EU and its member states 
cannot afford to dither and lose precious 
time if they want to be ready for when the 
next crisis hits.
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Differentiated  
integration
q French President Emmanuel Macron applauds after delivering  
a speech on the European Union in the amphitheatre of the Sorbonne 
University in Paris on 26 September 2017. © LUDOVIC MARIN / POOL / AFP
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Handle with care: 
The potentials and 
limits of differentiated 
integration
Julian Rappold – Senior Policy Analyst, head of the joint EPC-Stiftung Mercator project ‘Connecting 
Europe’ at the European Policy Centre (EPC)
The concept of differentiated integration has once again 
moved to the centre stage in the debate on the future of the 
European Union (EU). But differentiated integration is not a 
new concept: it has been and will continue to be an integral 
feature of European integration, although it is still unclear 
in which areas, how and to what extent it will be applied in 
practice in the years to come.
Flexible forms of cooperation and integration involving not all 
member states have always been a way to overcome political 
stalemate and opposing views on the priorities and scope of 
integration. The Schengen area and the eurozone constitute 
the most prominent of many examples of differentiated 
integration in which a group of countries decided to deepen 
their cooperation without all member states taking part (from 
the very beginning). 
Differentiated 
integration is not 
a panacea to cure 
the EU’s internal 
divisions. It should 
remain a second-best 
option in order not to 
jeopardise the Union’s 
political, legal and 
institutional cohesion. 
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q Differentiated integration offers a pragmatic and 
functional	way	to	maintain	the	Union’s	capacity	to	act,	but	should	be	handled	with	care.
WHAT TO DO: 
q  Differentiated integration should only remain the second-best option to ensure 
procedural and institutional coherence.
q 	Differentiated	integration	should	not	lead	to	a	closed-off	‘core	Europe’.	It	should	
always	follow	the	principles	of	openness,	inclusiveness	and	efficiency.	
q 	Differentiated	integration	should	as	much	as	possible	take	place	within	the	EU’s	
existing legal set-up.
q 	Berlin	and	Paris	should	focus	more	on	including	other	member	states’	perspectives	
in their thinking to form wider leadership coalitions at an early stage.
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Given the many internal and external challenges the EU is 
facing and the increased heterogeneity among member states, 
the number of flexible forms of cooperation will likely further 
increase in the next politico-institutional cycle (2019-2024) 
as it offers a pragmatic-and functional way to maintain the 
Union’s capacity to act. However, differentiated integration 
is not a panacea to cure the EU’s internal divisions. It should 
remain a second-best option in order not to jeopardise the 
Union’s political, legal and institutional cohesion. If applied, 
differentiated integration should always follow the principles 
of openness, inclusiveness and efficiency and should as much 
as possible take place within the EU’s existing legal set-up to 
ensure procedural reliability and institutional coherence.
 The need for more 
 differentiation  
Over the past decade, the experience and consequences of 
the so-called poly-crisis have severely hampered the Union’s 
cohesion and its capacity to act. The United Kingdom (UK) has 
even entered a path of ‘negative integration’, aiming to break 
itself free from the EU. Ruptures have emerged between the 
Union’s North and South in the euro crisis, and between the 
East and West over irregular migration. These developments 
have fuelled fragmentation and distrust both among the 
EU28 and between national capitals and ‘Brussels’ (see 
also contribution by Janis A. Emmanouilidis in the present 
volume).
The EU’s inability to overcome stalemates and blockages in 
crucial policy areas not only exposes it to the risk of future 
crises but also undermines the confidence of citizens in 
the Union. Past experiences have shown that differentiated 
integration can help to increase the EU’s efficiency when 
dealing with internal and external challenges. It is very likely 
that after the European elections in May 2019, the new EU 
leadership will have to operate in an even more complex and 
conflictual environment leaving only little room for manoeuvre 
for an ambitious reform agenda. This has intensified the 
debate on the scope of member states taking the lead and 
moving forward in certain policy areas, while leaving the door 
open for others to join at a later point in time.1 Differentiated 
integration can be a pragmatic alternative for those member 
states with a greater ambition to move beyond the lowest 
common denominator. 
European leaders’ 
support for 
differentiated 
integration expressed 
in Sunday speeches 
is not matched in 
Monday’s actions. 
In reality, however, 
striking a fine line 
between openness 
and inclusiveness 
on the one hand and 
efficiency on the 
other hand is at times 
difficult to achieve, as 
some member states 
might not be able or 
willing to deliver or 
have diverging motifs 
for joining the group.
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 Differentiation and its critics 
The debate on flexible forms of cooperation 
between a limited number of member states 
gained particular traction after the UK’s 
decision to leave the EU. In March 2017, 
the European Commission put forward a 
White Paper presenting five scenarios for 
the Union’s future including a ‘flexible 
Europe’ scenario (“Those who want more 
do more”) that foresaw a group of member 
states enhancing their cooperation.2 On the 
occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Treaty 
of Rome in May 2017, the leaders of the 
EU27 subscribed to the possibility of moving 
ahead at different speeds while stressing the 
indivisibility of the Union.3 In his Sorbonne 
speech in September 20174, and recently in 
his op-ed published across Europe in March 
20195, French President Emmanuel Macron 
gave another boost to the debate when he 
affirmed his support for a higher level of 
differentiation, endorsing the creation of a 
vanguard of states that might not have to 
wait for a wider consensus to move ahead to 
advance specific reforms.
However, European leaders’ support for 
differentiated integration expressed 
in Sunday speeches is not matched in 
Monday’s actions. And often, those who call 
for more flexible forms of integration are, 
at the end of the day, not able or willing to 
deliver. Coalitions between member states 
are often of an ad hoc nature or created with 
the main purpose of blocking progress in 
specific policy fields (‘negative coalitions’) 
as the examples of the Visegrád Group or 
the New Hanseatic League have repeatedly 
shown in practice.
Moreover, the concrete application of a 
higher level of differentiation is highly 
contested. Newer and smaller member 
states, especially in Central and Eastern 
Europe, are concerned that additional layers 
of flexibility would gradually lock them into 
a kind of second-class membership, thus 
further exacerbating the already existing 
divisions between member states. They 
argue that those willing to move ahead 
might increasingly use differentiation as a 
threat to exert pressure on those who are 
not willing or able to enhance cooperation at 
EU level. With the UK leaving the EU, these 
concerns have become more pronounced, 
as the group of member states that are 
reluctant to envisage deeper integration will 
lose an important ally in preserving their 
interests.
 Openness, inclusiveness, and  
 efficiency as guiding principles  
 for differentiation 
In light of these concerns and to safeguard 
the Union’s political, legal and institutional 
cohesion, cooperation among a limited 
number of EU countries should always 
adhere to the principles of openness, 
inclusiveness and efficiency – even if the 
accommodation of all three principles is not 
always an easy task. In more concrete terms, 
this means that; (i) all EU countries should 
be involved in the decision on whether or 
not to allow differentiated cooperation; 
(ii) all EU countries are invited to join an 
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initiative at any time – also at a later stage; 
(iii) ‘outs’ should be constantly informed and 
involved as much as possible in the given 
area of differentiated integration. Moreover, 
procedural reliability and institutional 
consistency should be ensured by applying 
differentiation as much as possible within 
the Union’s existing legal set-up, with the 
strong involvement of the EU institutions. 
Finally, differentiated integration initiatives 
should always pass the test of delivering a 
more efficient policy output than would be 
the case without it – not least to highlight 
the clear benefits to European citizens. Thus, 
all members willing to move ahead should 
share the same direction of the initiative 
and fully commit to the responsibilities 
they have agreed to.6 In reality, however, 
striking a fine line between openness and 
inclusiveness on the one hand and efficiency 
on the other hand is at times difficult to 
achieve, as some member states might 
not be able or willing to deliver or have 
diverging motifs for joining the group. More 
generally, these principles also highlight 
that higher levels of differentiation should 
not lead to a closed-off ‘core Europe’, in 
which an avantgarde of member states 
deepens the level of cooperation while 
excluding other EU countries. In the past 
years, when moving ahead, EU governments 
and institutions have already been careful 
not to create or exacerbate a deep rift in 
Europe between those who are part of 
a potential core and those who are not. 
But the creation of a closed ‘core Europe’ 
is not only undesirable, as it violates the 
principles of openness and inclusiveness, 
it is also unrealistic. It presupposes that a 
number of member states are ready to make 
a qualitative leap forward towards closer 
integration in a number of policy fields. Yet, 
even the most integration-friendly countries 
are not ready to substantially deepen their 
level of integration well beyond the current 
state of affairs.
 Inside or outside the EU Treaties –  
 The different shapes of differentiated 
 integration 
Differentiated integration can take many 
shapes.7 The most important distinction is 
whether higher levels of cooperation take 
place inside or outside the EU’s existing 
legal framework. Closer cooperation outside 
the Union’s framework bears a number 
of risks. First, it might lead to a deep rift 
between participating and non-participating 
countries, if cooperation among a limited 
number of member states does not follow 
the principles of openness and inclusiveness. 
Second, there is a risk of institutional 
duplication in case EU institutions do not 
play a strong executive, legislative or judicial 
role. Finally, democratic legitimacy and 
parliamentary scrutiny at both the national 
and European level might be compromised 
if cooperation takes place outside the EU 
framework and thus beyond the control of 
the European Parliament, and if cooperation 
is limited to relations between governments.8
Despite these potential risks, past experience 
has repeatedly shown that there is sometimes 
no other alternative than to organise closer 
cooperation through intergovernmental 
arrangements – particularly if the urgency of 
a crisis situation requires immediate action. 
But the examples of the adoption of the 
Fiscal Compact and the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) in the context of the euro 
area crisis highlight that member states have 
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been willing and able to take into account the 
aforementioned concerns when turning to 
solutions outside the EU framework. These 
intergovernmental arrangements involved 
non-euro members and EU institutions and 
are due to be incorporated into the Union’s 
framework at a later point in time.9
Still, the risks, limits and concerns that come 
with intergovernmental arrangements can 
be avoided when using the instruments 
foreseen in the EU Treaty framework. The 
instrument of “enhanced cooperation” is 
the most elaborate arrangement for Treaty-
based flexible cooperation.10 In the past, 
member states have refrained from using 
the instrument. Yet, more recent examples 
such as the introduction of a common 
system of patent protection or the inception 
of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
illustrate that it is a workable instrument, 
which is increasingly explored but hinges 
on the political will of member states. 
Enhanced cooperation entails less risk, 
as differentiation takes place in a unitary, 
institutional structure preventing an 
exclusive club of member states to develop 
a separate nucleus of rules and procedures.11
 Making differentiation work 
The debate on whether and how to apply 
higher levels of differentiated integration 
is likely to intensify in the next politico-
institutional cycle. As a second-best option, 
differentiated integration might prove 
to be a pragmatic instrument to deepen 
cooperation on migration, security and 
defence, and in the attempt to further 
stabilise the eurozone. Yet, in all three 
policy fields, there are also considerable 
constraints to its application.
RESPONSIBILITY-SHARING IN THE 
AREA OF MIGRATION – LAST OPTION 
DIFFERENTIATION
The large increase of irregular migration 
in 2015 has revealed the shortcomings 
of the Dublin system that places the sole 
responsibility for the vast number of 
asylum claims on member states with an 
European external border.12 For the time 
being, there is no consensus among all 
member states for a structural reform 
of the Dublin system that could address 
these deficiencies. The governments who 
are most strongly advocating for European 
solutions are cautious not to exempt other 
countries from the responsibility of taking 
their share of the re-distribution of refugees. 
Temporary Emergency Relocation Schemes 
to move asylum seekers from Greece and 
Italy to other member states adopted by 
the Council through qualified majority 
voting failed. They were not effectively 
implemented given, first and foremost, the 
strong resistance of the outvoted Visegrád 
countries. 
In the absence of a structural reform, some 
member states have looked to reallocate 
responsibility to the national level. There 
are, for instance, the bilateral agreements of 
Germany with Spain, Portugal and Greece. 
In addition, willing member states agreed 
on several ad hoc arrangements to relocate 
migrants stranded on search and rescue 
vessels in the Mediterranean in case of 
immediate urgency.
Yet, the pressure to find adequate solutions 
to reform the Dublin system will remain 
high in the years to come (see also the 
contribution by Evangelia (Lilia) Tsourdi). 
Even though irregular migration has 
dropped significantly since 2016, migration 
policies will continue to dominate the 
19
162 CHALLENGE EUROPE  –  YES, WE SHOULD! EU PRIORITIES FOR 2019-2024
political debate in many EU countries and chances are 
high that migratory pressures will re-emerge in the future. 
Differentiation through voluntary arrangements can be 
one tool to overcome the political stalemate – at least as a 
transitional solution until a more structural reform involving 
all member states will be found. The Commission’s recent 
proposal to set up a contingency plan for the disembarkation 
of migrants in times of particular pressure could serve as a 
starting point to develop an appropriate framework beyond 
pure ad hoc arrangements.13
EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION – CAUGHT 
BETWEEN INCLUSIVENESS AND AMBITION 
Given the vast number of external security challenges, the 
case for deeper European defence cooperation has gained 
momentum. At its core lies an instrument of differentiated 
integration foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty. Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched in December 
2017 to intensify the cooperation in the field of Common 
Security and Defence policy (CSDP). With 25 participating 
members14 PESCO is characterised by a high level of 
inclusiveness, but also allows willing and able members to 
join forces through concrete projects in the fields of defence 
investment, capability development and operational readiness.
The participating members will have to prove that the 
inclusive approach to PESCO does not undermine the level 
of ambition, despite the continuing differences in member 
states’ strategic cultures.15 Moreover, the principle of 
unanimity in the decision-making process will continue to 
hamper consensus building. The projects that have, so far, 
been established by smaller groups of member states are a 
mixed bag in terms ofthe level of ambition. More political 
will is needed to exploit the full potential of PESCO, which 
could lead to more differentiation within this framework in 
the future.
The French proposal to launch the European Intervention 
Initiative (E2I) was widely seen as a response to an overly 
inclusive and unambitious PESCO. In contrast to the latter, 
which focuses on building capabilities, E2I aims to enhance the 
operational dimension of military cooperation. So far, only ten 
states are part of E2I, and that number is expected to stay low, 
with the intention offorming an ambitious and effective club. 
At the same time, as the initiative is organised outside the EU 
and NATO framework, E2I allows for cooperating with CSDP 
opt-out Denmark and tying the UK to wider European defence 
cooperation after Brexit (see also contribution by Jamie Shea). 
Higher levels of 
differentiation should 
not lead to a closed-
off ‘core Europe’, in 
which an avantgarde 
of member states 
deepens the level  
of cooperation while 
excluding other  
EU countries.
The risks, limits 
and concerns 
that come with 
intergovernmental 
arrangements can 
be avoided when 
using the instruments 
foreseen in the EU 
Treaty framework.
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The political momentum for deeper defence cooperation has 
opened up pathways for differentiation within and outside the 
existing legal framework. In the best case, PESCO and E2I will 
be mutually reinforcing. Yet, both formats will compete for EU 
leaders’ political capital, which could also lead to a weakening 
of European cohesion.16 Thus, a proper link between both 
initiatives should be established that ensures a minimum level 
of transparency for EU member states that do not participate in 
E2I. Much will depend on whether France and Germany find a 
mutual understanding on how both initiatives can co-exist and 
benefit from each other.
ONLY LIMITED LEEWAY FOR DIFFERENTIATION  
IN THE EUROZONE
The euro crisis has highlighted the imperfect construction 
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the urgent 
need for additional reforms (see also piece by George 
Pagoulatos).Yet, the immediate crisis response did not lead 
to a higher level of differentiation within the eurozone but 
rather to a further deepening of cooperation involving all euro 
countries.17 Considerable measures have been taken to respond 
to the immediate crisis situation based on intergovernmental 
treaties that were concluded outside of the EU framework 
(Fiscal Compact and ESM), which included the Euro19, the EU 
institutions and non-euro countries from the beginning.
Beyond the decisions taken in 2010-2012 under the immediate 
pressure of the euro area crisis, the profound differences between 
the ‘responsibility and competiveness’ camp and the ‘solidarity 
and caring’ camp over how to substantially reform the EMU still 
persist.18 Many of the underlying structural causes of the crisis 
remain unresolved, leaving the eurozone vulnerable to future 
crises. While EU leaders managed to achieve a ‘mini-compromise’ 
at the December 2018 EU Summit, many open questions and 
unsettled issues still need to be clarified, particularly on the 
eurozone budget or the European Deposit Insurance Scheme.19 
In the absence of an immediate crisis, it seems more than likely 
that the deepening of cooperation in the euro area will progress 
incrementally. Only another escalation of the crisis might apply 
sufficient pressure for substantial economic, fiscal and financial 
integration to materialise.
Yet, in the medium term, the withdrawal of the UK from the 
EU could increase the efforts of some non-euro countries to 
join the common currency. Given the loss of an important and 
influential ally to advance their interests vis-à-vis the Euro19, 
their fear of being marginalised in EU decision-making has 
increased.20 In the coming years, the next EU leadership should 
19
Differentiation 
through voluntary 
arrangements can 
be one tool to 
overcome the political 
stalemate – at least 
as a transitional 
solution until a more 
structural reform 
involving all member 
states will be found.
PESCO and E2I will be 
mutually reinforcing. 
Yet, both formats 
will compete for EU 
leaders’ political 
capital, which 
could also lead to 
a weakening of 
European cohesion.
The withdrawal of the 
UK from the EU could 
increase the efforts 
of some non-euro 
countries to join the 
common currency. 
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thus clearly articulate the advantages of 
eurozone membership, i.e. higher financial 
stability, lower financing costs as well as 
access to the ESM and full participation in the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The 
adoption of the common currency in more 
EU countries would decrease the overall level 
of differentiation between the ‘ins’ and the 
‘outs’ and thus further enhance the Union’s 
political and institutional cohesion.
 Pragmatic exception, not a panacea 
In the next politico-institutional cycle, 
the new EU leadership will be confronted 
with an even more complex and conflictual 
political environment, leaving only little 
room for manoeuvre for an ambitious reform 
agenda. Differentiated integration can serve 
as a pragmatic and functional instrument 
to overcome stalemates and blockages 
and to maintain the EU’s efficiency and 
responsiveness in addressing current and 
future challenges.21 However, the examples 
of the key policy fields of migration, eurozone 
governance, and security and defence illustrate 
that besides the opportunities that come 
with differentiated integration there are also 
considerable constraints to its applicability 
that have to be taken into account.
More generally,differentiated integration 
should be handled with care. It should not 
lead to a closed-off ‘core Europe’ and it is no 
panacea to cure the EU’s internal divisions 
– rather it should remain a second-best 
option in order not to jeopardise the Union’s 
political, legal and institutional cohesion. 
When applied in practice, a higher level of 
cooperation among a limited number of EU 
countries should always follow the guiding 
principles of openness, inclusiveness and 
efficiency and should as much as possible 
be applied within the EU’s existing legal 
set-up. If the situation requires moving 
ahead outside of the EU treaty framework, 
intergovernmental arrangements should 
always accommodate these principles and 
eventually be integrated into the EU’s legal 
system as quickly as possible.The future 
EU leadership will also have to think long 
and hard about how to extend the concept 
of differentiated integration to non-EU 
countries and how to tie these countries 
closer to the Union beneath the level of full 
EU membership. While Brexit forces the EU 
to find solutions on how to design the future 
EU-UK relationship, it could also provide an 
opportunity to reassess its enlargement and 
neighbourhood policies and the formats 
it has at its disposal to work towards more 
tailor-made solutions for partner countries, 
depending on the level of ambition and the 
compliance in meeting EU standards (see 
also contributions of Larissa Brunner and 
Fabian Zuleeg, Dimitar Bechev as well as 
Janis A. Emmanouilidis). 
The current political situation requires the 
bold leadership of member states willing 
to deepen their cooperation despite the 
resistance of others. Reviving the Franco-
German tandem and overcoming both 
countries’ fundamental differences on 
eurozone governance and security and 
defence will be crucial, but it will not be 
enough. Berlin and Paris should focus 
more on including other member states’ 
perspectives in their thinking to form broader 
leadership coalitions at an early stage. In 
this regard, differentiated integration can 
temporarily provide an adequate solution. 
However, leaders need followers as well. In 
the end, for the sake of maintaining the unity 
of the EU, the pioneers of deeper integration 
need to continue to engage with the ‘outs’ 
in the political debate and need to better 
communicate and coordinate their own 
positions to craft consensus.
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The never-ending 
Brexit?1
Larissa Brunner – Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre
Fabian Zuleeg – Chief Executive and Chief Economist at the European Policy Centre
Even after the United Kingdom’s (UK) exit from the European 
Union (EU), Brexit will not disappear from the Union’s agenda 
– if anything, it will become even more important. The EU 
institutions and member states will not only have to deal 
with immediate day-to-day issues such as the EU-UK trade 
negotiations, but also with more strategic questions on the 
future relationship between the EU and the UK and the broader 
implications of the divorce for the Union’s role in the world and 
its own future architecture. 
In part, this is a damage-control exercise. The aim is to reach 
the closest possible EU-UK relationship within the limitations 
of dealing with a third country, not only in economic terms 
but also on issues such as security. However, there is also the 
broader question of how to integrate countries such as the UK 
in the European integration process, possibly based on refined 
or new models of differentiated integration.
The aim is to reach 
the closest possible 
EU-UK relationship 
within the limitations 
of dealing with a third 
country, not only in 
economic terms but 
also on issues such  
as security. 
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q Even after Brexit, the EU will have to deal with 
immediate day-to-day issues i.e. the EU-UK trade negotiations and with more strategic 
questions regarding the future relationship between the two.
WHAT TO DO: 
q  Ensure an orderly withdrawal, but not at any cost.
q  Develop a vision for a close and stable future relationship that both sides can  
live with.
q  Engage in contingency planning for the worst-case scenario, i.e. no deal before or 
after Brexit.
20
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 Tactical successes, strategic 
 deficiencies 
The outcome of the June 2016 Brexit 
referendum has thrown the EU into less 
disarray than many observers predicted at 
the time. A domino effect triggering similar 
membership votes in countries such as 
France, Denmark or the Netherlands has 
not materialised. On the contrary, polls 
have shown growing popular support for EU 
membership as it has become clear just how 
difficult and costly it is to extricate a country 
from the Union.
Perhaps even more remarkable has been 
the unexpected unity of the EU27 in the 
Brexit negotiations. Many predicted the 
UK would speak with one voice, while the 
EU27 would be in hopeless disarray unable 
to manage their diverging interests and to 
contain internal tensions. The opposite 
has happened. This has strengthened the 
EU27’s negotiating position, helping them 
to stand by the Union’s red lines, such as the 
backstop for the Irish border, the financial 
settlement and the sequencing of the 
Article 50 and trade talks (which then-Brexit 
Secretary David Davis predicted in 2017 
would be the “row of the summer”, before 
the UK government quickly and quietly 
folded).
However, the tactical success of the first 
phase of the negotiations cannot hide that 
the EU has not yet fully engaged with Brexit 
at a strategic level. There is no single, 
coherent vision of what the long-term EU-
UK relationship should look like once the 
dust of departure has settled. How close a 
relationship should the two sides aim for 
and how may it change over time? In which 
areas is close political, economic, diplomatic 
or security cooperation essential and where 
is there greater scope for divergence? How 
can the EU and the UK prevent a loss of 
influence on the global stage? To what 
extent will the EU-UK model be an example 
for the EU’s relationship with other third 
countries?
The EU’s overwhelming objective in the 
Brexit negotiations is to maintain the 
integrity of the single market and ensure 
that the ultimate arrangement with the 
UK does not threaten the long-term 
viability and attractiveness of the Union 
by setting a precedent of cherry-picking 
or by prioritising reaching a deal over a 
member state’s vital interests. As long as 
that is ensured, it is in the Union’s interest 
to pursue a relationship that is as close as 
possible to minimise the costs associated 
with Brexit.2
However, if  cherry-picking is ruled 
out, developing a very close economic 
relationship will be difficult since the 
conditions for doing so violate the UK’s red 
lines on free movement and an independent 
trade policy. Barring a significant shift in 
the UK domestic political context, a more 
distanced (and for the EU suboptimal) 
model such as Canada plus (i.e. a free trade 
agreement in goods with some liberalisation 
in services) appears more likely. This also 
implies a separate solution for the Northern 
Ireland border, most probably reverting to 
the backstop. Given the political volatility 
in the UK, the EU needs to plan for the 
worst-case scenario: a break-down in the 
relationship either at the end of the Article 
50 or the transition period.3 However, a 
stable equilibrium is unlikely whatever the 
outcome of the Brexit process. Debates 
about the UK’s relationship with the EU are 
likely to continue whether there is a deal, 
no deal or the UK decides to remain after 
all, and such debates could play a role in 
future general elections or party leadership 
contests. 
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Navigating these issues and developing a strategic view of Brexit, 
taking into account the UK’s aspirations and limitations, will be 
one of the key tasks for the EU institutions and the future EU 
leadership in the years to come.
 Painful losses ahead 
Though the costs of Brexit will be asymmetrically distributed – 
with the UK much more affected than the EU27 – neither side 
will emerge unscathed. The UK remains an important player 
for a number of reasons and its departure will weaken the EU27 
in various ways and change its position and role in the world.
First, Brexit has direct economic consequences for the EU. They 
can be divided into two categories: transition costs and long-
term costs. Any change to the status quo will impose transition 
costs on EU firms, which may have to spend resources on 
contingency planning and re-organising supply chains. In the 
longer term, any additional friction caused by a UK departure 
from the customs union and single market could impact trade 
flows and reduce economic growth. 
However, it is not all bad from the EU’s perspective. There will 
probably be a gain from firms relocating to the Union, and EU 
companies could benefit from reduced competition if friction 
caused by Brexit leads their UK rivals to abandon the EU 
market or puts them at a disadvantage, for example in public 
procurement.
But the EU’s loss of economic weight also has an external 
dimension. The UK’s economy was the fifth-largest in the world 
in 2018, with a value of $2.94 trillion.4 It was the second-largest 
in the Union, surpassed only by Germany. If the UK leaves the 
EU’s customs union, the European Commission will no longer 
be able to offer access to the UK market to third countries it 
negotiates trade deals with. This will reduce its leverage and 
could make it more difficult to achieve favourable outcomes for 
the Union.
Moreover, London is a powerful financial centre and arguably 
the only one in Europe that can compete with the likes of New 
York, Hong Kong and Singapore. Brexit will almost certainly 
reduce Europe’s weight. While London initially hoped to agree 
on future access to the EU market for UK-based financial 
services firms on the basis of mutual recognition, it has now 
accepted Brussels’ position that financial services trade will be 
20
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based on the EU’s equivalence regime.5 The 
UK government is still seeking to include 
certain elements of mutual recognition but 
these attempts are likely to be unsuccessful, 
while the EU is likely to push for standard 
equivalence, not least to prevent regulatory 
arbitrage.6 Such an outcome would have 
implications for the financial services sector. 
Equivalence does not apply to wholesale 
banking and can be withdrawn unilaterally 
by the EU with a 30-day notice, so it will 
not provide financial services firms with 
the predictability they require. Cities in 
remaining member states such as Paris 
and Frankfurt could benefit somewhat as 
banks relocate some staff, but it is not just 
a European competition. If European capital 
markets fragment further due to Brexit and 
the financial competitiveness of the EU 
decreases, financial services firms could 
decide to abandon the EU altogether and 
focus on the United States or Asia.
Second, Brexit is set to weaken the EU 
politically. A smaller EU that is not perceived 
to be speaking for all major European 
countries will be a less powerful one. This 
could make it harder for the Union to 
defend its interests at a time when Russia 
is becoming more assertive, concerns are 
growing over China’s expanding political 
and economic reach and US politics are 
increasingly unpredictable and unstable (see 
also contribution of Giovanni Grevi in this 
volume).
In terms of international clout, the EU is 
arguably losing one of its most powerful 
member states. The UK is one of two 
European countries with a permanent seat 
on the UN Security Council and continues 
to derive considerable influence from its 
history, soft power and ties with non-
European countries (for example through 
the Commonwealth). It has a highly 
regarded diplomatic service and has played 
a key role in shaping EU foreign policy, not 
least by traditionally serving as a link to the 
US. Its departure will be a blow to advocates 
of a close transatlantic relationship and a 
tough stance on Russia. It could shift the 
balance of power in the EU towards those 
that are sceptical of some of the EU’s current 
foreign policy orientations. 
Brexit could, for example, have negative 
spill-over effects on the EU’s sanctions 
regimes vis-à-vis Russia. Without the 
UK, the EU’s determination to address 
Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and Crimea 
could diminish. While this may not affect 
the EU’s current sanctions (the renewal of 
three sets of sanctions against Russia every 
six months has become a largely routine 
task), the Union may become less willing to 
introduce new measures to respond to fresh 
Russian aggressions for fear of upending the 
fragile consensus among member states, 
and might be less able to react to future 
foreign policy crises. At the same time, the 
EU’s loss of economic weight after Brexit 
means that economic sanctions – unless 
they are coordinated with the UK and other 
major countries such as the US – will lose 
some of their bite. Similarly, as the EU 
single market will be smaller after Brexit, 
the prize of market access, which the EU can 
offer to third countries to promote certain 
values, may become less attractive. Both 
developments mean that the ability of the 
EU to reward and punish third countries’ 
behaviour will be diminished.
Third, Brexit may undermine the EU’s 
security capacity. The UK and France are 
the only global military powers in the EU. 
The UK also plays a crucial role in NATO 
and was one of only six EU countries to hit 
NATO’s target of spending 2% of GDP on 
defence in 2018.7 Brexit means that the UK 
cannot participate in EU initiatives such 
as PESCO (though it could be argued that 
the momentum to agree PESCO probably 
would not have been there if the UK had 
not voted to leave, or that the UK would 
have blocked the initiative) and that 
the EU could become less relevant as a 
security player. The loss may also be felt in 
counterterrorism, where the UK has well-
regarded capabilities. 
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 Differentiated integration  
 and enhanced cooperation 
Brexit is closely linked to strategic concepts 
about the future of the EU, including the 
notion of differentiated integration and 
ideas about an EU core and periphery. 
After the UK’s exit, the EU’s centre of 
gravity is likely to shift further towards 
Germany and France, and the eurozone. 
Non-eurozone countries and economically 
liberal northern member states – long-
time allies of the UK – could lose influence 
as the EU becomes more centralistic in its 
areas of competence. Member states have 
already started trying to fill the void. One 
expression of the counterbalancing act 
against a potential dominance of Berlin and 
Paris is the creation of the New Hanseatic 
League in 2018, which groups eight fiscally 
conservative northern member states. 
Regardless of Brexit, future progress in 
the EU will also require a higher level of 
differentiated integration, for example 
in areas such as taxation or defence. This 
could reinforce the shift of power towards 
the EU’s ‘core’ around Berlin and Paris and 
widen asymmetries between those regularly 
participating and those abstaining.  
At the same time, Brexit could provide 
an impetus to extend the concept of 
differentiated integration to non-EU 
countries by tying these countries closer 
to the Union beneath the level of full and 
unlimited EU membership (see also the 
contributions of Janis A. Emmanouilidis 
and Julian Rappold in this volume). The UK 
may wish to continue participating in parts 
of the EU architecture such as Euratom, 
without making concessions in other, more 
politically sensitive areas. 
However, this raises several difficulties. 
A preference could emerge in the UK for 
membership of the single market for goods, 
services and capital but not for people, 
while for the EU the indivisibility of the 
four freedoms would be non-negotiable. 
Applying the concept of differentiated 
integration would also be complex in 
legal, political and institutional terms, 
especially if it fails to respect the exclusive 
prerogatives of those who are member of 
the ‘club’. The EU will, therefore, be wary 
of setting a precedent if the UK’s deal is 
perceived to be more attractive than full 
EU membership. Politically speaking this 
implies that certain proposals such as the 
continental partnership8 or a ‘shared market’ 
between the UK and EU9 are unlikely to 
gain much support at EU level, regardless 
of their merits. Any form of differentiated 
integration involving non-EU countries 
is likely to be tightly restricted and come 
with numerous conditions, such as financial 
contributions without offering access to EU 
institutions and to the Union’s decision-
making mechanisms. Brexit might lead 
to a more unified model, creating a sharp 
distinction between (full) membership and 
those outside the EU, which would limit the 
level of integration with third countries.
20
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 Key recommendations 
What can the EU do to address the strategic 
challenges posed by Brexit? 
q First, it should focus on ensuring an 
orderly withdrawal, but not at any cost. 
Unlike for the UK, the mantra ‘no deal is 
better than a bad deal’ rings true for the 
EU. Any deal that would compromise its 
core values, disadvantage member states 
vis-à-vis a third country or undermine 
the integrity of the single market would 
threaten its long-term viability. Even though 
an orderly withdrawal would avoid chaos 
and create a feasible path towards the long-
term EU-UK relationship. 
q Second, the EU should develop a vision 
for a close and stable future relationship 
that both sides can live with10, going beyond 
mere economic ties. Close alignment and 
cooperation on economic, political and 
security issues would be an effective way for 
both the EU and the UK to maintain as much 
global influence as possible. To achieve this, 
it is important that despite any frustration 
with the day-to-day Brexit process, bridges 
are not burnt and resentment on both sides 
is minimised. However, it is hard to see 
how this could be achieved in case of an 
acrimonious divorce.
q Third, the EU should engage in 
contingency planning for the worst-case 
scenario, i.e. no deal before or after Brexit. 
A breakdown in relations could see the 
UK, no longer tied to EU rules, emerge as a 
fierce competitor for foreign investment and 
resources. The EU needs to be prepared in case 
London shifts towards a more mercantilistic 
model, lowering tax, social and environmental 
standards to gain a competitive advantage. 
Cooperation across all policy areas would 
become much less likely.
But the significance of Brexit goes far 
beyond the future UK-EU relationship. As 
a starting point there are valuable lessons 
that can be taken from the Brexit process. 
The EU should analyse the reasons for 
the unexpected and remarkable unity of 
the EU27. These may include shared goals 
during the first phase of the negotiations, a 
sense of existential threat and the desire to 
avoid setting a precedent of a member state 
being abandoned by the Union in favour 
of a (soon to be) third country. Identifying 
the reasons for the EU’s remarkable unity 
will enable the Union to apply the lessons 
of Brexit to other policy areas and help to 
‘Re-unite EUrope’ (see also contribution of 
Janis A. Emmanouilidis).
Most importantly, the EU institutions and 
member states must consider whether, and if 
so to what extent, differentiated integration 
could serve as a model for the EU’s 
relationship with third countries, especially 
in the Union’s direct neighbourhood, 
including the future EU-UK relationship. 
This will have significant implications for 
the future of European integration.
From the EU’s perspective, the best version 
of a relationship with a third country is one 
that is as close as possible but, at the same 
time, shows very clearly the costs of being 
outside the club. This poses a paradox: 
it implies that those third countries that 
are integrated most have to, de facto, 
become members without rights, creating 
a politically unstable and conflictual 
situation, especially for countries that have 
a significant political and economic weight 
but are not willing to accept the terms and 
conditions of membership.
This conflict can clearly be seen in the 
negotiations with the UK and implies that 
any deal that will now be reached will 
probably evolve over time. If, for example, 
the next phase of negotiations between 
the EU and the UK would shift to a Norway 
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plus-style model (i.e. single market and 
customs union membership with close 
cooperation on many issues), the UK would 
be facing major political issues, essentially 
becoming a rule-taker. But barring such 
a shift, a Canada plus model with deeper 
integration in certain policy areas, while 
politically feasible, would not deliver 
the close integration that is desirable, in 
economic terms and for Europe’s role in 
the world.
This tension between economic and 
political benefits at the price of adhering to 
a common set of values and rules will also 
play itself out within the EU. The current 
model of differentiated integration, which 
foresees that some countries progress while 
others follow at a later point in time, is 
no longer functioning. Those who are not 
part of the more integrated policy areas 
have a significant and broad disadvantages 
from being outside the inner circle. But, 
at the same time, we have seen that these 
countries are simply not willing to join the 
euro, Schengen or other forms of closer 
cooperation. On the contrary, they have 
used whatever powers they have to counter 
or even block further steps of integration. 
We might have reached the limit of what 
can be achieved within the current model, 
which could also explain why we have 
witnessed a number of (unsuccessful) 
initiatives outside the EU system. Brexit 
is a stark reminder that we have to revisit 
and reform the current model of European 
integration and its reliance on limited forms 
of differentiated integration.
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Future of Europe
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The European Citizens’ 
Consultations: Will the 
member states make 
them count?
Corina Stratulat – Senior Policy Analyst and Head of the European Politics and Institutions Programme 
at the European Policy Centre
Paul Butcher – Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre
If necessity is the mother of innovation, a stroke of luck 
must be its father. The story of the European Citizens’ 
Consultations (ECCs) confirms this proverbial insight. The 
ECCs might have emerged in response to the European 
Union’s (EU) long-standing need to fix its growing problem 
of democratic legitimacy, but it was the push that French 
President Emmanuel Macron gave to the idea of organising 
citizen consultations across the EU that turned the odds 
in favour of this new, large-scale experiment in European 
democratic reform. Whatever helped to make the ECCs a 
reality in 2018, the burning question as the process draws to 
an end in May 2019 is whether the member states will now 
make it count.
To do so, they should explicitly link their discussions about the 
EU’s next policy agenda and priorities with the results of the 
consultations in the run-up to the European Parliament (EP) 
Citizens want change, 
and this was precisely 
what President 
Macron promised 
when he suggested 
giving “people a voice” 
and the opportunity 
to influence the 
Union’s future 
through “citizens’ 
conventions”.
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q	Explicitly	link	discussions	about	the	EU’s	next	policy	 
agenda and priorities with the results of the consultations in the run-up to the European 
Parliament elections.
WHAT TO DO: 
q Keep the conversation going.
q Turn the talk into action.
q Make it a regular feature.
q Aim for better coordination and coherence.
q Set	clear	objectives.	
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elections. Keeping political attention on the 
outcome of the process will ease the way for 
new ideas about necessary improvements to 
the instrument and its incorporation into a 
broader reform of European governance.
 Hoping for change 
The past  decades have seen many 
attempts to improve and sustain citizens’ 
participation in European affairs. At 
times, this search for a better quality 
of democracy in the EU has inspired 
substantial institutional reform processes 
across Europe, for example, as a result of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which affected the role and 
powers of national assemblies (the yellow 
and orange card procedure), the European 
Parliament (extending co-decision), and the 
citizens themselves (the European Citizens’ 
Initiative). But all these efforts have so 
far proven insufficient: to this day, most 
European citizens still perceive the EU as 
distant and unaccountable.
The public’s dissatisfaction is well-
documented in the Eurobarometer polls. 
Yet their lack of enthusiasm for European 
politics is not a demand for ‘no Europe’ 
so much as a call for a ‘different Europe’. 
Citizens want change, and this was precisely 
what President Macron promised when he 
suggested giving “people a voice” and the 
opportunity to influence the Union’s future 
through “citizens’ conventions”.1
His proposal was inspired by the 2017 
French elections, in which he unexpectedly 
won the presidency and his En Marche! 
movement secured an absolute majority at 
the Assemblée nationale. This happened 
largely thanks to a grassroots initiative 
that collected the concerns and priorities 
of the French electorate through thousands 
of local meetings and used them to shape 
and legitimise the En Marche! campaign. 
The success of this bottom-up method of 
formulating political positions encouraged 
Macron to suggest replicating it at the 
European level, in the hope that it would 
help with the Union’s own democratic 
dilemmas.2
Of course, the idea of discussing the EU with 
European citizens is in itself nothing new. 
The European Commission, for example, 
has been organising Citizens’ Dialogues in 
the member states since 2012 as a means 
of allowing people to ask EU politicians 
questions, make comments, and share 
their visions for the Union. Little wonder 
then that Macron’s initiative quickly won 
the support of Jean-Claude Junker, the 
President of the Commission, who saw it as 
dovetailing with the institution’s existing 
‘Future of Europe’ discussion.3
Unlike any previous democratic reform 
efforts, however, the ECCs have been driven 
by national governments and relied on 
the active involvement of all the member 
states rather than being merely another 
EU institutional tweak and fix. As such, 
the ECCs aimed to shake up European 
democracy by new, popular means.
Sti l l , the member states  were not 
immediately won over by the initiative. On 
the one hand, the fears and frustrations 
prompted by Trump’s America and the 
reality of Brexit underscored the need to 
re-energise the Union after years of crisis.4 
The return to economic growth, the decline 
in unemployment, and the easing of the 
migration crisis opened the door to revisiting 
the profound and unresolved challenges that 
had been tearing the Union apart before 
2017. Acceptance was also growing that the 
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wider public would have to be more closely involved in decisions 
about the future of European integration. On the other hand, 
most capitals insisted that, if they were to adopt Citizens’ 
Consultations as a way to shore up public support and seize 
the opportunity for European reform, they needed flexibility 
both in the details and the timeframe of how they were to be 
implemented.
The process, which all 27 EU member states ultimately 
endorsed at the informal European Council Summit on 
23 December 2018, followed two tracks: 
1. At the EU level, the Commission would host an online 
survey, available in all EU languages, consisting of questions 
formulated by a Citizens’ Panel. In parallel, the Commission 
would also increase the number of Citizens’ Dialogues to reach 
1300 by May 2019.
2. At the member state level, governments would be in charge 
of organising physical events in their respective countries and 
synthesising the results. 
They also agreed to discuss the national syntheses at the 
European Council in December 2018, which marked the 
end of the ECCs process for most member states. For some 
EU countries5 and the European Commission, however, the 
endpoint is the Leaders’ Summit in Sibiu in May 2019, which 
will debate the future of the EU and prepare the Strategic 
Agenda 2019-2024.
 Taking the plunge 
The prominent role played by President Macron in proposing 
the idea and the Commission’s efforts to provide an overarching 
framework might create the impression that the ECCs were a 
monolithic series of events fitting a defined template. But in 
fact, the hallmark of the initiative was diversity: in exchange for 
their agreement to participate, the member states were given a 
free hand to implement the events in whichever way best suited 
their aims, resources, and national practices. Thus, the ECCs 
effectively took place in 26 separate campaigns,6 each with 
their own branding, format, timescale, and goals.7
The overall process had no official name. ‘Citizens’ 
Consultations’ is the closest thing to a common branding, 
derived from the name used in France (“Consultations 
Unlike any previous 
democratic reform 
efforts, however, 
the ECCs have been 
driven by national 
governments and 
relied on the active 
involvement of all 
the member states 
rather than being 
merely another EU 
institutional tweak 
and fix.
With so much 
national variation, 
the initiative failed 
to acquire an identity 
and produced no clear 
criteria to judge its 
success.
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citoyennes sur l’Europe”) and shared by countries like Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Romania, and Austria. But in Denmark 
and Finland, for example, the term was ‘Citizens’ Hearings’, 
while Germany, Lithuania, and Ireland called the events 
‘Citizens’ Dialogues’. This latter name could potentially lead to 
confusion with the Commission’s own events, although they 
were presented as distinct.
The rationale of the consultations also differed. From 
emphasising the need to involve citizens more closely in 
EU decision-making, sometimes explicitly referring to the 
forthcoming EP elections, through citing the need to identify 
the future priorities for the EU, potentially including reform, to 
merely seeking to raise awareness about the Union, the member 
states disagreed about the exact purpose of the discussions.
Moreover, events were mostly organised by national authorities 
with little involvement from civil society. Many were held in a 
‘top-down’ format whereby government ministers ‘consulted’ 
the citizens by listening to their views and responding via a 
question-and-answer session or as part of a panel discussion. 
This is very similar to the set-up of the Commission’s Citizens’ 
Dialogues, and a far cry from encouraging people to debate 
Europe among themselves.
In fact, although the ECCs were nominally about European 
issues, in practice, many discussions focused on domestic 
or global politics and ignored the Commission’s online 
questionnaire, which had been intended to provide a common 
set of topics. In several countries, especially in Central and 
Eastern Europe, governments appear to have interpreted the 
ECCs as an opportunity to push their own political agenda.
This flexibility came at a price. With so much national variation, 
the initiative failed to acquire an identity and produced no clear 
criteria to judge its success. Media and other commentators 
have been quick to criticise the instrument for its lack of 
representativeness among audiences, restrictive topics, or poor 
promotion, and portrayed it as a tick-the-box exercise signalling 
token European commitment.8 But this implies holding the 
ECCs to a standard that, in many cases, they did not even aspire 
to reach.
For example, the Joint Report prepared by the Austrian and 
Romanian Presidencies for the European Council9 mentions 
a total of 1,700 events organised by member states. France 
accounts for a comfortable majority of this figure (i.e. 1,100)10, 
which could be taken to mean that other countries did not put 
in the same effort or commitment. Yet to do so would be to 
misunderstand their intentions. 
The ECCs should 
be considered in 
light of what they 
accomplished 
against the odds.
The ECCs were a 
decisive – albeit 
small – step forward 
in the history of 
democratic and 
open government 
initiatives.
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The French ‘model’, which labelled anything 
from conferences to participatory theatre 
performances as ‘consultations’ via an 
open application process, was certainly an 
inspiration for some member states. However, 
others consciously rejected it in favour of a 
smaller-scale vision. In the Netherlands, for 
example, the consultations consisted of just 
five meetings, where citizens, hand-picked 
from a set of applications, discussed the 
EU’s future in depth, not with politicians but 
among themselves. 
The ECCs should be considered in light of 
what they accomplished against the odds. 
The idea was conceived, organised, and 
implemented in less than a year. Achieving 
the political will to embark on a process of 
consulting citizens at a time when Europe is 
facing a growing radical populist challenge, 
and risk giving voice to those views, was no 
mean feat. And yet the ECCs not only went 
ahead but actively involved all member 
states, thus expanding the scope of European 
discussions. In many countries, it was the 
first time that European issues had been 
prominently debated at the national level.
In that sense, the ECCs were a decisive 
– albeit small – step forward in the history 
of democratic and open government 
initiatives. What happens next will 
determine whether they can eventually 
yield transformative results.
 Carrying the flame 
To ensure that the ECCs kick-start a 
meaningful process of EU democratic 
renewal, several recommendations should 
be considered for the future, building on the 
experience with the instrument so far.
q Keep the conversation going: The EP 
elections should give centre stage to the 
results of the ECCs. The campaigns of the 
Spitzenkandidaten and MEP candidates 
should amplify the voice of the people, as 
heard during the consultations. Moreover, the 
agenda of the Sibiu Summit and the EU’s next 
Strategic Agenda (agreed by the European 
Council) and Strategic Priorities (defined 
by the next Commission) should reflect the 
syntheses of the discussions held during 
the ECCs, following up on the concerns and 
proposals raised.
q Turn the talk into action: In the period 
until September 2019, covering the last 
leg of this round of ECCs and the start of 
the new politico-institutional cycle after 
the EP elections, national and European 
politicians should keep sight of the initiative 
and echo the results of the consultations 
in their discourses and decisions. This 
will be a critical test for the future of the 
initiative. If in the end, citizens feel that 
their participation in these events had no 
impact on European decision-making, their 
perception that politicians are unresponsive 
and unrepresentative, and that the Union is 
distant and develops beyond their control, 
will likely be reinforced. In that case, their 
support for European integration can be 
expected to drop.
q Make it a regular feature: Beyond 2019, 
the process should be repeated, drawing on 
lessons learned from this time around to 
improve the format. At the EU level, this could 
be facilitated by a permanent mechanism 
for inter-institutional cooperation, such as 
that proposed by the European Committee 
of the Regions and the Economic and Social 
Committee.11 Any such future efforts should 
also be inclusive of civil society and experts, 
who have the necessary expertise and 
experience to suggest appropriate common 
quality standards and processes.
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q Aim for better coordination: Organisers 
should consider the trade-off between 
standardisation and respecting national 
practices, with the goal of making the 
process more unified and coherent to allow 
citizens to feel engaged in a single Europe-
wide discussion. This would also make it 
easier to compare and synthesise the results, 
increasing the instrument’s potential impact. 
The European institutions should also work 
together as much as possible.
q Set clear objectives: The goal of the 
consultations should be clearly stated at 
the outset so that people can understand 
and trust the initiative. Citizens should be 
informed precisely on how their input will be 
reflected in decision-making to avoid setting 
expectations too high and to give purpose to 
their engagement.
As national governments played a crucial role 
in the implementation of the ECCs, the key to 
their future success lies in national capitals. 
The member states must demonstrate a 
willingness to stick with the idea and keep 
moving forward. The Citizens’ Consultations 
were a new experiment in improving the 
quality of democracy in the EU, but they 
could become, in Macron’s words, “an integral 
part of Europe’s radical reform”.12 If necessity 
and providence set the ECCs in motion, will 
political leaders’ curiosity to explore their full 
potential drive European democratic progress 
henceforth?
1.  “Presidential programme of Emmanuel Macron”, 
En Marche.
2.  “Speech by Emmanuel Macron at the Sorbonne, 
Paris”,	Office	of	the	President	of	the	French	
Republic, 26 September 2017.
3.  “Jean-Claude	Juncker’s	State	of	the	Union	
Address”, European Commission, 13 September 
2017.
4.  See, for example, Emmanouilidis, Janis A., 
rapporteur, (2017), “Re-energising Europe: A 
package deal for the EU27. Third report New Pact 
for Europe”, Brussels: European Policy Centre.
5.  For example, Belgium, Finland, and Lithuania.
6.  In Italy, political factors, notably the crisis 
resulting from the March 2018 general election, 
prevented the ECCs from taking place. The United 
Kingdom decided not to participate given its 
forthcoming departure from the EU.
7.  For a full overview of how the ECCs were 
implemented in each country, see Stratulat, Corina 
and Butcher, Paul (2018), “The	European	Citizens’	
Consultations: Evaluation Report”, Brussels: 
European Policy Centre.
8.  See, for example, Munta, Mario, “The empty 
taste	of	Macron’s	citizens’	consultations”, Euractiv, 
11 April 2018.
9.  Council of the European Union, “Citizens’	
Consultations – Joint Report”, 3 December 2018.
10.  Quelle est votre Europe? (2018), “Citizens’	
Consultations on Europe – Executive Summary”, 
Paris: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 4.
11.  Lambertz, Karl-Heinz and Jahier, Luca (2018), 
“Bringing the EU closer to its citizens: The call 
for an EU permanent mechanism for structured 
consultations and dialogues with citizens”, 
European Committee of the Regions and the 
European Economic and Social Committee.
12.  “Speech by Emmanuel Macron at the Sorbonne, 
Paris”,	Office	of	the	President	of	the	French	
Republic, 26 September 2017.
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Unfashionably, I am going to argue for more Europe. The 
European Union (EU) is too weak to do what is expected of it. 
We do not need more scenarios from the Commission’s think-
tank to tell us that the EU lacks sufficient centralised powers to 
act effectively in the many critical situations in which it finds 
itself. Nor do we need more politicians to explain that European 
unification is, for them, a distant abstraction which, if pursued 
overtly, will make them unpopular. 
Europe is simmering with problems which defy the capability 
of its current governance. Some issues may recede over time 
because of natural or technological developments; other 
problems may come and go according to the economic cycle; 
but the most problematic challenges will persist – and if 
not addressed, worsen. Global warming, the rule of law, 
fundamental rights, the state of democracy, terrorism, military 
insecurity, corruption, international organised crime, mass 
refugees, social dislocation, low employment, environmental 
decay – these are Europe’s systemic challenges demanding 
sustained structural responses from stable, strong government. 
The scale and 
complexity of today’s 
challenges are too 
much for Europe’s 
nation states to tackle 
alone.
A basic lack  
of self-confidence  
at the level of the 
EU’s leadership has 
led to this muddle.
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The politics of ever  
closer union
Andrew Duff – President of the Spinelli Group and a Visiting Fellow at the European Policy Centre.  
He was a Member of the European Parliament (ALDE), 1999-2014.
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q	The	EU	lacks	sufficient	centralised	powers	to	act	effectively	 
in	the	many	critical	situations	in	which	it	finds	itself.
WHAT TO DO: 
q  Need for the Union to assume sovereignty in addition to the national sovereignty  
in its member states.
q QMV and co-decision should become the norm.
q A stronger commission with more explicit federal powers. 
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 Taking the place  
 of the old order  
The scale and complexity of today’s challenges are too much 
for Europe’s nation states to tackle alone. Many European 
citizens have realised this, and are disenchanted with the old 
order. The emerging polity of the European Union offers the 
hope of a solution   but in terms of modern government, it 
lacks necessary assets, instruments and competences. The EU 
preaches its values but continues to promise more than it can 
deliver. Its workings are abstruse, and it lacks affinity with its 
citizens. It claims to be a single market but remains poorly 
integrated in terms of services, taxation, banking and capital. 
It has a single monetary policy but no common fiscal policy. 
Its foreign policy is patchy and military footprint negligible. 
For most third countries, the EU is an unknown and sometimes 
awkward quantity. 
Until recently, the EU institutions could rely on a solid 
bipartisan consensus in all its member states to sustain the 
integration project and uphold liberal democracy. But today 
a polarisation is taking place which fractures the political 
landscape, dissolving old political parties and destabilising 
parliamentary government. Several European countries are 
threatened by civil unrest and the rise of radical populism. 
The EU is made to share the blame for the decline of the old 
order, inheriting the stresses and strains of its member states. 
If it was once true that the EU rescued Europe’s nation states, 
the reverse may now be happening: the decline of those 
incapacitated states is undermining the Union. The rise of 
Euroscepticism impedes the creation of a federal level of 
European government just at the time when it is needed most.
 Constitutional deadlock 
The EU’s constitutional structure remains part confederal and 
part federal. While the European Parliament has been directly 
elected since 1979, its elections and political parties are national, 
not transnational. The European Commission is endowed with 
executive authority in some areas, such as competition and 
state aids policy, but not in others, such as tax or foreign affairs. 
The Council has wide powers to take decisions by qualified 
majority vote (QMV) on secondary legislation but is condemned 
One cannot be 
surprised that the 
Union is suffering 
from wear and tear 
and now needs 
refurbishment. 
Central to the 
federalist thesis is the 
need for the Union to 
assume sovereignty 
in addition to the 
national sovereignty 
of its member states.
Given the state of 
play at the national 
level, however, 
reform has to be 
led by the European 
Union institutions, 
not least by the new 
Commission and 
Parliament.
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to using unanimity on matters of primary 
law and high importance. The European 
Court of Justice develops case law on the 
assumption of primacy and direct effect but 
is denied the powers of a federal supreme 
court. Likewise, the European Central Bank 
is tightly constrained and cannot assume the 
competence of lender of last resort even for 
the eurozone. At the political level the basic 
dichotomy between the intergovernmental 
and the supranational mode impairs the 
Union’s ability to act rapidly, effectively 
and coherently, both at home and abroad. 
A basic lack of self-confidence at the level of 
the EU’s leadership has led to this muddle. 
The EU’s treaties have been added to and 
amended over 70 years in a fairly ad hoc way 
while the size of the Union grew from six to 
twenty-eight member states. Constitutional 
reform has taken place spasmodically in 
response to a variety of internal or external 
pressures. Leaders responded as best they 
could to successive political, economic or 
security crises, but treaty amendment was 
disorganised, impaired by institutional 
struggles. EU treaties piled up without 
codification, and often without adequate 
democratic justification.1
The EU’s official strategy was to widen its 
membership and deepen its integration 
at the same time, although some member 
states, like Britain, wanted widening but 
not deepening, while others, notably 
France, preferred deepening to widening. 
Three European states (Iceland, Norway 
and Switzerland) could have joined the 
Union but chose not to; and now the United 
Kingdom, having failed to renegotiate its 
terms of membership, is leaving. 
Throughout this process, the historic 
mission of “ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe” has been repeated in 
successive treaties without being defined. 
Ever closer union became totemic, allowing 
gradual steps to be taken in a federal 
direction, but also provoking hostility among 
those who resented the loss of the comfort 
zone of the nation state. Below and beyond 
elite commitment to the goal of European 
unity, real and rhetorical, nationalist forces 
survived and even prospered. European 
leaders, fearing adverse popular reaction, 
were careful to avoid teleological debate. 
The result of this experiment in the peaceable 
unification of Europe is mixed. When things 
went well there could be satisfaction, even 
complacency. When the shocks came, as they 
did, there was disruption and the EU became a 
whipping boy for all sorts of misdemeanours, 
often unfairly. During the last decade, the 
EU has had to endure the drama of the great 
enlargement of membership (from 15 to 28), 
the defeat of the constitutional treaty in 
2005, the great financial crash of 2008, and 
the influx of refugees from the Middle East 
and Africa which peaked in 2015 – and now 
Brexit. One cannot be surprised that the 
Union is suffering from wear and tear and 
now needs refurbishment.
Those of conservative disposition claim 
that the Treaty of Lisbon has settled the 
constitutional future of the Union, at least 
for now. They add that the time is not ripe for 
a new bout of constitution mongering, and 
that to pursue more political integration risks 
provoking the hostility of the nationalists. 
Their concern is to deal pragmatically with 
present difficulties – and to hope for the best 
about the future (while fearing the worst). 
In truth, the EU often avoids conflict by 
postponing difficult decisions, muddling 
through in good times, complemented by 
crisis management in bad. But the new 
leadership of the EU institutions to be elected 
in 2019 would be wise to recognise it has a 
duty to prepare carefully for constitutional 
reform whenever the moment comes. Such 
preparation involves honest analysis of 
the state of the Union and the marshalling 
of democratic arguments for and against 
specific reforms. The noble cause of European 
unification could and should be confidently 
refreshed for the benefit of the millennial 
generation. 
22
186 CHALLENGE EUROPE  –  YES, WE SHOULD! EU PRIORITIES FOR 2019-2024
 The Spinelli Group proposes reforms 
As our contribution to this debate, the 
Spinelli Group has published a Manifesto 
for the Future of Europe.2 Central to the 
federalist thesis is the need for the Union 
to assume sovereignty in addition to the 
national sovereignty of its member states. 
Such a complex, diverse and sovereign Union 
requires a proper constitutional government 
– especially if, as it develops towards a fiscal 
union, EU citizens are going to be asked 
to share the burden among themselves as 
taxpayers. Executive authority should be 
centred on the Commission, one of whose 
vice-presidents would be the Treasury 
Secretary with powers to tax, borrow and lend 
(and issue eurobonds), as well as to represent 
the Union in international monetary affairs. 
We recommend that the Commission is reduced 
in size according to the formula prescribed in 
the Lisbon treaty. Executive decisions now held 
jealously by the Council, such as the power to 
set farm prices and fishing quotas, should be 
transferred to the Commission. A new call-
back procedure should be introduced to allow 
the two chambers of the legislature to hold the 
more powerful Commission strictly to account. 
QMV and co-decision should become the 
norm; special laws of the Council would be 
abolished; and a new category of organic law 
could be introduced for weightier matters 
such as electoral reform, own resources 
and rule of law sanctions   subject to higher 
voting thresholds. In effect, the next treaty 
revision should assume that all the Lisbon 
passerelles are crossed. The extension of 
QMV to Council decisions on taxation and 
social and environment policies would spur 
the integration of a wider single market, 
bringing direct benefit to citizens and to 
business. Loosening the national veto over 
finances would allow the EU to develop a 
budgetary capacity fit for its federal purpose, 
including macro-economic stabilisation. The 
transfer of some large items of expenditure 
such as R&D, energy infrastructure and 
defence equipment from national to the EU 
level would constitute good value for money. 
The Spinelli Group would not merge the two 
presidencies of the European Commission 
and European Council. Instead, we would 
put the European Council more firmly in 
charge of the running of the legislative 
Council of ministers (and scrap the 
rotating presidency of the latter). While 
the Commission in its governmental role 
would continue to initiate legislation, both 
Parliament and Council should enjoy a 
limited power to initiate draft law. 
Current constraints on the judicial purview 
of the European Court of Justice should be 
lifted, notably in the field of foreign policy, 
security and defence. 
The European Central Bank must become 
the lender of last resort with full supervisory 
authority over the whole financial sector. The 
Bank’s remit would be widened from that of 
maintaining price stability so as to support the 
objectives of the common economic policy of 
the Union as conducted by the Commission. 
The European Monetary Fund should evolve 
over time into a properly federal body. 
The shift from unanimity to QMV would 
give momentum to the development of 
common foreign and security policy under 
the initiative of the High Representative 
(upgraded to EU Foreign Minister). In 
foreign policy, as in other fields, we would 
encourage the use of the treaty’s provisions 
on enhanced cooperation. We would remove 
the current stipulation that groups of like-
minded states can only be formed as a 
matter of “last resort”. 
In matters constitutional the Spinelli Group 
wants to boost the role of the Convention, 
composed of national and European 
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parliamentarians, the European Council, 
Commission and Committee of the Regions. 
Convention proposals to change the treaty 
would stand unless opposed by the European 
Council acting by unanimity. Treaty 
amendments would enter into force once 
ratified by four-fifths of the member states. 
The emergence of a stronger Commission 
with more explicitly federal powers would 
raise the stakes for the European Parliament. 
To enhance its legitimacy in time for the 
next elections in 2024, Parliament must 
insist on the introduction of a pan-European 
constituency for the election of a portion of 
MEPs from transnational party lists. This 
change would guarantee the emergence of 
strong political parties at the federal level 
whose absence so far has impeded the 
development of a truly European demos. 
 Making the case 
The Spinelli Group takes a long-term 
perspective. It would be naïve to think that 
our radical reform programme will be agreed 
in a hurry even though we are careful to 
build on the current treaties. But it is vital 
to prepare the next Convention well if its 
proposals are to be rational, consistent and 
comprehensive. There are many people 
to be persuaded at each federal level if the 
democratic acceptability of such a package 
is to be assured during the next decade. 
Given the state of play at the national 
level, however, reform has to be led by the 
European Union institutions, not least by 
the new Commission and Parliament. 
This year the Union may struggle to 
pick a first-class team of leaders. Over 
the next five years, the EU faces serious 
divisions over the future of its financial 
framework, immigration, the rule of law 
and tax reform. It will continue to be 
plagued by the British problem. The euro 
remains at risk of financial instability. Its 
neighbourhood, in the shape of Putin and 
Erdogan, continues to be threatening, and 
the transatlantic alliance is in jeopardy. In 
these circumstances, it will become easier 
to make the case for constitutional change.
The objective of the Spinelli Group is to 
endow the governance of the European 
Union with credible and democratic 
leadership. By streamlining the functions of 
government and by clarifying how the EU is 
run, the next round of reform must strive to 
bring a sense of constitutional settlement. 
The Union cannot allow itself to be 
intimidated by nationalist forces that reject 
its values and purpose. Inaction is the worst 
way to counter the risk of disintegration. 
Our states, citizens and institutions will 
rise to ‘Challenge Europe’ only when they 
succeed in building a well-governed federal 
union. There is no sterner test for liberal 
democracy in Europe.
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1.	The	EU’s	constitutional	order	has	been	built	
mainly on the Treaties of Paris (1951), Rome 
(1957), Schengen (1985), Single Act (1986), 
Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2001), 
and Lisbon (2007). Important treaties failed to be 
ratified	in	1954	and	2005.	
2. Manifesto for the Future of Europe: A shared 
destiny, September 2018, is available in EN, FR, 
DE and PO on www.spinelligroup.eu. The Spinelli 
Group brings together federalists on a cross-party 
basis in the European Parliament and Committee 
of the Regions. Its aim is to work by stages towards 
a federal union of Europe based on the values of 
liberal democracy, solidarity and the rule of law.
q Pro-EU activists are seen covered with 
an	EU	flag	during	a	“Pulse	of	Europe”	rally	
outside the Cathedral in Cologne, western 
Germany, on 23 April 2017.  
© ODD ANDERSEN / AFP
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Re-unite EUrope:  
A shared Leitmotiv for 
the next EU leadership
Janis A. Emmanouilidis – Director of Studies at the European Policy Centre
As the European Union (EU) is entering a new politico-
institutional cycle, it is the right moment to take a step back 
and reflect on the current state of and prospects for European 
integration. The EU’s record over the past decade is somewhat 
mixed and it is highly difficult to predict its future path given 
the many uncertainties inside and outside Europe. One thing 
that is certain is that the Union and its members will face 
two fundamental, structural challenges in the coming years: 
a high degree of fragmentation between countries and a high 
level of polarisation within national societies. To counter 
these challenges, which will strongly affect the ability of EU 
institutions and member states to deal with future internal as 
well as external turbulences, the Union’s new leadership should 
follow a shared Leitmotiv aiming to help Re-unite EUrope at 
both the European and national level.
The Union and its 
members will face 
two fundamental, 
structural challenges 
in the coming years: 
a high degree of 
fragmentation 
between countries 
and a high level of 
polarisation within 
national societies. 
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q Introduce a new, shared Leitmotiv that will help  
to	‘Re-unite	EUrope’	at	both	the	European	and	national	level.
WHAT TO DO: 
q Need for a win-win package deal to counter fragmentation and distrust.
q Counter polarisation within EU countries.
q Allow	for	more	differentiation	but	no	‘core	Europe’.
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 State of the Union –  
 A tale of two narratives 
At the end of the current cycle, one can 
tell two very different narratives about the 
state of the Union. Both accounts are valid, 
and it is unclear which path the EU will take 
in future.
On the one side, there is a positive and 
optimistic view of the state of affairs, 
characterised by the following features:
q High level of resilience: despite all 
the turmoil of recent years, the EU has 
survived multiple crises since 2008 and 
has been able to resist the many forces of 
disintegration pulling at the Union and 
its members since 2008. Many prophets of 
doom predicted the Union’s collapse – they 
have been proved wrong on each and every 
occasion.
q Long-standing positive economic 
development: the EU and the euro area 
have collectively witnessed more than 
five years of continuous economic growth. 
This growth is less credit-fuelled and thus 
more sustainable compared to the period 
before the outbreak of the financial and 
economic crisis – although the exceptional 
countermeasures taken by governments 
and central banks could still backfire and 
fuel an economic downturn or another 
financial crisis.
q Substantial reforms and progress: the 
EU and its members have achieved progress 
that would have been unfeasible before the 
onset of the poly-crisis. Yes, the responses 
have often been slow, insufficient and 
sometimes ill-advised. But the EU and its 
members have individually and collectively 
made remarkable progress and, at times, 
painful adjustments in response to 
the severe challenges they faced in the 
past decade.
q High degree of unity: the EU has, on 
many occasions in recent years, been 
remarkably united. This is particularly 
true in the case of Brexit, with respect to 
maintaining consensus on the economic 
sanctions against Russia, or regarding the 
Union’s collective response to President 
Trump, where the Union has delivered a 
unified message to the rest of the world 
that it is ready to defend the rules-based 
multilateral system. All this was by no 
means a given.
q Increasing public support: a growing 
number of citizens are in favour of their 
country’s EU membership. People believe 
that the ‘costs of non-Europe’ would be 
very high and a clear majority wants their 
country to remain in the EU and the euro 
– and their numbers have grown since the 
Brexit vote in 2016. Nobody wants to move 
towards a cliff edge without a parachute.
All the above points are a testament to the 
Union’s positive track record in recent years. 
However, this is only one side of the coin. 
There is also a much more negative and 
gloomier story characterised by another set 
of key features: 
q Fragmentation and distrust: first and 
foremost, the levels of fragmentation and 
distrust have in the past decade increased 
significantly among member states and 
between national capitals and ‘Brussels’. 
This is not a new phenomenon. But it is 
increasingly becoming a core element of 
Europe’s integration narrative. The notion 
is spreading that the Union is not able to 
overcome the structural differences and 
fundamental schisms dividing EU countries 
and citizens. Mutual accusations of a lack 
of solidarity have deepened the divisions 
and eroded trust among member states. 
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European integration is no longer perceived as a win-win 
exercise from which all EU countries and their citizens profit. 
There are serious doubts about the Union’s added value, with a 
palpable feeling in many countries that European integration 
is no longer a positive-sum project. These divisions do not only 
affect political elites, but also societies as a whole, with an 
unprecedented resurgence of national stereotyping, historical 
resentments and a damaging blame game. This is clearly one of 
the biggest collateral damages caused by the poly-crisis – and it 
will haunt the EU and its member for years to come.
q Inability to achieve structural reforms in key areas: the 
EU27 has not been able to make sufficient progress in crucial 
areas of integration. In late 2017, there was hope that the sense 
of optimism that had spread after the French and German 
elections would spark new reform momentum. Some thought 
the time had come to “re-energise Europe”. But the EU27 were 
not able to exploit that window of opportunity. Nobody knows 
when it will re-open. As a result, the EU runs the risk that its 
defences will be too weak to weather future storms – and new 
turbulences will occur, although we do not know when, where 
and how they will hit us.
q Living on ‘different planets’: policymakers, experts and the 
wider public assess the state of the Union and the root causes, 
nature and gravity of the multiple crises the EU and its members 
have faced in very different ways. At times, it seems as if Europeans 
are almost ‘living on different planets’: they do not share the same 
analysis, let alone agree on the remedy. This widening divergence 
of perceptions makes it much harder to forge compromises and 
implement joint actions and structural reforms.
q High degree of economic divergence and rising inequalities: 
there is a widening economic gap between and within EU 
countries. While some countries have managed to weather the 
financial and economic storm, many others are still struggling. 
Living standards and social conditions vary significantly across 
Europe, both between and within countries. Real and perceived 
social divisions have widened. There is a growing sense of 
social injustice, which has fuelled indignation, despair and 
even anger in many parts of society. National societies are 
seeking a new socio-economic balance – but struggle to reach 
a new equilibrium, which in return has led to a high level of 
political and societal volatility in the EU27. All this undermines 
traditional social contracts and may even endanger social peace 
within countries and between generations (see also the piece by 
Claire Dhéret in this volume).
q Europe’s uncertain global role: the Union and its members 
struggle to (re-)define Europe’s role in a more challenging 
The notion is 
spreading that  
the Union is not able 
to overcome the 
structural differences 
and fundamental 
schisms dividing  
EU countries  
and citizens.
Europeans are almost 
‘living on different 
planets’: they do 
not share the same 
analysis, let alone 
agree on the remedy.
Populism is a 
phenomenon,  
and not the source 
of the problems 
facing open liberal 
democracies in 
Europe and beyond.
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international environment. It is unclear 
whether the EU will be willing and able to 
play in the top league of global shaping 
powers. Major power shifts are under 
way and there is a serious risk that Sino-
American competition will emerge as 
one of the main features of international 
affairs, with Europeans and others exposed 
to the shockwaves (see the contribution of 
Giovanni Grevi). There is a growing sense 
of urgency and awareness that Europeans 
have to assume more responsibility for their 
own security both at the regional and global 
level. But despite all the commitments 
expressed in public speeches, strategy 
papers and joint communiques, the EU27 
struggle to fulfil the expectations they have 
raised with respect to the Union’s future role 
as a comprehensive and credible security 
provider. Sunday speeches are not met in 
Monday´s reality.
q Persistent threats to liberal democracy 
and the rule of law: last but certainly 
not least, authoritarian populists are 
threatening or even actively undermining 
the fundamental pillars of our open, liberal 
democracies. Illiberal democracy has been 
on the rise for some time and the ‘populist 
surge’ continues in many EU countries. But 
this is not just a European phenomenon, 
and there is much more at stake than the EU 
– it is about the future of our societies and 
democracies. 
The Union is much more vulnerable than 
other political entities given that it is not as 
consolidated as mature nation states. Like 
any other organisation, the EU is not perfect, 
and it is a sign of increasing maturity that 
today’s Union is being scrutinised much 
more than it was 20 or 30 years ago. But 
on many occasions, criticism towards the 
European project does not aim to move 
things forward constructively. The EU has 
become a popular punching bag, with many 
anti-EU, anti-euro and anti-migration forces 
using their opposition to the Union as a 
vehicle to achieve their ultimate objective: 
to strengthen their position at home. They 
use fierce criticism of the EU to enhance 
their political influence and power at the 
national level.
But the underlying challenges are real: 
the populist surge did not come out of the 
blue, and it will stay with us for some time 
to come. It is the result of deeply rooted 
political, socio-economic, and societal 
challenges questioning the prevailing 
order. Populism is a phenomenon, and not 
the source of the problems facing open 
liberal democracies in Europe and beyond. 
Populists are successful when they can tap 
into people’s grievances, insecurities and 
fears about the future, when citizens are 
deeply frustrated with those who have been 
in power, and when they are dissatisfied 
with the existing state of (representative) 
democracy (see also the contribution by 
Corina Stratulat and Paul Butcher in this 
volume). 
Populists are most successful when societies 
are split, when they can exploit divisions by 
using an ‘us versus them’ logic in a strongly 
polarised political and societal environment. 
Polarisation is part of their political DNA, 
and they will do their utmost to nourish 
divisions within and between member 
states. They are dividers who actively 
oppose the notion of a pluralist society, 
portraying themselves as the champions 
and defenders of the ‘ordinary, pure people’ 
against the ‘corrupt elite’. They want to 
establish ‘homogeneous’ societies and 
revert to ‘national actions’ to protect ‘their 
people’, although this makes no sense in a 
world that has long outstripped the confines 
of closed national frontiers. Their criticism 
of today’s state of affairs often point in the 
right direction, but their proposed solutions 
are in most cases simplistic and flawed.
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 Battle of (split) camps 
Both the positive and negative narrative are 
valid interpretations of the current state of 
the Union. The truth lies somewhere in the 
middle, and it is unclear which path the EU 
will follow in the next politico-institutional 
cycle. No doubt, today’s situation is much 
better than it was at the height of the poly-
crisis. But it is still not certain that the ‘iron 
law’ of European integration, i.e. that the 
EU always emerges stronger from a crisis, 
will prove itself again. The final verdict 
is still out, and future historians might 
eventually tell us that Europe´s poly-crisis 
lasted much longer than we originally 
thought. 
So, what will affect the Union’s future 
direction, and which Leitmotiv (guiding 
principle and theme) should direct the next 
EU leadership in light of the above-described 
tale of two narratives and uncertainties 
ahead?
At the European level (and besides Brexit 
(see the piece by Larissa Brunner and 
Fabian Zuleeg)), the European Parliament 
(EP) elections dominated the first half of 
2019. The second semester will focus on the 
(s)election of a new EU leadership and 
the need to agree on the Union’s strategic 
agenda and priorities for the next five years. 
This will be no easy exercise.
In the run-up to the European elections, 
we have witnessed an increasing ‘battle of 
(split) camps’, which is likely to affect the 
Union in the years to come. On the one 
hand, there is a growing confrontation 
between those who wish to push Europe 
towards a more illiberal, nationalistic and 
closed direction and those who want to 
defend the values and principles of an open 
and pluralist society. On the other hand, 
there is also an escalating struggle within 
the liberal and illiberal camps that will not 
be resolved in the foreseeable future.
The homogeneity in the liberal camp is 
under pressure for three main reasons. First, 
its protagonists pursue different political 
strategies and recipes on how to deal with 
the so-called populists. Some want to ban 
and stigmatise the ‘anti-forces’, while others 
believe that the best way to cope with the 
‘populists’ is to contain them by integrating 
them into the political machinery at 
national and/or European level. We already 
see both tactics at play, and it is not clear 
which will be more successful at the end 
of the day. Second, liberal forces disagree 
on the necessary policy responses at EU 
level to counter the populist phenomenon. 
Some, like President Macron, believe that 
EU countries should deepen integration in 
key areas (like EMU) to be able to defend the 
Union and its members from the ‘populist 
threat’. But others in the liberal camp are 
much more cautious when it comes to 
a further pooling of sovereignty – they 
have even formed (negative) coalitions 
to prevent a further deepening. Third, we 
are witnessing an increasing clash within 
the liberal camp about who shall lead the 
political fight against the illiberal anti-
forces. This split is not likely to disappear 
after the EP elections – it will rather increase 
the divisions in the liberal camp.
The illiberal camp is similarly split for a 
number of reasons. First, like on the liberal 
side, its protagonists quarrel over who 
should lead the charge for anti-EU, anti-
euro and anti-migration forces. Matteo 
Salvini and Victor Órban are the two most 
prominent figures at European level. 
However, they follow different strategies 
vis-à-vis the ‘old establishment’ and neither 
wants to subordinate himself to the other. 
Second, these anti-forces subscribe to 
different policy recipes in key areas such 
as migration, especially concerning the 
solidarity dimension between member 
states. Third, their nationalistic focus is 
23
194 CHALLENGE EUROPE  –  YES, WE SHOULD! EU PRIORITIES FOR 2019-2024
another source of division. Their ‘my-country-comes-first’ 
attitude might strengthen them at home, but it makes it more 
difficult for them to form stable coalitions at European level, 
even though they know that they could collectively profit from a 
higher level of cooperation and strengthen their claim that they 
can change the EU from within if they do well in the EP elections.
This battle of (split) camps will further increase political divides 
in Europe. One cannot predict how this will affect actual policy 
choices in the years to come. What is certain is that the overall 
atmosphere between and within member states will not make 
EU business any easier in the next politico-institutional cycle, 
neither at the European nor the national level. Chances are high 
that it will amplify the level of fragmentation and distrust and 
thus limit the Union’s ability to come up with proactive policy 
responses to the manifold internal and external challenges the 
EU27 will face in the years to come.
 A shared Leitmotiv –  
 Re-unite EUrope 
But what does all this mean for the period after the EP 
elections? What should be the guiding principle when EU 
leaders define and implement the Union’s strategic agenda and 
future priorities for 2019-2024? 
Two words should become the shared Leitmotiv of the next EU 
leadership: Re-unite EUrope. 
There is a need to counter the increasing divisions between 
member states and the growing divisions within national 
societies. The level of fragmentation between member states, 
national capitals and national societies as well as the degree 
of polarisation within societies are already a cause for great 
concern, and chances are high that they will increase in the 
next politico-institutional cycle. 
A collective commitment to Re-unite EUrope both at the EU 
and the national level should guide the ambitions and concrete 
work of the next (President of the) European Commission, the 
next President of the European Council, the next (President 
of the) European Parliament, and the next President of 
the European Central Bank. Cooperation between the next 
European Council and European Commission Presidents 
will be particularly important: continuous coordination and 
It is still not certain 
that the ‘iron law’ of 
European integration, 
i.e. that the EU always 
emerges stronger 
from a crisis, will 
prove itself again.
The overall 
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states will not make 
EU business any 
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within national 
societies.
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collaboration across Rue de la Loi based 
on mutual trust and following a shared 
Leitmotiv in an increasingly divided 
Union will be crucial to progress at EU 
level (see also Poul Skytte Christoffersen’s 
contribution in the present volume).
But agreeing on a shared Leitmotiv in 
abstract terms will not be enough. The 
ambition to Re-unite EUrope needs 
to be reflected in the definition and 
implementation of the Union’s strategic 
agenda and the Commission’s strategic 
priorities for 2019-2024. 
This is no simple exercise: there is no ‘silver 
bullet’, no one magic thing that can be done 
to counter the forces of fragmentation 
between member states and the forces of 
polarisation within countries. But three key 
elements could provide an overall sense of 
direction for the journey aiming to Re-unite 
EUrope at different levels of policymaking:
q Need for a win-win package deal to 
counter fragmentation and distrust: Yes, the 
EU27 missed the last window of opportunity 
to re-energise Europe after the last French 
and German elections. However, the fact 
that things did not work out in 2017/2018 
does not mean that one should not attempt 
to give it another try in the next politico-
institutional cycle. The underlying logic 
will continue to apply: substantial progress 
in critical areas of European cooperation 
and integration will only be possible if EU 
institutions and national capitals have the 
political courage and will to elaborate and 
implement a win-win package deal. 
Cooperation and compromises between 
Paris and Berlin will be decisive and 
indispensable in this respect – not against 
but with all those who are ready to form 
constructive reform coalitions. Obstructing 
a Franco-German understanding will be 
detrimental to the Union’s future and is 
thus not in the interest of all those who say 
that they cherish and support European 
cooperation and integration.
For years now, the EU and its members are 
struggling to overcome blockages in crucial 
policy areas. Future attempts to reach 
significant compromises on EMU reform 
(see George Pagoulatos’ contribution) or the 
future of EU migration and asylum policies 
(see Marie De Somer’s and Evangelia (Lilian) 
Tsourdi’s contribution) will only succeed 
if the EU27 can agree on an ambitious 
but pragmatic win-win package deal. A 
compromise that reflects the interests 
and considerations of all EU countries is 
necessary to (i) make the Union ‘storm-
proof’, (ii) restore trust among member 
states and between national capitals and 
EU institutions, and (iii) (further) foster 
citizens’ confidence in the Union. Aiming for 
a pro-active strategy is wiser than waiting 
for the eruption of another fundamental 
crisis to overcome national hesitations 
and reservations. Playing with fire is risky, 
especially if the collateral damage caused by 
previous crises still looms large.
q Counter  polarisation within EU 
countries: The Union’s next strategic agenda 
and the Commission’s strategic priorities 
should reflect the aim to provide added 
value to counter the increasing polarisation 
within national societies. Divided societies 
are the fertile ground on which authoritarian 
populists thrive and they are already the 
source of many tensions or even crises at 
the national level, with adverse effects on 
the functioning of the Union.
To fight the danger of a more regressive, 
national ist ic , c losed, i l l iberal  and 
authoritarian Europe, the EU should address 
the fundamental factors fuelling the threats 
linked to an increasing polarisation of 
our societies. EU policies and the next 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 
(see Annika Hedberg’s piece) should be 
guided by an ambition to help reduce the 
dividing lines between the (potential) 
‘winners and losers’ of change in an age of 
massive transformation in all spheres of 
economic, social and political life.
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To support this aim, the Union’s strategic 
agenda and priorities should address the 
multiple insecurities felt by citizens:
q socio-economic insecurities and rising 
inequalities, with a growing number of people 
doubting that the economic benefits of 
globalisation are equally shared and believing 
they benefit only some privileged ranks of 
society (see Claire Dhéret’s contribution); 
q cultural and societal insecurities, with 
a growing number of people fearing that 
traditional values, norms and benefits are 
being eroded, prompting concerns about 
identity even among people who do not (fear 
to) feel the negative economic consequences 
of globalisation; 
q generational insecurities, with a 
widening gap between generations in terms 
of current wealth and prospects as many 
young Europeans feel doomed to be part of 
a ‘lost generation’;
q technological insecurities, with large 
segments of society feeling that they 
are being left behind by technological 
developments and disruptions which they 
see as a risk rather than an opportunity from 
which they can profit in their personal and 
professional lives; 
q and security insecurities linked to 
both internal and external threats related 
to terrorism, organized crime, regional 
instabilities (see Dimitar Benchev’s piece), 
climate change, and increasing geopolitical 
tensions, especially in the EU’s relationship 
with key strategic partners, including, 
first and foremost, the US and China (see 
Giovanni Grevi’s contribution).
The next strategic agenda and priorities 
should aim to address all these insecurities 
to help counter the polarisation within the 
EU27. However, as long as the Union and its 
members are not willing and able to make 
a federal leap including, ultimately, treaty 
change (along the lines proposed in Andrew 
Duff’s contribution), one should not forget 
that the means to reduce the different sources 
of insecurity lie predominantly at the national 
level. It is thus primarily the responsibility of 
national actors to address them. 
The EU certainly has a role to play in 
protecting its citizens from the above-
listed insecurities, given the transnational 
character of the challenges facing Europe. 
However, the Union’s next leadership team 
should be careful not to overburden the 
European level, given its limitations in 
terms of power, competences, and financial 
means – the Union must avoid falling into 
a ‘capability-expectations trap’. The EU 
can provide added value in crucial areas, 
it can become “une Europe qui protégé” 
(see also Herman Van Rompuy’s preface), 
but it cannot compensate for deficiencies 
at the national level, and it cannot, on its 
own, solve today’s complex problems. The 
old narrative that what cannot be solved at 
the national level should be tackled at the 
European level needs to be refined, as this 
asks too much of an EU whose competences 
and powers remain constrained.
In the coming politico-institutional cycle, 
the Union should, therefore, concentrate 
on implementing initiatives in areas where 
it can make a tangible difference. It should 
listen and take the concerns expressed by 
European citizens seriously (see also the 
piece by Corina Stratulat and Paul Butcher). 
But the EU27 should apply a ‘delivery filter’ 
to scrutinise all new EU initiatives. It is not 
about ‘less Europe’, but rather about a more 
effective, realistic and credible EU. ‘Gesture 
politics’ – measures designed merely to 
show the EU is doing something – should be 
avoided, as a failure to actually implement 
policies raises valid criticism of the Union.
q More differentiation but no ‘core Europe’: 
progress at EU level will also in the coming 
years require a higher level of differentiated 
integration (see also Julian Rappold’s 
contribution). Diverse groups of member 
states will have to intensify cooperation 
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in specific policy fields to move beyond the lowest common 
denominator. Enhanced collaboration in the defence field 
(within the framework of PESCO and beyond (see Jamie Shea’s 
contribution)) or with respect to certain aspects of migration 
management must not always involve all EU countries; and 
further boosting the resilience of the euro will require deeper 
cooperation and integration among the countries that have 
already joined the common currency. Differentiation will also be 
necessary to tie non-EU countries closer to the Union beneath the 
level of full and unlimited EU membership while respecting the 
exclusive prerogatives of those who are members of the ‘club’.
However, multiple speeds should be the exception, unity the 
rule. Higher levels of differentiated integration should not lead 
to the creation of a closed ‘core Europe’ (Kerneuropa) involving 
only a limited number of EU countries and actively excluding 
others. The establishment of an institutionalised ‘two-tier’ 
Europe with diverse classes of membership is neither likely nor 
desirable. It should not be the guiding principle steering the 
way towards a more differentiated Europe. It could fuel a deep 
rift in Europe between those who are part of the core and those 
who are not. For good reasons, differentiated integration has 
not, in the past, led to an institutionalised core, i.e. a small, 
coherent group of countries forming an exclusive avant-garde 
and distinguishing themselves from other member states.
Differentiation has been, is and will remain an indispensable 
feature of the European construction. At times, variable 
geometry has been and will be the only way forward. However, a 
higher level of differentiated integration is no magic potion and 
should not be considered an end in itself. It should instead be 
guided by functional and pragmatic needs, and the willingness 
of some to progress in specific areas to overcome stalemates in 
a bigger, more heterogeneous and more complex EU.
Europe’s future will to a large extent depend on the ability of the 
European Union – including both its institutions and member 
states – to help counter the sources of fragmentation and 
polarisation which haunt it. That is why the EU’s new leadership 
should follow a shared Leitmotiv aiming to Re-unite EUrope 
at both the European and national level. This will be no easy 
exercise. ‘EU business’ will not become simple or straightforward 
in the aftermath of the EP elections and in the course of the next 
politico-institutional cycle, neither in Brussels nor in national 
capitals. However, trying to move things forward while having a 
compass indicating the EU’s future direction is still worth trying 
for the sake of current and future generations. At the end of the 
day, there is no better alternative than to continuously work 
on the European construction – even if this has been and will 
continue to be a cumbersome exercise full of ups and downs.
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YES Lab
In February 2019, the European Policy Centre (EPC) brought together  
a selected group of thirteen young Europeans in Brussels in the framework 
of the Younger European Strategy Lab (YES Lab). The group discussed 
the most pressing challenges for the European Union (EU) ahead of the 
European elections in May 2019 and identified key priorities for the new 
EU leadership in the next five years. The participants of YES Lab come 
from ten different member states from all across Europe, and make up  
a diverse group in terms of social backgrounds, gender, ethnicity, and age. 
The group consists of alumni of the EPC’s FutureLab Europe programme, 
and of its foundation partners, Stiftung Mercator, Evens Foundation,  
and Allianz Kulturstiftung, as well as from the idea competition  
“Why should I care”, which the EPC carried out before the 2014 European 
elections. The FutureLab Europe programme, which was supported  
by a consortium of European foundations, was a network of young 
European professionals and activists implementing civic projects 
throughout Europe. 
From left to right: Mia Forbes Pirie (facilitator), Johannes Weiss (EPC), Julian Rappold (EPC), Nitin Sood, Fridolin Firsching, Argyri Kaoukaki,  
Albert Meijer, Julia Czaban, Mihails Kozlovs, Constanze Jeitler, Benjamin Wilhelm, Selina Adedeji Mortoni, Doris Manu, Anja Crusius,  
Kawthar Karout, Johannes Greubel (EPC), not in the picture: David Timis.
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Our vision: Europe,  
a beacon of sustainability
YES Lab: Anja Crusius, Julia Czaban, Fridolin Firsching, Constanze Jeitler, Argyri Kaoukaki, Kawthar Karout,  
Mihails Kozlovs, Doris Manu, Albert Meijer, Selina Adedeji Mortoni, Mia Forbes Pirie, Nitin Sood, David Timis and 
Benjamin Wilhelm
On 20 August 2018, Greta Thunberg’s seat in her Stockholm 
high school remained empty. She was not on holiday. She was 
not sick. She had just decided to go on a ‘climate strike’ in front 
of the Swedish Riksdag, every day until the Swedish general 
elections in September 2018. She has gone on strike each Friday 
ever since. What started out as an individual protest grew into 
an international youth movement with thousands of protesters 
in over 20 countries around the world.
Climate change is not the only cause for which Europeans have 
rallied in demonstrations recently. Women’s marches, protests 
against corruption and human rights abuses, the gilets jaunes, 
those protesting social and economic inequality – it has been 
busy on the streets of Europe. 
We, as younger Europeans, need to make our voices heard. This 
is why we, the participants of the YES Lab met in February 
2019 in Brussels, to formulate what we think the next EU 
leadership should pursue in the coming politico-institutional 
cycle. Although there is some diversity in the group in terms of 
nationality, gender, age, ethnicity, religion, and sexual identity, 
We want the Union to 
become a beacon of 
sustainability, a place 
that respects the 
rights and livelihoods 
of all its citizens, and 
the environment, both 
now and in the future.
MAIN RECOMMENDATION  q The EU needs to become a beacon of sustainability, a 
place that respects the rights, livelihood and environment for all its citizens, both now 
and in the future.
WHAT TO DO: 
q  Adopt a comprehensive policy package to tackle the climate crisis, including 
measures regarding energy and transport, agriculture and food and circular 
economy. 
q  Counter inequality through tax reform and stronger social policies at the EU level.
q  Take effective measures against discrimination of women and minorities in its 
member states by adopting legislations and appointing an own vice-president of 
the Commission on human rights.
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we do not claim to represent all young 
Europeans. However, our discussions were 
informed not only by our own experiences 
but also by the increasing fragmentation 
between and the polarisation within 
European societies, exemplified by the 
protests we see taking place all over Europe.
Inspired by the rise in political activism 
of a new generation of Europeans, we are 
presenting our vision for the future EU. 
We want the Union to become a beacon 
of sustainability, a place that respects the 
rights and livelihoods of all its citizens, 
and the environment, both now and in the 
future. In the coming years, we want the 
EU to take action in three areas connected 
to building a strong, stable and sustainable 
European community. While many different 
themes are important to younger Europeans, 
we choose to focus on the ones that we 
think are vital in making the EU a beacon 
of sustainability: climate change, economic 
inequality and human rights.
These topics deserve urgent attention in the 
2019 European elections, the definition of 
the Union’s strategic agenda and priorities 
for 2019-2024, the formation of the next 
European Commission, and the 2021-2027 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). 
The choices that will be made over the next 
five years will determine the future of our 
generation and those to come.
 1. A comprehensive policy package  
 to tackle the climate crisis 
The house is on fire. Environment-related 
risks have been dominating the World 
Economic Forum’s ranking since 2016. 
Global temperature has reached new 
records, prompting extreme weather events 
across the continent and beyond. Moreover, 
climate change has contributed to changing 
migration patterns, which is affecting 
the EU. In response to political inaction, 
hundreds of thousands of young Europeans 
flood the streets every week to rightly warn 
of a betrayed generation, urge policymakers 
to curb emissions and demand drastic 
measures. To help tackle the climate crisis, 
we want the new EU leadership to pursue 
changes in three particular areas: energy 
and transport; agriculture and food; and the 
circular economy. 
ENERGY AND TRANSPORT
q Accelerating decarbonisation: emitting 
1,000 kg of CO2 currently costs less than a 
monthly public transport ticket.1 The OECD 
recommends tightening allowances to reach 
€60 per tonne of CO2 by 2020.2 However, 
returning to a path where temperatures 
do not rise above 1.5°C requires binding 
“Maastricht criteria” for emissions, which 
urge member states to stay within their 
greenhouse gas budgets, in addition to the 
3% budget deficit.
q Subsidising solidarity: European 
member states sponsors fossil fuels for an 
amount of over €100 billion a year.3 They 
should heed the Commission’s calls to 
stop environmentally harmful subsidies 
by 2020. Part of the money that is saved 
should go to a new environmental disaster 
fund that supports member states when 
climate change-related disasters strike. 
The other part should fund regional 
innovation clusters for research on clean 
energy, electrification, grids and storage 
solutions. Investments in storage and grid 
interconnection are especially needed for a 
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successful transition and should be supported by building on 
the 2017 Commission Staff Working Document ‘Energy storage 
– the role of electricity’.
q Prioritising clean infrastructure: as long as train tickets cost 
more than taking the plane and Europe spends more on gas 
routes than on grids, a sustainable future remains a pipe dream. 
EU policymakers can nudge governments in the right direction 
by subsidising and fast-tracking modes of transportation and 
transmission powered by clean energy.
AGRICULTURE AND FOOD
q Planting prosperity: the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
has been a key pillar of European cooperation in the past six 
decades. But if Europe wants to be more efficient in the 21st 
century, the next European Commissioner responsible for 
agriculture should aim towards a shift from animal husbandry 
to plant-based programmes with a shorter supply chain and 
smaller carbon footprint.4
q Greening subsidies: today, 80% of CAP subsidies go to 20% 
of Europe’s farms.5 The MFF negotiations provide a window of 
opportunity to boost small businesses and move even further 
away from hectare-based payments to funding linked to socio-
economic and environmental criteria. Moreover, allocated 
funds should foster regional and seasonal farming to support 
sustainable regional food supply, instead of exporting cheap 
meat and dairy products.
CIRCULAR ECONOMY
q Procuring responsibly: defining green public procurement 
criteria for 20 product groups can only be a first step. Similar 
to the Netherlands, the EU should aim to raise the proportion 
of circular procurement to 10% by 2020 to unleash the multiple 
benefits the European Commission has identified.6
q Modern recycling: whereas Europe’s construction sector 
recycles 89% of its used materials, the rate is disappointing 
when one looks at plastic (42%) or e-waste (41%).7 Valuable, 
finite materials must not go to waste if Europe wants to 
champion sustainability. Initiatives on furthering landfill 
mining and trading recyclable raw materials would bolster the 
Circular Economy Action Plan.
q Promoting zero waste: EU policies have to ensure a 
sustainable production cycle from cradle to cradle. The planned 
24
If we manage 
to connect 
underdeveloped EU 
regions with the 
most developed 
regions and promote 
intellectual and 
physical exchange 
between them, then 
we most certainly will 
be able to create a 
much more cohesive 
EU.
Europeans would 
ultimately benefit 
from the increased 
revenues that digital 
taxation would 
generate. More 
money could be 
spent on housing, 
education, health and 
infrastructure, thereby 
reducing inequality 
at the national level, 
too.
Policies should be 
focused on creating 
opportunities for 
young people to enter 
the labour market in 
their own country first 
so that they will not 
be forced to move.
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ban on single-use plastic is a step in the right direction. 
A consistent carrot and stick approach would increase the 
chance of accomplishing the mission. Regions and municipal 
applicants should only benefit from European Structural and 
Investment Funds if they have submitted a zero-waste plan 
that considers the full life cycle of products.
 2. Countering inequalities 
Economic divergence is growing, leading to inequality and 
development discrepancies within and between EU member 
states. Dealing with this issue is extremely important as 
it fuels polarisation within European societies and the 
fragmentation between member states. This jeopardises the 
common European project as such, because it contributes to EU 
scepticism and ultimately to a dysfunctional European Union. 
ACHIEVING COHESION
EU cohesion policy is fundamental for the Union’s prosperous 
future. Policy implementation was meant to support the overall 
development of its member states and regions by reducing 
economic and infrastructure disparities. Despite spending 
€350 billion on cohesion policy over the past five years8, many 
citizens are unaware of the EU investments in their regions. 
The EU should thus better communicate its cohesion policy 
efforts and successes to the wider public. 
However, at the same time, the EU’s self-congratulatory 
assessment about the decrease of disparities between the 
regions seems to be out of place, as the Gini index, which 
measures the extent to which the distribution of income within 
a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution, still 
varies significantly between member states – its value in 2013 
ranged from 0.25 (in Slovenia, Sweden and the Czech Republic) 
to 0.35 (in Bulgaria, Cyprus and the Baltic states). Even though 
many suggest that the Gini index shows a positive picture, 
reflecting high European standards and high levels of equality 
within the EU, we believe that measuring by the average is not 
adequate when dealing with equality issues. We do not want 
the reality of cohesion to be hidden in average characteristics 
and we believe that median results paint a more detailed and 
honest picture. For example, the average wage in Latvia is 
more than €1,000; however, if one takes a closer look at some 
Latvian regions, the average wage is at least 40% less than 
Many roadblocks 
are still present in 
the field of human 
rights, minority 
rights and with 
respect to women’s 
discrimination.
The Union has not 
paid enough attention 
to secure the rights of 
marginalised groups 
in European societies.
To implement the 
protection and 
strengthening of 
minority rights 
horizontally, across 
different policy areas, 
the next Commission 
should appoint a  
vice- president 
responsible for 
human rights.
Normalising 
discrimination of both 
women and minorities 
is a serious problem 
that leads to the 
creation of a future 
generation that does 
not understand the 
dangers of having an 
unequal society.
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that. Similarly, many other EU regions are 
lagging behind. The south of Italy and the 
eastern parts of Germany are also very clear 
examples of European regions that are not 
doing so well when compared to national 
averages. 
We believe that cohesion should be 
promoted and measured not only by 
putting EU resources into regions that are 
lagging behind, but also by enhancing the 
links and cooperation between member 
states. Societal cohesion in Europe can be 
further developed by existing exchange 
programmes, like Erasmus for students 
and young start-ups. Right now, these 
international programmes are lacking 
analysis of existing trends, strategic 
planning and clear direction setting. If we 
manage to connect underdeveloped EU 
regions with the most developed regions 
and promote intellectual and physical 
exchange between them, then we most 
certainly will be able to create a much more 
cohesive EU.   
FAIR TAXATION AND ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING ACTION
Economic inequality between EU citizens 
and among EU member states is also the 
result of flawed and ineffective tax policies. 
In the EU, tax fraud, tax evasion and deals 
between corporations and tax authorities 
cost citizens €1 trillion each year.9 Huge 
amounts of money are hidden in tax havens.
Building on the existing work of the 
European Parliament on Financial Crimes, 
Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance10 the EU 
should, as a matter of priority, focus on 
overhauling the system for dealing with tax 
evasion and avoidance; as well as on phasing 
out golden visas and passports and tax 
havens within the Union.
The comparative advantage some EU 
countries have over others when it comes 
to corporate taxes should be removed. Last, 
but not least, the unanimity requirement 
on tax issues in the Council should be 
changed to qualified majority voting. 
Member states should also adopt the 
Commission’s legislative proposals on 
the Fair Taxation of the Digital Economy 
that would result in a fairer taxation of 
corporate digital activities in the EU. No 
state should be allowed to veto proposals 
for tax reforms at the European level, as 
this fuels a race to the bottom, whereby all 
countries try to attract investment from 
the digital sector by exempting companies 
from paying tax on profit or activities. 
Europeans would ultimately benefit from 
the increased revenues that digital taxation 
would generate. More money could be 
spent on housing, education, health and 
infrastructure, thereby reducing inequality 
at the national level, too.
EU UNEMPLOYMENT SUPPORT 
In January 2019, 16.222 million men and 
women in the 28 EU member states were 
unemployed. Of these, 3.38 million were 
young people under 25. Among the member 
states, the lowest unemployment rates 
in January 2019 were recorded in Central 
Europe (Czech Republic 2.1%; Germany 
3.2%), while the highest unemployment 
rates were observed in Southern Europe 
(Greece 18.5% (in November 2018); Spain 
14.1%; Italy 10.5%). 
We are witnessing high levels of internal 
economic migration, from member states 
that face economic and social problems 
towards countries with stronger economies. 
Frequently, those who move abroad are 
young and highly-qualified citizens. They 
make use of the possibilities of moving to 
and working freely in another EU country. 
This possibility can be a solution to their 
personal hardship but many of them 
feel that they were forced to leave their 
countries due to bad economic and social 
circumstances. 
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In addition, as the number of those leaving 
is continuously growing, the resulting ‘brain 
drain’ hampers the economic catching-up 
process in these countries and fuels a feeling 
of unequal opportunities for youth across 
the Union.
The EU should tackle this issue by designing 
policies which will allow for more cohesion 
within the EU. Policies should be focused on 
creating opportunities for young people to 
enter the labour market in their own country 
first so that they will not be forced to move. 
The Union should enhance programmes 
aimed at reducing youth unemployment 
by giving young people more opportunities 
to acquire professional experience in their 
home country.
 3. Promotion of human rights 
Many roadblocks are still present in the 
field of human rights, minority rights and 
with respect to women’s discrimination. 
Policies that could address these issues do 
not exist, and if they do, they might not 
tackle the problem in all its aspects or are 
viewed as being of secondary importance in 
decision-making.
ENHANCING WOMEN’S RIGHTS
Women are still discriminated in the EU. 
The inequality between men and women 
is reflected in a major pay gap. On average, 
for each €1 that a male counterpart makes, 
women with the same degree and level of 
experience are, on average, only paid around 
€0,84.12
No EU-wide policies are currently in 
place that aim to effectively promote 
income equality. Under-representation of 
women in many professions, particularly 
in STEM fields, as well as in the realm of 
politics13 is another example of women’s 
discrimination. This is also reflected in the 
composition of EU institutions, including 
the Commission college and the cabinets 
of Commissioners. Furthermore, even the 
simplest and most basic rights, such as 
sexual and reproductive health rights, are 
contested in parts of Europe, for example 
when it comes to abortion rights in Italy 
or Poland. Finally, even today, European 
women today still have to deal with sexual 
harassment, rape and domestic violence.
To address these challenges, the next 
EU leadership should aim to initiate 
new projects, grants, and scholarship 
programmes supporting women in science 
and women’s achievements in the scientific 
and public environment. This should be 
adequately reflected in the next MFF. The 
EU should also take steps aiming to prolong 
paternity leave, reduce the gender pay gap 
and promote human rights, not only abroad 
but also within member states. Women 
still spend more time on housework and 
child-rearing than their male partners, 
so a gender-sensitive budget should be 
implemented and employee rights related 
to parenthood should be progressively 
balanced in an effort to ensure that working 
women will not be disadvantaged. 
STRENGTHENING THE RIGHTS  
OF MINORITIES
T h e  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n  Ag e n c y  f o r 
Fundamental Rights has recognised that 
minorities (including ethnic, religious, 
sexual and gender minorities as well 
as disabled people) continue to face 
widespread discrimination across the 
EU and in all areas of life. Indeed, the 
207EUROPEAN POLICY CENTRE
Union has not paid enough attention to secure the rights 
of marginalised groups in European societies. Minorities, in 
particular ethnic and religious minorities who are not white 
or seen as ‘European’ are often used as scapegoats to fuel 
divisions between “us” and “them”. Furthermore, migrants 
and Europeans who are not white are instrumentalised 
to distract from actual issues such as social injustices, 
corruption or mismanagement of the economy. This trend is 
witnessed across the EU, not just in countries like Hungary 
or Poland, whose current governments have most evidently 
disrupted the very foundations on which the European 
Union is built, undermining the rule of law, basic human 
rights and fundamental values in their country. The Danish 
government, for example, wants to pass laws that in fact 
label certain areas with a high immigrant population as 
‘ghettos’, which will be subject to harsher laws14. 
Minorities and migrants tend to generally only succeed in 
society if they adapt to a predominantly white, heterosexual 
and male ideal. Minorities and migrants still experience 
discrimination and are often targets of hate speech, both in 
the real and virtual world. They are on many occasions treated 
unequally and do not have the same opportunities in finding 
jobs and housing. 
Over the next five years, to implement the protection 
and strengthening of minority rights horizontally, across 
different policy areas, the next Commission should appoint 
a vice-president responsible for human rights. This vice- 
president should work towards incorporating the protection 
of minorities’ rights in all policy fields.
Legislation is important but as long as ignorance and 
intolerant attitudes linger, then prejudice, discrimination 
and inequalities will continue to be part of our societies. 
The lack of equality and diversity lessons in European 
educat ion  programmes  encourages  the  negat ive 
influences of social media, adults and peers. Normalising 
discrimination of both women and minorities is a serious 
problem that leads to the creation of a future generation 
that does not understand the dangers of having an unequal 
society. Many schools and universities have started with 
“equality weeks” aiming to raise the awareness regarding 
the different topics of equality. Especially with people 
moving to new cultures and migrant students being thrown 
into a new reality, a good inclusive educational system 
is crucial for these people to be able to integrate and be 
accepted as constituent parts of Europe’s young generation, 
and thus of its future.
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We, as younger 
Europeans, see that 
there is still a lot 
to be done if we 
want a bright and 
sustainable future for 
the EU. 
Despite all its 
weaknesses, we love 
to call Europe our 
home, and we think 
the foundation for 
that home as laid 
down in the Treaties 
is sound.
If the EU really is 
“United in Diversity”, 
then it needs to 
safeguard those 
elements in society 
that make it diverse, 
take action to prevent 
diversity from being 
a hollow term, and 
truly ensure equal 
opportunities for all 
Europeans.
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Concluding remarks:  
Our European future 
Picture this: it is 2057 and the European 
Union is celebrating the 100th anniversary 
of the Rome Treaties. The EU has weathered 
many storms, but it has succeeded in 
maintaining peace and stability for a full 
century. It has been a long and arduous 
road to ensure European citizens’ active 
participation in and political approval of the 
European project. But the EU has managed 
to set an unprecedented record of a century 
of peace and prosperity: it is a beacon of 
sustainability. 
Rewinding back to 2019, and we, as younger 
Europeans, see that there is still a lot to be 
done if we want a bright and sustainable 
future for the EU. Looking at the status 
quo, we see a Union that is still divided by 
inequality between and within member 
states. We see inequality between men and 
women, ongoing discrimination based on 
race, ethnicity, religion, sexual identity, 
gender identity, or disabilities. Looming over 
it all is the threat of climate change. Rising 
sea levels, droughts, wildfires, and extreme 
weather events are threatening the lives and 
livelihoods of millions of Europeans, not 
only in the distant future, but right now. 
Despite all its weaknesses, we love to 
call Europe our home, and we think the 
foundation for that home as laid down 
in the Treaties is sound. To strengthen 
the European house we live in, for us, our 
children and grandchildren, and to make 
Europe a beacon of sustainability, there is 
still a lot to be done. 
The whole world needs to take action 
to tackle climate change, and in signing 
and implementing the Paris Agreement, 
many countries are doing just that. As 
a strong union, the EU needs to lead by 
example. It should invest in its energy 
and transport sectors, by building a clean 
infrastructure, investing in innovation 
and divesting from polluting energy and 
ways of transport. It should reconsider 
the current CAP structure and invest in 
sustainable agriculture and food chain. 
It needs to promote recycling and the 
circular economy and set up a disaster fund 
to strengthen European solidarity in times 
of crisis.
The Union should also try to achieve 
more social cohesion, and fight economic 
inequalities between member states. Fair 
taxation needs to be a central pillar in its 
social policies. EU unemployment support 
is another priority. Only by having a fair 
division of wealth between people and 
between EU countries can the Union be 
sustainable and strengthen the feeling of 
belonging among everyone who lives in 
the EU. 
We have a strong tradition in Europe to 
safeguard human rights, but it remains 
important to protect and promote them 
in EU policy discussions. Like economic 
inequality, the unequal treatment of 
women and minorities are a threat to the 
social cohesion in Europe and stand in 
the way of a strong and sustainable EU. If 
the EU really is “United in Diversity”, then 
it needs to safeguard those elements in 
society that make it diverse, take action to 
prevent diversity from being a hollow term, 
and truly ensure equal opportunities for 
all Europeans. 
We, as younger Europeans, still have our 
whole lives ahead of us. Most of us will live 
to see 2057. We need the EU to take the 
necessary steps now to ensure that Europe 
is a beacon of sustainability, and a safe and 
comfortable home for all Europeans. 
This issue of Challenge Europe – the 24th edition already – 
delivers an alternative to those who cynically claim that European 
cooperation no longer works and should be abandoned. It 
argues instead that integration can still work, and that it is still 
the best answer to the many problems we are now facing. We 
want to remind people of the value of European cooperation 
and offer some suggestions on how we can continue to shape 
and improve the project now, so that we are better equipped 
to respond to the underlying political, socio-economic, and 
cultural insecurities plaguing Europe, and later down the 
line, to radically re-think the way we organise our societies.
Each of the 24 contributions in this volume, authored by renowned 
experts and practitioners in their respective fields, presents a set 
of concrete recommendations for the next EU leadership, both 
in terms of key priority areas – sustainable prosperity, values, 
migration and Schengen, and Europe’s place in the world – and 
on how the EU can use the instruments it already has at its 
disposal to act in a more effective, transparent, and decisive way.
Challenge Europe is a multi-authored, periodical publication appearing 
at key moments and dealing with key issues in the EU integration debate.
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